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Chapter I - Introduction 
Today, military literature is a well established genre: perusing the shelves of an 
average modern book-store, one would find a wide range of works of military history, 
covering events as diverse as the Battle of Hastings and Operation Desert Storm. 
Given the frequency, severity and importance of the wars in the First Century B.C., 
one would imagine that this would be reflected in the literature of the time and that we 
would find a high degree of interest in military matters and that the literary study of 
warfare would be in a highly developed state. It is my intention to prove that this was 
not the case. 
Certainly, a cursory examination of some of the major literary works of the First 
Century B.C. would indicate that battles and military events play a major role in them. 
Livy's Ab Urbe Condita describes what cone sometimes feel like an endless 
procession of skim1ishes, campaigns and battles. Caesar published his own campaign 
diaries. Battles play a major role in the works of other authors, such as Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus and Sallust. However, as I shall endeavour to demonstrate, none of 
these authors can be considered "military histo1ians". For history to be considered 
''military history" requires that the conduct of warfare should be the dominant theme 
of the work. I shall attempt to demonstrate that none of the major historical writers of 
the First Century B.C. saw this as the role of their work. 
In order to achieve this objective, it shall first be necessary to lay down the 
foundations for a detailed investigation. Chapter 2 establishes a small background 
concerning the authors I shall focus upon, namely Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
Sallust and Caesar. Chapter 3 establishes the background of their sources and 
influences, including Fabius Pictor and Polybius. The aim of these chapters is not to 
provide the reader with a thorough analysis of these authors, but rather to establish 
their military credentials, including their. familiarity with military matters and the 
influences of the military upon their own personal history. These chapters shall also 
attempt to summarise existing critical opinion concerning the authors in question and 
their merits as sources of information upon military matters. Chapter 4 contains a 
brief study of the Roman military, charting its development over the course of the 
Regal and Republican periods and examining issues such as logistics and command. 
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This shall form the basis for an analysis of the extent to which First Century authors 
were familiar with or interested in the conduct of warfare. 
Once this foundation is established, I shall examine five specific battles, taken from 
the works of the authors under investigation. These ballles shall be presented in 
chronological order and most of them shall contain analyses of the accounts of more 
than one author. The first case study shall be upon the Battle of the Cremera. As a 
battle whose basis is more legendary than historical, this case study shall allow an 
exploration of Roman attitudes towards the military events of their distant past. The 
second and third case studies shall concern the battles of Cannae and Zama 
respectively. Here, the focus of the investigation shall be upon the historian's need to 
justify both Roman defeat and victory and differences in the manner in which these 
battles are identified shall be emphasised. The fourth case study shall be of the battle 
of the Muluccha, a rather little known event, of which an account today survives only 
in the work of Sallust. This battle, falling as it does within that span of history which 
has obvious and immediate relevance to the author's present, shall be used as a means 
to identify the role of Roman politics in shaping the depiction of military events. 
Finally, the fifth case study shall analyse Caesar's campaign against Ariovistus. Here, 
the focus shall he on the role of personal propaganda in military writing and also upon 
Roman justifications for warfare. 
Although the balance of the focus shall vary between the case studies, there are three 
essential themes that I shall track throughout, in order to prove that the authors of the 
First Century B.C. had no conception of "military history" as we would understand it. 
These three themes shall be: 
Personal Experience 
It is a prerequisite of military history that the author should he well versed in the 
military practices of the period he is describing. This knowledge may he a product of 
personal experience, as seen in war diaries, or else it may he a product of extensive 
research. I shall demonstrate that even where the authors could lay claim to either of 
these allributes, they played little or no part in shaping their literary output. 
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Justifying Rome 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which writings upon military matters might 
be used to justify Roman actions. The first, which is by no means completely 
incompatible with the modern concept of military history, lies in providing 
justifications for Roman defeats. This may relate to political factors, or else may focus 
upon specific elements of a battle that contributed to a Roman downfall. The second, 
and more troublesome aspect of this theme shall concern the use of military accounts 
to justify Roman foreign policy and expansionism. Where evidence of this trend is 
encountered, it may serve to illustrate the fact that the author is not concerned with the 
military events for their own sake, but rather with their significance as tools for the 
justification of the development of Rome into a Mediterranean super-power; a topic 
which caused no small amount of controversy at Rome. 
Political Propaganda 
The use of literature as propaganda is a well-recognised trend in the works of First 
Century B.C. authors. Therefore, it shall be essential for me to monitor the extent to 
which accounts of battles and campaigns are used for factional or personal 
propaganda. Where sufficient evidence of this is encountered, it may form reasonable 
grounds for classifying the work as a primarily political, rather than military 
document. 
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Chapter 2.1 -The Main Sources 
My first task is to present the authors upon which my work will be focussed. 
Although this does not cover the complete list of historians writing histories of Rome 
in the first century BC, I believe that it covers a broad enough spectrum for some 
useful analysis to be possible. The four authors with whom I am primarily interested 
are Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Sallust and Julius Caesar. 
This group is difficult to describe using generalisations; they cannot be termed Latin 
historians, since Dionysius wrote in Greek and they cannot necessarily even be 
covered by the blanket-label of historian, since it is possible to argue that Caesar's 
commentaries did not constitute a historical work from the point of view of their 
author. Therefore, these four authors, with their distinct viewpoints, attitudes and 
agendas, are broadly representative of the whole range of prose writing on military 
matters in the First Century BC. 
It would not be possible here for me to present a detailed discussion of these authors. 
Indeed, I would be hard-pressed to provide an exhaustive account of any one of them 
if they formed the main subject of my investigation. My purpose here shall he to 
provide a brief introduction to each of these authors and to provide references that the 
reader may use to find more extensive discussion. 
Livy 
Of the four authors in question, it will be Livy who forms the largest part of my 
investigation. Indeed, given the bulk and range of Livy's historical work, the Ab Urbe 
Condita, this should come as no surprise. The one hundred and forty two books of 
Livy's history span from the myths surrounding Rome's foundation down to Livy's 
own day. Most of these books are lost today, with less than a third of the total, mostly 
from the first fifty books, surviving. Nevertheless, the contents of the lost books can 
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be discerned from the Periochae which survive for almost all of the lost books, 
furnishing us with a summary of their contents. 1 
Livy's history is written in the annalistic style, with the narrative proceeding on a 
year-by-ycar basis. Recent scholarship has noticed that the extant books can be 
divided into blocks of five, termed pentads? Each year is described in turn, with the 
account beginning with the election of consuls. As we would expect, the account 
becomes progressively more detailed as the period under discussion moves closer to 
Livy's own time and his sources become more detailed. So while the events of the 
first pentad spans over hundreds of years, the Second Punic War alone fills two 
pentads, spanning from books twenty one to thirty. 
The early books of Livy's history contain the stories surrounding the development of 
Roman society. A b1isk pace is maintained during the first five books, with generally 
brief and terse narrative interspersed by more detailed accounts of specific episodes, 
concerning both the military exploits of the city and the jostling for position between 
the patricians and plebeians. There are frequent references to matters such as portents-' 
and Livy's introduction to his sixth book, where he notes that from this point 
onwards, he is able to use more reliable sources and to talk about more certain 
matters,4 seems to be an admission that he regards many of the incidents in his first 
five books as stories rather than accurate records of facts. As we would expect given 
the pace with which Livy moves through these early years, there arc few characters 
who have a significant presence and there is little room for character development. 
Once Livy moves onto more recent events, such as the Second Punic War, numerous 
characters appear who remain prominent in the narrative for the space of several 
books.5 
1 Beghie. 1967. CQ 17. pages 332-338 and Stadler. 1972. Historia 2 I, pages 287-307 provide a more 
detailed look at the Periochae. 
2 Walsh. I 96 I. pages 5-8 
'For more on Livy's attitudes to portents and other "supernatural'' phenomena, sec Levene, I 993, 
especially pages I 6-33 
4 Livy. 6.1.1-3 
5 Walsh. 1961, page 7 outlines Livy's treatment of the career of Marius, which appears to have spanned 
lhree pentads. 
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Livy's use of sources has attracted much criticism from recent scholarship, although 
there have been efforts to defend him. Walsh provides a detailed discussion ofLivy's 
use of sources,6 identifying the annates maximi, the libri lintei, private family 
archives, Valerius Antias, Claudius Quadrigarius, Licinius Macer, Aelius Tubero, 
Fabius Pictor, L. Calpurnius Pi so, Coelius Antipater and Polybius as important 
sources. As Walsh points out, Livy does not generally present his audience with a 
variety of accounts, where discrepancies occur in his sources, but gives a single 
account, adding his own suggestions as to motivations and morality. 7 However, as 
Walsh also notes, there is good evidence to be found in Livy's use of Polybius that 
Livy read a variety of accounts of an event, where they were available and switched 
the source he used at whim. Walsh catalogues the errors that Livy made in following 
his source too uncritically and not taking adequate care with the translation of Greek 
sources.
8 Finally, Walsh further condemns Livy for the charge of allowing obvious 
"patriotic falsifications" from earlier Roman historians to pass unchallenged.9 
There can be no doubt that Livy's own life experiences did not facilitate his 
interpretation of his sources. Modern scholars are universal in their acknowledgement 
that Livy's composition of his history must have occupied almost all of his adult life, 
leaving no time for travel or military experience. 10 Indeed, there is ample evidence for 
Livy's lack of understanding in matters of geography and tactics, since, as Walsh's 
examples prove, it is from these areas that his misunderstandings of his sources most 
frequently arise. 
The final aspect of Livy that I will summarise is his motivation for the writing of 
history. Livy sets out his agenda in his preface to his work; in addition to wishing to 
take refuge in the past from the troubles of the present, he wishes to set out the whole 
of human experience for the education of his contempormies, to provide exempt a for 
the behaviour of individuals and states alike. 11 Therefore, it should come as no 
6 Walsh. 1961. pages II 0-172 
7 Walsh, 1961,page 141 
x Walsh, 1961. pages 143-144 
'' Walsh. 1961. pages 144-145 
"'Walsh. 1961. pages 2-4 
11 For a detailed discussion of Livy's use of exempt a. see Chaplin. 2000. For discussion of Livy's 
morality as a tool for the distortion of history. see Walsh. 1955. AJPh 76, pages 369-383 
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surprise that Li vy' s work contains strong moral elements. 12 This extends beyond a 
simple preference for the past over the present and Livy's moral outlook is 
complicated in many ways. Indeed, while Livy often describes Rome's foreign 
conquests with relish, Walsh is correct when he demonstrates that Livy is by no 
means reluctant to express sympathy for those who are subjected to Roman 
conquest. 13 Although there is ample evidence for Livy' s habit of using his history to 
celebrate Rome's achievements, he is amply aware that these achievements have not 
come without a price. 
That Livy did not believe wholeheartedly in the traditional mechanisms of Roman 
religion seems to me to be beyond doubt. Levene presents a number of arguments 
both for and against Livy's belief in traditional Roman rcligion. 14 I believe that the 
arguments against his belief, which are based on Livy's own explicit statements of his 
attitude, must ultimately outweigh the arguments for his belief, which are largely 
based upon the key roles that religious events and omens often play in Livy's 
narrative. To me, it seems that Walsh offers the most feasible solution to this problem; 
Livy did indeed believe that the lapse of religious practice at Rome had been a 
disaster for the city, hut that this belief was based upon his theories as to the social 
effects of religious practices rather than any personal belief in their immediate 
benefits. At the same time, this was balanced by a general conception on Livy's part 
of a dominating divine figure, which, although not necessarily concerned with the 
mechanisms of the Roman state religion, did expect a cet1ain order to be maintained 
in the relationship between the human and the divine. 15 
Livy's attitude towards the divine has been critical to the growing trend in modern 
scholarship to see Livy in relation to the Stoic school of philosophy. Indeed, Walsh 
twice addressed this issue in detail. 16 Walsh associates Livy's depiction of the power 
of fate as an unavoidable, inescapable force with the Stoic doctrine of predestination. 
However, as Walsh rightly notes in his 1961 work, Livy' s usc of narrative techniques 
which parallel Stoic doctrines docs not necessarily mean that he was an explicit 
1
" For a breakdown of these moral clements as applied to characters within the work. sec Moore. 1989 
13 Walsh. 1961. pages 191-194 
14 Levene, 1993. pages 16-37 
15 Walsh, 1961, pages 47-49 
1
" Walsh. 1958, AJPh 79. pages 355-375 and Walsh. 1961, pages 49-64 
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adherent of the Stoic school, whose morality had become current in a broader context 
at Rome by Livy's time. 17 Indeed, I believe that there is often the danger when 
analysing Livy's text that one might he tempted to see moral overtones in places 
where Livy is simply trying to tell an effective story. 
Perhaps the most obvious places to find moral and philosophical overtones in Livy's 
history are his speeches. These are generally agreed to he Livy's own compositions18 
in many cases, although often modelled along the lines of speeches delivered in his 
sources.
19 Indeed, these speeches often fulfil another purpose of Livy' s history, 
namely to provide enjoyment to the audience through the quality of the writing and 
rhetoric. 20 However, examples of Livy's interest in morality abound in the speeches21 
and there seems little room for doubt that he used these speeches to further express his 
moral arguments. 
Running alongside his use of his history to set out a moral agenda, Livy was also 
concerned to demonstrate the superiority that the Roman people had enjoyed in the 
past.22 Hence, moral lessons were tied in with Roman propaganda. That Livy wished 
to use the past to instruct people of his own day is clear from the instances sited by 
Walsh, but we must also bear in mind Miles's remarks that Livy by no means saw the 
past as a "utopian age"?J Indeed, judging from the early conflicts between the 
patricians and plebs in the first five books of the ab urbe condita, it is clear that Livy 
also wished to demonstrate the first sprouting of the seeds that eventually blossomed 
into the civil discord that was to be the downfall of the republic. For Livy, the past, as 
with the present, contained flaws. These flaws were far less pronounced, and Walsh is 
correct to identify 4.6.12 as a passage intended to demonstrate the superiority of the 
past over the present with regards to the struggle of the orders,24 but the broader 
intention, within the scope of the whole of the ab urbe condita is to demonstrate the 
17 Walsh, 1961. page 50 
IX Walsh. 1961. page 219 
1 ~ For Livy's adaptation of one speech related by Polyhius. to which we shall return later. see Englund. 
1967. Latomus 65. pages 146-168 
2
" Walsh. 1961. page 229 
21 Walsh. 1961. pages 223-224 
22 Walsh. 1961. pages 64-81 
21 Miles, 1995, pages 114-115 
24 Walsh. 1961. page 65 
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escalation of these early matters of discord into crises which shook the very 
foundation of the state. 
To conclude, when discussing military episodes in Livy's texts, we must he prepared 
to encounter a number of elements. First, we must be prepared for a severe lack of 
familiarity with military terms and procedures, and the consequent confusions and 
misunderstanding that may arise in his text. Next, we must he prepared for a general 
lack of identification of sources. We must also be prepared for strong moral elements, 
expressed through characters, speeches and Livy's own comments. Finally, we must 
expect to see a general bias towards the Roman perspective, hut not to the extent that 
criticism of Rome or praise of her enemies is excluded entirely. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
Of the four main authors under consideration, Dionysius is the only one to have 
written his history in Greek. Born in Halicarnassus, the bi1thplace of his illustrious 
forbearer Herodotus, Dionysius travelled to Rome in the wake of Octavian's victory 
over Mark Antony .25 Other than this, almost nothing is known of his life prior to the 
start of his literary career and we have no way of knowing if he had any military 
experience relevant to the military sections of his history. His Roman Antiquities, 
written in twenty books, ran from the earliest days of Rome's foundation down to the 
start of the First Punic War, thus forming a "prequel" to the older work written hy 
another Greek living at Rome, namely Polyhius. Roughly half of this work survives 
today, mostly sections from the first ten hooks. In modern times, a tradition of 
hostility towards Dionysius as a historian has been established, of which the most 
famous example comes from Schwartz's infamous article.26 However, more recent 
years have seen a move towards the rehabilitation of Dionysius, particularly thanks to 
the efforts of Gahba27 and Fox.28 
Dionysius's history, concerned as it is with Rome's remote past, has not been 
investigated at as much length as Livy's with regards to its attitudes towards the 
25 Gahba. 1991. page I 
20 Schwartz. 1905. PW 5. pages 934-961 
27 Gahha, 1991 
2x Fox. 1993, JRS 83. pages 31-4 7 
II 
Augustan reigime. Indeed, as Gabba notes, Dionysius seems to be generally optimistic 
with regard to the new political arrangement at Rome.29 Dionysius's preface to his 
work devotes a considerable amount of space to Rome's supremacy over the 
Mediterranean world, with favourable comparisons to the great empires of the 
Classical and Hellenistic period of Greek history.30 Indeed, the comparisons with the 
Greek world continue as he sets out his objective to make the history of Rome both 
accessible and attractive to a Greek audience.-~' 
Dionysius's model for his history is, as has been noted by modem scholars, far more 
Herodotean than Thucydidean.32 Dionysius himself, writing on Thucydides, explicitly 
claims that his historical technique was inferior to that of Herodotus. 33 As such, 
Dionysius is producing a less politically and militarily oriented work than the 
Thucydidean historians, with more of an emphasis upon cultural events. 34 
Dionysius is far more explicit than Livy with regards to his use of sources. Indeed, his 
preface to his history makes reference to the necessity for the careful use of sources in 
compiling a historical work.35 He uses a list of Roman sources that he has consulted36 
to enhance his own credibility as a historian and also emphasises the value of his own 
personal experience at Rome. 37 In practice, the focus upon sources results in a 
tendency by Dionysius to present the reader with all the available accounts of a 
specific incident, accompanied by his own explanation of which is most likely. Fox's 
example of Dionysius's accounts of the reasons for the rape of the Sabine women 
provides a good example of Dionysius's comparison and selection of sources. 3M 
Dionysius never cites Livy, but Gabba sees the potential for numerous 
uncomplimentary references to Livy's historical technique, particularly in the 
preface. 39 Indeed, it is easy to see Dionysius's criticism of those who write about 
worthy events but with an unworthy technique as a veiled attack upon Livy's quite 
29 Gabba. 1991. page 212 
.m Dionysius of Halicamassus. Roman Amiquities, 1.2-3 
11 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rolnan Antiquities. 1.4-5 
32 Gabba. 1991, pages 60-90, Fox. 1993, JRS 83. 
33 Dionysius of Halicarnassus. On Thucydides. For more discussion, see Pritchett. 1975. 
34 Gabba, 1991. page 62 
3
; Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Roman AntiquiTies. 1.1 
y, Dionysius of Halicamassus. Roman AnTiquiTies. 1.6, summarised at Schultze. 2000. Histos 4. 3.2 
n Discussed at Fox, 1993. JRS 83. page 33 
·'x Fox, 1993, JRS 83. page 35 
19 Gabba. 1991. page 213 
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different attitude to the use of sources.40 Of course, as Fox notes, Dionysius's 
application of this rigorous criteria to mythological events is often inappropriate, 
particularly in the first book of his history .41 Dionysius does himself draw a 
distinction between myth and history, but this is generally a stylistic division and we 
must surely recognise that a good deal of what Dionysius terms history, we would 
I . . h 40 term ess mterestmg myt . -
Stylistically, Dionysius's history has often been categorised as "rhetorical". As we 
have seen, Dionysius is writing towards a specific goal, namely the promotion of 
Roman history and culture to the Greek world.43 Indeed, it was Dionysius's 
wholehearted appreciation for Roman culture that was partly responsible for his fall 
from grace in the eyes of many modern critics, who saw him as a traitor to his own 
Greek culture, whose subjugation to the Roman powers he failed to appreciate 
properly.44 Indeed, as Fox notes, many critics found it necessary to look for 
insincerity in Dionysius's praise ofRome.45 Certainly, the desire for factual truth 
professed by Dionysius in his prologue is apparently incompatible with this rhetorical 
and ideological objective and it is easy to see how Dionysius could be accused of 
choosing a period of Roman history where factual evidence was scarce enough to 
allow for significant reinterpretation and even outright invention. 
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges to the factual accuracy of Dionysius's work 
comes from the speeches that he produces. These form a significant proportion of the 
work, particularly in the earlier books,.t6 and are generally introduced only where 
Dionysius's sources had indicated that a speech should occur.47 In Dionysius's 
history, the speeches are often used to explain the speaker's motivations behind 
events, particularly changes to the Roman constitution.48 Clearly, Dionysius is using 
his speeches to further his objective of allowing his Greek audience to better 
understand the development of the Roman state and its institutions. However, in doing 
40 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities. 1.1.4 
41 Fox. 1993. JRS 83. page 44 
42 For more on Dionysius's relationship with myth and history. see Marincola. 1997. 122-123 
43 Gabha, 1991. page 3 
44 Gahba, 1991. pages 6-9 
4
' Fox, 1993. JRS 83. page 31 
4
" Gabba. 1991. page 153 
47 Gahba. 1991. pages 83-84 
4K Gabba. 1991, pages 48, 153 
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so, he loses any claim to be faithfully reproducing speeches that were actually 
delivered. 
It seems to me that Dionysius's concept of factual accuracy extended not to the direct 
reproduction of material which, by his own time, was no doubt long lost, but was 
rather concerned with giving his reader an assessment of a probable accurate outline 
of events and providing a reasonable explanation for them. 
When we come to examine the depiction of military events in the Roman Antiquities 
then, we must be prepared to find that we are often given numerous accounts of 
events, along with Dionysius's own explanation, possibly based on verisimilitude, of 
which of these he regards as most probable. The same level of explanatory material, 
particularly speeches, that we find in the political sections of Dionysius's work may 
not be apparent in his military passages, since these are not so crucial to Dionysius's 
objective of guiding his audience through the development of the institutions of the 
city of Rome. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to find more lengthy explanatory 
passages and more detailed reconstructions than we would in Livy. In particular, we 
should expect to see great efforts taken to exalt the Romans, explain their conduct and 
show them as being on an equal footing with the best of the Greeks. 
Sallust 
Born in Amiternum in 86B.C.49 , Sallust pm1icipated in a long political career, with 
decidedly mixed fortunes. 5° A "new man" in Roman political circles, with a well-off 
but provincial background and none of the benefits of belonging to a great political 
dynasty, Sallust was proud of the advancement he had achieved, but ultimately 
became disillusioned with politics following a series of setbacks. In circa 42BC,51 
following the effective collapse of his political career, Sallust turned his attentions to 
the literary world and the composition of history. Sallust is known today for having 
produced three historical works, of which two, the Bellum Catiline and the Bellum 
-'Y Mellor. 1999. page 3 
50 Symc. 1964, pages 16-59 and Mellor. t999. pages 30-32 
51 Syme, t964. page 59 
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lugurthinum, survive in their entirety. The third, the more ambitious Histories, was 
left uncompleted at the author's death and survives today only in fragments. 51 
Sallust's frustration with politics weighs heavily upon the introductions to his two 
surviving monographs. He vigorously denounces the political ambitions of his earlier 
ycars53 and expresses the sentiment that he can be of as much usc to the state through 
his literary endeavours as through political action.54 Sallust's agenda, as he himself 
sets it out, is to enhance Rome's standing and inspire her people through the narration 
of her great deeds and by the analysis of her heroes and villains. Indeed, both of 
Sallust's monographs take villainous figures as their stated focus. However, as more 
recent scholarship has noted, Sallust's monographs are, in many ways, profoundly 
hostile to Roman society and Kraus and Woodman note the strong theme of 
disillusionment that dominates the introductions.55 
Unlike both Livy and Dionysius, Sallust does not demonstrate great interest in the 
distant past. It is recent events that occupy his attention and, as such, we must surely 
envision that he intended to use his histories as commentaries upon his own time. 
Indeed, even the second-century Rome of the Bellum Jugurthinum is wracked by 
corruption and honest men in politics are the exceptions rather than the rule. 56 Indeed, 
a recurring theme in Sallust is the frustration of hopes at all levels, 57 no doubt a 
gloomy retlection upon the author's own disappointments. 
If Dionysius took Herodotus as his model, then Sallust's technique is firmly 
Thucydidean. Politics and warfare are his favoured themes, with geographical and 
ethnographical digressions confined within strict bounds.58 Indeed, Scanlon, who 
unearths many parallel episodes and arcs of character development, has explored the 
extensive parallels between Sallust and Thucydides in depth. 59 
'"For a brief discussion of the Histories. see Mellor. 1999. pages 41-43. For a more detailed analysis. 
see Syme, 1964, pages 178-213. 
'' Sallust, Bellum Catiline. 3.3-5 and Sallust. Bellum lttKurthinum, 4.7-8 
5~ Sallust. Bellum Catiline, 3.1-2 and Sallust. Bellum Jugurthinum. 4.1-6 
55 Kraus and Woodman, 1997. page 10 
56 For discussion of Roman politics in Sallust's day. sec Syrne. 1964. pages 16-28 
57 For detailed exploration of this theme. sec Scanlon. 19S7 
>k For more on geography in Sallust. see Green, 1993. AneW 24.2. pages 185-197 
59 Scanlon, 1980. Also see Mellor. 1999.43-47. 
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Sallus! 's use of sources is highly obscure; he himself sheds lillie light upon it, failing 
to give any precise identification. No doubt the conspiracy of Catiline was recent 
enough that the events were still familiar to Roman population at large, but the war 
with Jugurtha was removed enough from Sallus!'s day that the consultation of literary 
sources would have been a definite necessity. 
Perceived bias in Sallust's work has attracted much criticism over the last few 
centuries, as concepts of the impartial historian have become more dominant.60 
Sallus!'s affiliation with Caesar, which spanned at least part of his political career, 
gives cause for suspicion that his treatment of Caesar, his family (particularly his 
uncle Marius) and his political ideals may well be tinged with bias. However, Syme 
argues convincingly against the idea of Sal lust as a devout follower of Caesar, 
demonstrating that Sallust did not by any means completely absolve Caesar of blame 
for the conspiracy of Catiline.61 If Sallust expresses preference for the cause of the 
Populares over the Optimates (a division for which he was himself largely 
responsible for promoting), then we need not see anything more sinister at work than 
the sentiments that would doubtless have been provoked by Sal lust's own rise as a 
New Man in Roman politics. 
Sallust's monographs contain several remarkable features. Among the most striking 
of these are his character portraits. Usually, although not always, given at the point of 
a character's introduction into the narrative, these portraits are presented in starkly 
moral terms, which often tell us as much about the author as about his subject.62 The 
portraits of Catiline63 , Jugurtha6~, Metellus65 , Marius66 and Sulla67 arc perhaps the best 
examples of this. The character portraits arc rarely unambiguous; positive and 
negative traits are usually mixed together (even Catiline possesses a remarkable 
energy and vigour) and it is clear that Sail us!' s interest lay in watching the manner in 
which the various elements of a man's character shaped his life and his development. 
"" Mellor. 1999. pages 46-47 
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Sallust does place speeches within his work, but, as Mellor notes, he does not attempt 
to reproduce the style of those who he attributes the speeches to, and the speeches in 
Sallust are most likely the author's own inventions.68 Debates and political harangues, 
such as that which Marius delivers after his election, arc used as vehicles for 
exploration of the social phenomena that had wrought such drastic effects on Roman 
society in Sallust's day. 
Sallust's style has been the focus of considerable critical attention. Syme argues at 
length that Sallust introduced a new literary style for Latin prose,69 while Kraus and 
Woodman, on the other hand, state that he drew his style from a number of Latin 
predecessors and that his eventual product is a combination of three distinct styles.70 
Mellor cites the influence of Thucydides and Cato the elder upon the development of 
Sallust's style and shows it as Thucydidean scope combined with Catonian 
morality .. 71 
Sallust' s structuring of his work as also attracted attention. Here, we may be more 
ce11ain that Sallust was regarded as exceptional in antiquity, for, as Kraus and 
Woodman note,72 Fronto commented that Sallust wrote structe.73 Numerous balances 
and contrasts within the monographs contribute to their effect, while on a broader 
level, particularly in the Bellum Jugurthinum, numerous references introduced to 
events outside the scope of the monograph remind the reader of the place of the 
events described within the broader span of Roman history.74 
However, despite this attention to detail with regards to literary structure, it is over his 
lack of attention to detail with regards to historical matters that Sallust is most often 
taken to task. Dates, numbers and distances do not hold any particular interest for 
Sallust and he often treats them with a lack of attention that would cause a modern 
historian to gasp in horror. The effort required on the part of critics such as Paul and 
r~ Mellor. 1999, page 45 
""Syme, 1964. pages 240-273 
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Syme to build up a workable chronology of the war with Jugurtha is indicative of the 
problems this can cause.75 
In examining Sallust's portrayal of battles and the events that surround them, we will 
have to be conscious of several factors. We will need to be aware that Sallust' s years 
of experience in politics and his subsequent fall from grace have left him with a 
number of deeply held political, ideological and personal prejudices. We must also be 
aware that Sal lust was writing not merely to inform his audience of events that took 
place, or even, as with Livy, to offer them exempla, but rather so that he might give 
his own commentary upon the events that have shaped the present. As such, we may 
expect to find battle scenes represented in such a way as to further develop the 
portrayal of significant characters in the narrative. We should not expect any great 
degree of detail or precision with regard to military accounts. An active life as a 
politician had no doubt ensured that Sallust had at least a passing familiarity with 
military procedures, but there is no indication to be found in his introductions that 
such matters were of primary interest to him. Finally, we must accept that, for the 
most part, Sallust's tone will be negative and pessimistic, with no particular 
manifestation of patriotic feeling towards Rome. 
Caesar 
For the purposes of this work, I shall mostly be concerned with examining Caesar as a 
military leader and an author. However, these were but two facets of one of the most 
famous, innuential and, to many, notorious figures of antiquity. The amount of 
biographical work upon Julius Caesar, dating from antiquity, modern times and every 
intermediate stage, is too large to adequately summarise here. Grant's study of 
Caesar76 remains one of the more useful modern scholarly works, but depictions of 
Caesar's life can also be found in sources as far removed as Suetonius and 
Shakespeare. 
Born in I OOB.C., with Rome under the sway of his uncle, Manus, it was perhaps 
inevitable that Caesar would eventually enter into politics. Having built his initial 
75 Syme. 1964, pages 142-147 and Paul, 1984 
76 Grant. 1969 
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reputation as a lawyer and for his small-scale military actions against Mithridates, 
Caesar progressed for a while through the normal ranks of the Roman government, 
being quaestor in 68B.C. and aedile in 65B.C .. Eventually, after a controversial 
campaign in Spain in 61B.C. and an equally controversial consulship in 59B.C., 
Caesar became part of the so-called First Triumvirate, along with Crassus and 
Pompey. From 58B.C. to 51 B.C., Caesar, acting as Proconsul, was responsible for the 
subjugation of Gaul to Roman rule. As the first Triumvirate dissolved following 
Crassus's death, Caesar found himself drawn into a civil war with Pompey, from 
which he emerged victorious, only to be assassinated in 44B.C., a few months after 
his final victory. 
My concern, however, shall not he with the details of his career, although it shall he 
impossible to avoid these completely, but rather with his literary output. Caesar 
produced written accounts of his campaigns, known as commentarii, for publication, 
which survive intact for us today. His most significant works were the De Bello 
Gallico and the De Bello Civili. These works differ from the other works upon which 
I am focussing in that they were not specifically written as historical endeavours. 
Caesar was writing of his own experiences and therefore he did not need to concern 
himself with the usual mechanisms of historiography and historical research. Adcock 
presents a brief, but useful discussion of the nature of the commentarius as a literary 
form and contrasts it with historia. 77 For the most part, commentarii were notes 
designed for utility rather than artistry and not intended for publications. By contrast, 
a historia was a literary work, with a specific set of artistic expectations. As Adcock 
notes, Caesar's work challenges the constraints imposed by the definition of a 
commemarius, with the result that he produced a work of publishable quality while 
avoiding the rhetorical necessities of the historia. 
The content of these works is largely what we would expect from a general's account 
of his campaigns. Much of the narrative is concerned with military procedures such as 
marches, troop dispositions and battles. There is also a significant level of interest in 
diplomatic manoeuvrings and political struggles, with the latter being, for obvious 
reasons, more apparent in the De Bello Civili. 
77 Adcock. 1956, pages 7-13 
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Unlike the works of the other historians I have discussed, Caesar's works do not begin 
with introductions describing the author's intentions. The De Bello Gallico begins 
with a description of the geography and ethnography of Gaul,78 while the De Bello 
Cil'ili begins with the description of the reception of Caesar's letters in the Roman 
senate.79 At the same time, our wealth of biographical information about Caesar and 
the fact that his works survive for us today virtually intact leaves us better placed to 
offer educated guesses as to his purpose than we find ourselves in many cases where 
we are forced to depend upon the author's own statement. Given the energy and 
vigour with which Caesar pursued his career, and the fact that the commentarii were 
apparently produced during some of its most critical years, it seems unlikely that 
Caesar was indulging in art for its own sake. For while such a focus literary 
endeavour was by no means disreputable in Roman society, the experiences of Sallust 
and Cicero indicate that it was very much the preserve of those whose political careers 
were foundering. 
The obvious explanation for us to seize upon is that the commentarii were intended as 
a form of personal propaganda for Caesar; that by glorifying his exploits and, perhaps 
most importantly, ensuring that his own version of events was circulated in 
aristocratic circles, he could win much-needed support at Rome.80 However, Adcock 
argued against an interpretation of the commentarii, particularly the De Bello Gallico, 
based on personal propaganda, seeing also a more national level of propaganda, with 
Caesar obligated to support enthusiastically the Roman expansionist agenda.81 
Indeed, the portrayal of Gauls within the De Bello Galfico is relevant to any 
examination of Caesar's motives. For the most part, the Gallic chieftains who oppose 
Caesar are depicted as greedy and unscrupulous. In the first book, the Helvetii are 
shown as migrating not through any pressing necessity, but rather out of an 
opportunistic desire to improve their fortunes,82 while Ariovistus is driven by his 
greed for power and wealth. However, Caesar is also not reluctant to put stirring 
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words and valid arguments in the mouths of his enemies on occasion and, in 
particular, their asset1ions that Gaul has the right to be free seem to carry a particular 
weight, so that Caesar must devote considerable time to the justification of Roman 
activities in Gaul. Barlow argues that Caesar undercuts these arguments presented by 
the Gauls through his habit of portraying their leaders as greedy and unscrupulous.83 
Barlow also argues that the depiction of the pro-Roman Gauls is highly Romanised. 84 
If the content of and intentions behind the commentarii have been the subject of a 
certain amount of recent scholarship, this is nothing to the interest that has been 
lavished upon Caesar's literary style. Long dismissed as plain and workmanlike, there 
has been a recent advance in the understanding of the role Caesar's Latin in his works. 
The limited range of vocabulary used in Caesar's work is well attested; Hall identifies 
him as using fewer than thirteen hundred words85 and Adcock assigns Caesar an 
important role in the contraction of the vocabulary of literary Latin.86 Hall goes on to 
theorise that the tight control that Caesar exercised over his Latin was supposed to 
form a contrast between the precise rationality of the Romans and the chaos and 
superstition of the Gauls.g7 
Caesar's language also plays a role in his personal propaganda. Batstone demonstrates 
the manner in which Caesar uses repetition to build up the image of the inevitability 
of his march through Italy at the beginning of the civil war.88 No doubt Caesar's 
avoidance of Graecisms, at a time when they were becoming increasingly common 
among the Roman elite, did much to enhance the picture that is given of Caesar as an 
upright and traditional Roman. The careful use of vocabulary would have been an 
effective method for the promotion of Caesar's virtues as a commander, presenting 
him as a man with no room for niceties, but accustomed to the harsh language of real 
wars.
89 
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Having considered all this, we must expect to find striking differences between 
Caesar's battle descriptions and those of our other authors. Caesar stands alone among 
them for having personally participated in most of the battles that he describes. 
Despite not entering into a life of military command until relatively late in his life, he 
demonstrated a remarkable aptitude for it and even if we dismiss his own accounts of 
his conquests, his achievements speak for themselves. At the same time, Caesar was 
faced with a much more urgent need to use his writings to innuence his standing, and 
so his motivation use his work for political purposes is enhanced. This is balanced by 
the fact that he was writing about wars occurring in one of Rome's less distance 
provinces in his own time; no doubt there would have been plenty of witnesses on 
hand to discredit Caesar if he engaged in outright invention. From Caesar's battle 
reports, therefore, we should expect to see a far higher standard of accuracy than we 
would elsewhere, coupled with a more immediate, but less objective level of 
interpretation. From his accounts of the circumstances surrounding a battle, on the 
other hand, we should be expect to see numerous levels of reinterpretation at work. 
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Chapter 2.2 - The Peripheral Sources 
In addition to the main sources, it will also be necessary to mention other authors, in 
varying levels of detail. Although these authors arc not central to my investigation, it 
will still be necessary to touch upon them during my discussion of the "primary" 
authors. As such, it will be productive for me to bricny examine these authors, so that 
we may be aware of the issues surrounding them when discussing their impact upon 
the authors in whom I am primarily interested. 
Polybius 
Born in Megalopolis in around 200B.C., Polybius originally came to Rome as a 
hostage following the Roman victory at the battle of Pydna in 168B.C.. Polybius used 
his time at Rome to establish important connections among the Roman political elite 
and became intimate with the Scipios, whose innucnce at Rome had been extremely 
significant, following the victory of Scipio Africanus over Hannibal. Accompanying 
Publius Scipio the Younger to Cm1hage as a military advisor in I50B.C., he witnessed 
the eventual destruction of that city at the conclusion of the Third Punic War.90 
Although he seems to have played no small role in the politics and military events of 
his time, Polybius is remembered today for the history of Rome that he wrote, 
apparently with the intention of explaining the reasons behind Rome's rise to power 
to a Greek audience,91 in a time when many Greeks were no doubt still baffled by the 
meteoric rise of Rome from an Italian power to Mediterranean domination. Originally 
written in forty books, only the first five of these survive fully intact today, with the 
rest being represented by fragments, most of which come from the earlier books. 92 
Although Polybius decided to take 220B.C. as the starting point of his history, he uses 
the first two books of his work to survey events prior to this, stm1ing from 264B.C..93 
Marincola's arguments that this represents an attempt to compete with Herodotus and 
Yo Walhank. 1972. chapter I and Marincola, 2001. pages 113-116 for details of Polyhius's life 
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Thucydides, both of whom had included similar introductions, albeit on a smaller 
scale, seem generally convincing.94 
There has been renewed interest in Polybian studies following the publication of 
Walbank's three-volume commentary on the HistoriesY' Polybius's historical 
technique has been discussed at length, with works by Walbank96 and Sacks97 being 
of particular interest.98 Eckstein's recent survey of morality in the writings of 
Polybius has challenged the long-standing view of Polybius as a "Machiavellian" 
historian, judging his characters by the degree of success they experienced, and 
suggested instead a more "moral" interpretation of Polybius. 
If Polybius has been accused of "Machiavellianism", it is perhaps easy for us to 
understand why. Despite the fact that the events of the earlier portions of his life could 
be expected to have instilled a strong dislike of Rome in Polybius's character, once at 
Rome, he becomes an enthusiastic supporter of the city, he constitutions and her 
policies. Polybius devotes almost the whole of the sixth book of his work to a lengthy 
and detailed description of Rome's political, social and military institutions. Although 
this description is perhaps overly enthusiastic at times and has a distinct tendency to 
idealise, it remains one of our most important sources of information upon the Rome 
of the middle-Republic. Although Eckstein offers a plausible alternative to the 
"Machiavellian" Polybius, the temptation to see Polybius's enthusiasm for Rome as a 
direct result of Rome's victories is highly obvious. 
Polybius demonstrates a reasonable degree of awareness of the issues surrounding the 
sources that he makes use of. In particular, he devotes the twelfth book of his work to 
a critique of some of his historical predecessors, particularly Timaeus. Sacks's 
discussion of this section is particularly enlightening with regard to Polybius' s 
attitude towards history Y9 Chapters 12.17 to 12.22 are of particular interest to me; 
here, Polybius attacks Callisthenes for his inadequacies as a military historian. These 
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chapters demonstrate both Polybius's interest in military matters, and the relatively 
extensive experience that he had with them. 
Although, as will become evident, Polybius is sometimes quite eager to condemn bias 
in other authors, he is by no means free from it himself. Although Polybius's loyalties 
to the Achean League did not prevent the development of a deep affection for Rome, 
Polybius remained hostile to the Aetolian League, a long-standing rival of the Achean 
League. 100 He was also, as we have seen, perhaps rather too ready to see Rome's 
actions with rather too sympathetic a perspective. In the field of Roman politics, his 
friendship with the Scipios lead to a natural tendency to treat them sympathetically, 
and although Eckstein cites examples of occasions where Polybius attacked members 
of the family, 101 all of these cases either concerned the relatively distant past, or else 
were offset by vast amounts of praise. 
Fabius Pictor 
Born into a wing of the Fabian dynasty with a reputation for its interest in the arts 
(and the ensuing aura of eccentricity),102 Fabius Pictor lived during the events of the 
Second Punic War. Although widely known in antiquity as the first of the Roman 
historians, 103 Fabius wrote his history of Rome in Greek, perhaps largely due to the 
lack of sophistication in the Latin of his day, which rendered it an unsuitable for 
employment as a literary language. 104 
Fabius's history spanned from the foundation of the city and the myths surrounding it 
down to the time of the Second Punic War. It is almost entirely lost for us today, with 
just a few fragments surviving for us. Chassignet's compilation of these fragments is 
the most recent 105 and before this, there had not been any particular treatment of them 
since Peter's 1914 work. 106 Although it is, of course, dangerous to attempt to 
reconstruct an ancient work on the basis of an extremely limited range of fragments, it 
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is commonly believed that Fabius dealt primarily with the early myths of Rome and 
with the Punic Wars and that much of the intervening span was largely neglected. 107 
The surviving fragments certainly support this view, with many of them concerning 
Rome's early mythology or battles such as Trasimene, 108 but few relating to the Early 
Republican period. 
Fabius's reliability as a historian has been called in to question by both modern and 
ancient scholars. Polybius attacked Fabius over supposed Pro-Roman bias in 
accounting for the causes of the Second Punic War. 109 More recent scholarship has 
accused Fabius of outright invention with regards to Rome's early past. 110 
Nevertheless, he remained one of the more important sources for historians of Rome 
in the ancient world. Both Livy and Dionysius refer to their use of Fabius as a source 
on a number of occasions and even though many of Polybius's references to him are 
uncomplimentary, Mattingly argues that Fabius nevertheless remained an important 
source for Polybius. In support of this, he points to the transmission of a number of 
Fabius's personal biases into Polybius's work. 111 No doubt Fabius's work was 
attractive to a historian in the ancient world. For Fabius had lived through many of the 
events that he wrote about and, as such, would be perceived as the most reliable and 
authoritative source upon many of them. 112 Roman authors in particular may have 
been less inclined to be deterred by any pro-Roman bias in Fabius's work. 
Porcius Cato 
M. Porcius Cato is generally regarded as the first to have w1itten a history of Rome in 
the Latin language. 113 Although Cato participated in an active political and literary 
career, 
114 it is in his historical work, the Origines, that I am primarily interested. 
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Composed in seven books 115 and surviving today only through a few fragments and 
references, this work must have been vital in shaping the development of a literary 
historical tradition at Rome. 
Apparently concerned with the origins of Rome and of the Italian towns (perhaps a 
reflection of Cato's provincial origins), the Origines would appear to have been 
substantially different from most of the other historical works that I have discussed. 
Although Chassignet's recent work contains 116 fragments ofCato's work, many of 
these are no longer than a couple of words, having been preserved through the 
writings of the grammaticians. 116 Badian broke down the structure of the seven books 
of the Origines as follows: the first book was concerned with the foundation stories of 
Rome, the second and third with the foundations of the Italian towns, the forth and 
fifth with the Punic Wars and the sixth and seventh with the events ofCato's own 
day. 117 Badian's argument here is based upon testimony given by Cornelius Nepos 11 x 
and although Astin warns, with the convincing argument that Nepos's structure leaves 
no space at all for discussion of the early Republic, that we should not be too 
uncritical in accepting Nepos's word, 119 I still find Badian's explanation to be 
generally plausible. 
Cato appears to have been deliberate in setting his work up in contrast to the 
annalistic histories. In a fragment preserved by Gellius, he rejects the subject matter 
of the pontifical chronicles, which was presumably an important feature of annalistic 
histories. 120 Sadly, our fragments to not preserve whether Cato stated what he 
intended to discuss instead of these things and, with this fragment apparently coming 
from the beginning of the forth book of his work, there may even be cause to wonder 
whether or not it should be perceived as applying to the whole of the work, or rather 
as representing a change of emphasis in the middle of the work. 
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One of the more remarkable features that is attributed to Cato's work is the refusal to 
call military commanders by their names. This is attested by Nepos, 121 and the 
fragments that survive for us today broadly support it. Rawson suggests that this was 
due to an "old oligarchic tradition of distrust for individual ambition". 122 However, 
Astin argues that may be further misrepresentation of the Origines on the part of 
Nepos, drawing upon evidence from Gelliusm to suggest that Cato was by no means 
unwilling to allow himself to be identified as a military commander. Of course, Cato's 
own activities as a commander are of interest to me, since they emphasise his 
familiarity with military affairs and hence enhance his probable standing as a military 
historian. 
Finally, with regard to bias, numerous difficulties surround our understanding of Cato. 
He was to become proverbial for his staunch morality and did not shy from using his 
office of Censor to punish those senators who he believed had violated the rules of 
office. 124 However, there is no particular evidence of firm moral overtones in the 
Origines, at least, not in the fragments that survive for us today. Also well-attested is 
Cato's dislike of the influence of Greek culture at Rome. Again, aside from the strong 
interest in the Latin towns and a brief but scathing comment about the Ligurians 125 , 
Cato's Origines do not betray any particular traces of strong ethnic biases. 
The Annales Maximi and the Pontifical Chronicle 
The issues surrounding the Annates Maximi and its predecessors are so numerous and 
the debate smTounding them is so extensive that I shall not have time to do more than 
touch briefly upon the more important issues of contention here. 
Cicero tells us that the Pontifex Maximus used to keep a record of the events at Rome 
each year on a whitewashed board. 126 This practice was eventually put to rest in about 
130B.C. by P. Mucius Scaevola. Servius127 and Macrobius 128 also refer to these 
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events, although the details of their accounts vary. The point at which these records, 
known as the Ponficial Chronicle, were transposed into the "literary" Annales Maximi 
is not known for certain, although it has heen hotly debated. The theory that Scaevola 
himself was responsible for the publication of the "eighty book" Annates described by 
S . d h · · h C k 1 09 · · · I · d b F · 110 ervtus, as promote y cnttcs sue as ra e, - ts convmcmg y reJecte y ncr. -
Frier's arguments that Scaevola ended the practice of the keeping of the Pontifical 
Chronicle due to the proliferation of existing literary chronicles seem to be to be 
convincing. Dl Frier's attribution of the "eighty book" Anna!es Maxirni to Verrius 
Flaccus are too lengthy and complicated for detailed discussion here, hut the scenario 
he outlines is in no way improbable, although Bucher has sounded a wise note of 
caution with regards to the overly credulous acceptance of Frier's theories. 132 
The manner of the preservation of the Pontifical Chronicle is of great importance to 
the development of our ideas concerning the Amwles. Clearly, whitewashed boards 
would not be ahle to survive long in the Mediterranean climate. However, Bucher lays 
down a generally plausible, although perhaps at times rather thin, argument that the 
Pontifical Chronicle was preserved in a more permanent form in a series of bronze 
tablets kept in front of the Regia. 133 Even if we reject the details of Bucher's 
argument, the general case that it was possible for these records to have survived in a 
permanent manner remains strong. 
Finally, the contents of the Annales Maximi have remained contravertial. Although 
the Annales are lost to us today, a large number of references to them in our ancient 
sources still survive. 134 Cato' s statement that the Ponti fica] Chronicle recorded events 
such as famines and eclipses provides one of our few definite comments from an 
ancient author upon their contents. 135 Indeed, Rawson discusses the presence of 
prodigy lists in the Annates Maximi in some depth, but warns that the contents of the 
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Annates Maximi were not limited to these and that they did not fonn the sole source of 
information on such matters for later annalists. 136 
There are, of course, many other areas of controversy surrounding the Annates 
Maximi. For an introduction to many of the areas of controversy, see the works by 
Bucher, 137 Frier, 138 Rawson 1.19 and Crake 140. Frier in particular provides a detailed 
history of the debates that have suJTounded the Annates Maximi and the development 
of critical opinion over the last two centuries. 
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Chapter 3- The Roman Army 
My next task will be to examine, so far as is possible today, the realities of warfare in 
the Roman world. By combining this investigation with the examination of the 
authors that I conducted in the last chapter, it is my intention to build up a framework 
through which it will be possible to draw conclusions about the case studies that I am 
going to undertake. 
It will be necessary to divide this survey of ancient warfare into several sections. First, 
I must examine the chronological development of the Roman army, from its inception 
through to its state in the time of Julius Caesar. This will involve a review of the 
developments that occurred in the fields of tactics, equipment and recruitment, as well 
as of the political and military factors that were responsible for them. Next, I must 
assess some of the practical matters that would have been involved in the maintenance 
and usage of an army, such as problems of supply, manpower and command. Finally, 
on a more abstract level, I must examine Roman attitudes towards war and towards 
their army. 
The Development of the Roman Army 
The Early Army (The Cremera) 
Given the dramatic changes that Rome underwent between the end of her Regal 
period and end of the Republic, it is to be expected that her army would have 
undergone similarly dramatic development. Two of the more historians of the Roman 
army, Keppie and Parker, break the development of the Roman army down into 
several distinct stages. 1.t 1 The very earliest military force at Rome was most likely 
composed of the leading aristocrats and their attendants. 142 Keppie reports that 
archaeological evidence would seem to indicate that this early force would have used 
round shields, studded leather armour and bronze helmets, but confesses that there is, 
quite unsurprisingly, no evidence for the organisation of this proto-army. 143 In 
1 ~ 1 Kcppie. 1984, pages 14-79 and Parker. 1928. pages 9-46 
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addition, Keppie points out that the initial clashes between Rome and her neighbours 
would have been little more than skim1ishes between bands of raiders, with a couple 
of hundred men at most on each side. 144 This eventually expanded into a 3,000 strong 
infantry force, with 300 cavalry, apparently drawn up from the aristocracy of the three 
Roman tribes. 145 All of the soldiers in this primitive army were required to provide 
their own equipment, with the result that it was a heavily aristocratic force, 
particularly in its cavalry. 
Our ancient literary sources ascribe the first major development in the Roman armed 
forces to the king Servius Tullius. 146 He apparently opened up the ranks to the 
plebeians and ended the practice of limiting military service to those from a few elite 
families. The Roman army was divided into layers, with distribution between them 
dependent upon wealth. The richest members of society formed the cavalry, while 
those below them made up the various ranks of the infantry. There were four levels of 
infantry, each with its own requirements for armour and weaponry. Keppie describes 
these in detai1. 147 There was also a class below these, which owned no property and 
hence was not eligible for military service. Clearly, the army at this point was still 
restricted to wealthy citizens, even if the requirement of noble bi11h had been 
abolished. There was still no pay for military service and soldiers were required to 
provide their own equipment. 
This neat picture of the development of the Roman Anny and the manner in which it 
reflected the social structures of the time has recently been called into question. 
Goldsworthy puts forward the view that this system is in fact an invention of Livy and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who were constructing what seemed to them to be a 
plausible model, on the basis of the structure of the Comitia Centuriata. 148 
Although some authorities have tried to suggest that the Roman army used its later 
system of maniple.\· during these early years, Rawson argues convincingly against 
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this 149 and both Kcppie and Parker state that the tactical unit in usc at this time would 
have been the Hellenistic phalanx. 150 Perhaps adopted by the Romans from the 
Etruscans, the close-packed phalanx was the dominant formation in much of the 
Greek world. 
Modern scholars have rightly argued against the attribution of all of these reforms to 
the Roman army to Servius Tullius, on the grounds that Roman society was not, by 
the time he is supposed to hav,e lived, adequately advanced to have given rise to such 
a system and that it is more likely that these changes were the result of a more gradual 
evolutionary process. 151 Goldsworthy's argument, outlined above, seems especially 
plausible. 
The Roman Army at the time of the Second Punic War (Cannae, Zama) 
With its close-packed ranks, the phalanx was a powerful defensive formation. 
However, the lack of mobility it afforded to individual soldiers translated into a 
broader tactical inflexibility. Traditionally, the next round of reforms to the Roman 
army has been ascribed toM. Furius Camillus, who was responsible for the final 
Roman victory over Veii in 396B.C .. Again, modern scholarship has recognised that it 
is somewhat incredible for such a wide range of reforms to be ascribed to a single 
man and has identified the changes as having occurred more gradually over a 
protracted period. 152 Indeed, Rawson even argues for the possibility that the supposed 
Camillan reforms were nothing more than a series of temporary measures designed to 
meet a specific crisis. 153 
That the reforms attributed to Camillus were significant is beyond doubt; besides 
numerous changes to the equipment and tactics of the Roman army, he also 
introduced pay for soldiers. Although we do not need to see the introduction of pay as 
being indicative of any lowering of the property qualification for military service, 154 
Parker is no doubt correct when he states that it would have allowed the Roman army 
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1511 Keppie, 1984, page 17. Parker. 1928. pages 10-11 
151 Keppie. 1984. page 17 
15 ~ Keppie, 1984, pages 18-19 and Parker. 1928, pages 11-12 
15
·
1 Rawson. 1991. page 52 
154 For a description of the development of property qualifications. see Gabba. 1976. pages 1-12 
33 
to engage in winter campaigning, which would have been a necessity as Rome's 
military undertakings increased in ambition and duration. 155 
The most significant of the tactical reforms attributed to Camillus was the 
replacement of the phalanx with the maniple formation. This represented a move 
away from the Greek tactical doctrines and the emergence of a more distinctive Italian 
manner of fighting. That the maniple was a uniquely Roman formation is by no means 
cettain; Parker hints that it was adopted after the Romans had seen it used 
successfully against their own troops. 156 The new equipment that was introduced 
during this period complemented these tactical reforms; the pilum, or throwing spear, 
replaced the old hasta 157 and troops were expected to use their swords for close-
quarters fighting. This allowed the troops to be effective at a greater variety of ranges, 
with the pilum being used to disrupt the enemy ranks before the Romans closed to 
sword-range. 158 
The maniple was a more complex system of tactical organisation than the phalanx and 
necessitated a further degree of categorisation of the troops involved. Division on the 
basis of age became more pronounced over the former divisions on the basis of 
wealth. The youngest (and presumably most agile) of the troops became velites; light-
armed troops who were initially positioned in front of the other troops, with the 
expectation that they would retreat behind them once the engagement began in 
earnest. Equipped with a small shield and a throwing spear, 159 their task appears to 
have been mostly one of harassment. Their spear was designed to bend upon impact, 
so thai the enemy could not then re-use it. 160 
The next age group formed the hastati. These were the front-line troops, equipped 
with a pilum and a double-edged Spanish sword. 161 These would be arranged in ten 
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maniples per legion, and placed in a line, with a gap between each group of equal 
width to that of one of the maniples. 
The second line was composed of the soldiers in their prime; presumably those with 
more extensive military experience, hut not yet afflicted with any infirmity due to age. 
These principes were equipped in a similar manner to the hastati and were placed in 
maniples in the second line, with their maniples normally filling the gaps between 
those of the hastati. The troops drawn up in maniples were more widely spaced than 
those in the old phalanxes, both on an individual and a group level, allowing for 
greater freedom of movement and tactical flexibility . 162 Behind the principes came the 
triarii, the oldest of the troops. These were equipped with the old hasta, rather than the 
pilum. 16~ These were also drawn up in maniples and positioned so as to fill the gaps in 
front of them. The positioning of the various maniples would have conferred 
numerous tactical advantages. Not only would it have allowed individual maniples to 
manoeuvre more easily within their line, hut it also allowed the front line to fall back 
efficiently into the second when pressed hard and allowed the second line to reinforce 
the first easily when more strength was required at the front. The "dents" that were 
opened in the line by the gaps bet ween the maniples of the hastati also presumably 
offered opp011unities for the partial encirclement of enemy troops. 
The normal size for a legion at this time was 4,200 men, with the normal composition 
being I ,200 of each of the velites, hastati and principes and 600 of the triarii. The size 
of legions was sometimes expanded, usually through the expansion of the first three 
groups. 164 In addition to this, there were 300 cavalry attached to each legion, divided 
into ten squadrons. It is clear from this that the Roman focus was very much upon 
heavy infantry. The hastati and principes seem to have formed the core of the Roman 
legion, with the vclites, triarii and even, to some extent, the cavalry implemented in 
such a way as to provide them with support. Normally, four legions were raised in any 
one year, although this number appears to have increased dramatically during ctises 
such as the Second Punic War. 165 
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The Post-Marian Army ( The Muluccha, Ariovistus) 
Traditionally, the next stage of the development of the Roman anny has been 
attributed to Gaius Marius. However, recent scholarship has conceded that the 
grounds for this identification, namely that the last appearance of maniples in our 
literary sources comes during Metellus's campaigns against Jugurtha, are by no means 
secure or decisive. 166 Of course, we do, thanks to Sal lust's Bellum Jugurthinum, have 
a fairly solid basis for believing that Marius was responsible for one particularly 
significant reform to Rome's military, namely the abolition of the pro petty 
qualification. No doubt this development was instrumental in ensuring that Marius's 
name was attached to a whole range of other military innovations that occurred during 
this period. 
The most significant of these was the replacement of the maniple with the cohort. An 
individual cohort was larger than a maniple, with just ten of them to each legion. Each 
cohort was made up from a mixture of the four types of infantry, resulting in a more 
diverse formation, although the divisions between the groups was rapidly diminished 
and was soon only retained for the purpose of determining rank. The ten cohorts were 
then drawn up in three lines, with four cohorts on the front line and three on the 
second and third lines. 167 Bell discusses the advantages of the cohort over the maniple 
in some detail. It presented a uniform front-line, rather than the broken line of the 
maniple formation, which was better able to withstand the sudden and vigorous 
onslaughts of the barbarian tribes. 168 The cohort also represented a powerful 
individual unit, by comparison with the maniple, which made it ideal for detachment 
from the legion for smaller, more scattered engagements. 169 
The date for the adoption of the cohort as a tactical unit is the subject of some debate. 
As we have seen, its attribution to Marius is based on extremely thin evidence. There 
is also evidence in Livy and Polybius 170 to suggest the use of the cohort in the Second 
Punic War, a century before the time of Marius. The most likely theory, proposed by 
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Bell, is that the cohort was adopted in Spain during the Second Punic War and then 
continued to co-exist with the maniple throughout the Second Century B.C. 171 Parker 
argues that Scipio's use of the cohort was simply an experiment prompted by a 
particular situation, 172 but I find the number of references to the use of the cohort in 
Spain in Livy that Bell cites to be convincing evidence for at least moderately 
sustained use of the cohort. Of course, that Marius was not responsible for the 
invention of the coh01t or its initial introduction into the Roman army does not 
preclude the possibility that he may have done much towards its final complete 
replacement of the maniple. Bell's arguments that the cohort would have been 
uniquely well suited to Marius's campaigns against the barbarian tribes are doubtless 
true. 
Indeed, it is tempting to associate the various shifts that occurred in Rome's tactical 
organisation with the shifts in the enemies that she found herself facing. During her 
earliest years, the phalanx was adequate against the local Italian states Rome found 
herself pitted against. As Rome's sphere of influence and the scale of her wars grew, 
she needed the increased flexibility that came from the maniple system to counter the 
well-trained and organised Greek and Carthaginian armies she was facing. Eventually, 
with Greece and Carthage subdued, Rome found herself defending her borders against 
barbarian foes, whose savage offensive tactics required the greater defensive strength 
of the cohort. No doubt this explanation is a gross over-simplification of the factors 
that prompted Roman tactical development, but it presents a useful summary of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the various fonnations. 
Other reforms to the Roman army can be ascribed to Marius with slightly more 
certainty. II seems that Marius was responsible for standardising the equipment used 
by the various classes of infantry. 173 This was probably a natural development from 
the increasing state funding for the Roman army, which now provided its troops with 
equipment rather than demanding that they supply their own. 
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The final major change that Roman tactical doctrines went through in this period 
concerns the decline of the velites. Roman light infantry had apparently proven 
extremely ineffective in Spanish campaigns, when matched against the superior 
Spanish light infantry. Similarly, the use of velites to support cavalry left them 
horribly exposed if the cavalry should be forced to withdraw. Over the course of the 
Second and First Centuries B.C., the velites appear to have been withdrawn from the 
Roman forces, replaced by additional cavalry and light infantry from the allied 
.1. t74 auxt wry troops. 
Indeed, auxiliaries in general seem to have become more significant as Rome's army 
became more developed. Rome's weakness with respect to cavalry had been evident 
in the Second Punic War and even then, allied cavalry was used extensively to 
support the Roman cavalry. It is interesting that while we hear of the Roman cavalry 
being routed at Cannae, we do not hear of any similar difficulties on the part of the 
allied cavalry .175 
Therefore, if we look at the whole course of the development of the Roman military 
through the Regal and Republican periods, we see first a tend towards diversification 
and complex formations, followed by a later trend back towards unified equipment 
and simple formations. However, several common themes do run through the whole 
course of the development of the Roman army. The focus upon heavy infantry is 
continuous and unbending. The maniple system is built around its heavy infantry and 
the cohort later takes the practice further by absorbing the triarii and the velites into 
the ranks of the heavy infantry. As Rome's empire grows, so does her dependence 
upon her subjects and allies to provide her with light infantry and cavalry. 
Sources 
I have not yet touched upon one of the greatest problems facing us in our 
development of the Roman army, namely the problem of our sources. Obviously, we 
have several literary sources upon it. Most notably, Polybius wrote a detailed and 
174 Bell. 1965. Historia 14. pages 419-422 
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lengthy description of the Roman military in the sixth book of his work. 176 Rawson 
provides an extensive discussion of Polybius's account of the Roman military, 177 
noting several problematic features, such as its heavy focus upon the role of the 
tribunes, which she attributes to Polybius' s usc of the connnellfarii of tribunes in 
forming his account. 178 Besides Polybius, we also have numerous other literary 
sources on the Roman army, although none of it is so systematic or sustained. Livy 
mentions military matters frequently in his history, as do Sallust, Dionysius, Varro 
and many other authors. However, as I intend to show, authors in the ancient world 
were frequently ill-informed on military matters and did not necessarily possess the 
knowledge required to successfully narrate and interpret accounts of stratagems and 
battles. In particular, I must be extremely wary of depending upon literary sources for 
my knowledge of the military, given my intention to examine the worth of these 
sources as authorities upon military affairs. In order to pass an adequate judgement, it 
will be necessary to ensure a non-literary supply of evidence. 
Bishop and Coulston break the forms of evidence concerning the Roman army down 
. h d. . . . I 179 h I . II so d mto t ree tstmct categones: representatwna , arc aeo ogtca an 
documentary. 181 The first of these categories refers to sculpture, which can be a 
valuable tool in evaluating the equipment in use by the Roman army at any particular 
time. Presumably, the obvious argument runs, the equipment depicted in the sculpture 
will be analogous to that in use at the time of the sculpture's production. However, the 
matter is not necessarily this simple. As Bishop and Coulston and Rawson 182 note, 
sculpture was often influenced by a variety of propagandistic factors, such as 
archaism and Hellenism. Moreover, we need not assume that the sculptors had any 
more detailed knowledge of military affairs than had our literary sources. 183 
The propagandistic usc of sculpture would have had several influences upon what was 
actually depicted. Anybody with even a passing familiarity with the modern 
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propaganda imagery produced during or after the two World Wars would be aware 
that such imagery tends to focus upon concepts such as victory, defiance and strength, 
rather than upon the less palatable matters of defeat and hardship. As such, we find a 
disproportionately large amount of our representational evidence for the Roman army 
depicts state occasions such as processions and triumphs. The equipment in these 
depictions is often incomplete, with armour that would obscure the soldiers bodily or 
facial features removed. 184 Indeed, there is even reason to believe that the arms of 
Roman soldiers are on occasion replaced by Greek arms, when the sculptor's aim is to 
Hcllenise the troops. 185 Of course, there arc exceptions to this, such as Trajan' s 
column, which apparently depicts a Roman army decked out in the proper military 
equipment of the day .186 However, even when we find such representations, they 
frequently date from the Imperial period and, as such, are not particularly useful in 
dealing with the army of the Republic. 
There are, of course, further limitations of representational evidence. Sculpture does 
not lend itself well to the detailed portrayal of formations or manoeuvres. As such, 
while we may be able to learn about equipment from sculpture, it has almost nothing 
to tell us about tactics. 
Similarly, archaeological evidence is not without its problems. Logic would suggest 
that vast amounts of armour and weaponry must have been produced in the ancient 
world. However, as Bishop and Coulston state, ancient battlefields do not often yield 
large deposits of abandoned weapons, for the simple reason that ancient states could 
not easily afford to leave discarded equipment where it fcll. 187 As such, most of our 
archaeological finds of Roman military equipment are of weapons and armour that 
were deliberately abandoned because they were seriously damaged or of supplies 
which were buried to deny them to an advancing enemy. As such, they only provide 
us with a narrow viewpoint upon the Roman military .1x8 Of course, archaeological 
evidence shares the limitations of representational evidence with regards to its lack of 
value as a source for tactical developments. 
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Documentary evidence is comprised of two separate sub-groups; literary and non-
literary. I have already discussed literary evidence and the caution with which I am 
forced to regard it. However, non-literary documentary evidence can provide us with 
a few useful insights into the workings of the Roman military, albeit after the 
Republican period. Personal letters, in particular, provide us with a very different 
perspective upon the Roman army to that which is offered hy our literary sources. 
Bishop and Coulston provide an example in the form of a letter from a soldier 
requesting equipment, which sheds much light on the means by which soldiers 
provided for themselves. 189 However, sub-literary sources are again limited in their 
scope; they are generally written under peaceful conditions and provide us with a 
depiction of the mmy in garrison, rather than the army at war. 190 
Therefore, having brielly surveyed the available sources of information available to us 
upon the Roman army, it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that it is often our 
literary sources that provide us with the fullest evidence upon the Roman army. It will 
therefore be impossible to assess the relative merits of various authors as recorders of 
military events without depending, to some extent, upon concepts of the reliability of 
certain authors. However, we are not left totally at the mercy of our literary sources. 
While representational, archaeological and sub-literary sources provide us with only 
narrow views of the Roman military, they can help us to identify obvious 
anachronisms within our literary accounts and may often provide indications when 
our literary paths fail to convey properly the details of a situation. 
The Operation of the Roman Army 
Supply 
As well as considering the nature and the development of the Roman army, it will also 
be helpful to assess matters relating to its practical operation. Warfare has always 
taught us that no army, however well trained and armed, can survive in the field 
without attention to matters such as supplies, the chain of command and even 
IX" Bishop and Coulston. 1993. page 43 
1
"
11 For some of the more recent finds in this category. see Birley. 2002 
41 
recruitment to replace its losses and fuel expansion of its ranks. By assessing the role 
that such matters play in the works of various authors, it will become possible for us 
to draw conclusions as to the qualities of these authors as military historians. 
However, in order to do this, we must first possess some understanding of such 
matters ourselves. 
As we have seen, until the time of the Second Punic War (and perhaps after this time), 
Rome fielded four legions, each composed of something between four and five 
thousand men. It would, of course, have been necessary to provide each of these men 
with their daily requirement of food and water, and also to provide adequate shelter 
when required. Roth and Erdkamp both provide a detailed description of the 
nutritional needs of a Roman soldier191 and Roth, through his reference to Vegetius, 
provides us with evidence that the Romans themselves were aware of the importance 
of a soldier's diet. Roth's account is remarkably thorough and takes into account such 
factors as average height, build and age. Evidence suggests that the average Roman 
soldier would have been smaller and lighter than their modern American equivalents, 
and hence would have required smaller rations. In addition, the generally greater 
average age of the Roman soldier by comparison with his modern equivalent would 
have further diminished his nutritional requirements. As such, Roth estimates that the 
average Roman soldier would have a recommended daily intake of 3000 calories per 
day. Of course, we do not need to assume that the troops actually received this level 
of intake, but as Roth notes, it is unlikely that they were underfed under normal 
circumstances. However, as a contrast to Roth, Erdkamp argues that the army's food 
I ·1 f. R I 190 supp y was not necessan y o mterest to oman aut 10rs. -
The regular grain ration 193 would have formed a significant part of the Roman 
soldier's diet. Wheat-grain, particularly when baked into bread, provides a relatively 
efficient source of calories, but it is not sufficient in itself and is by no means the most 
compact source of nutrition. In addition to this, there would also have been meat, 
cheese, vegetables and seasonings such as olive oil, which would have provided 
protein and vitamins. These were apparently provided by a second ration, distinct 
141 Roth. 1998. pages 1-16 and Erdkamp. 1998, pages 27-32 
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from the grain ration. 194 Roth estimates the average Roman soldier's meat intake as 
being roughly one half pound of meat per day, with beef, and especially pork, being 
the most common meats. 195 This would have been supplemented by vegetables, 
mostly beans and lentils. When we consider the average size of the Roman legion, it 
is clear that just one legion would have required a vast amount of food each day; over 
two thousand pounds of meat alone, in addition to grain and vegetables. The duration 
for which foodstuffs such as meat, particularly meat other than salted pork, could be 
stored would not have been particularly long and frequent resupplies would have been 
necessary. 
The other great necessity would, of course, have been water. Roth agrees with the 
figure of two litres per day as the required intake of a Roman soldier196, although 
obviously this would have varied depending on climate and is quite possibly a rather 
conservative estimate. Whatever the exact statistic, it is clear that a Roman legion 
would have used at least 8,000 lit res of water per day, and quite possibly substantially 
more. As such, no anny would have been capable of surviving for any length of time 
away from a supply of fresh, clean water, unless exceptional measures had been taken 
for the transport of water and tight rationing imposed. Wine, both "vintage" and 
"sour", would also have formed part of the Roman ration and would have been issued 
to troops in quantities of approximately one quarter of a litre per day and drunk 
diluted in water. 197 
Roth demonstrates that Roman troops were provided with their rations in a raw form, 
rather than with prepared meals. Although centralised cooking would be practiced 
outside of times of war, the Roman army at war would require soldiers to produce 
their own bread, a task that would often be dealt with on a squad level. 198 During 
times when cooking was not possible, prepared iron rations consisting of hard-biscuit 
and dried meat were used. 199 In addition to this, it was necessary to provide fodder for 
the animals attached to the legion,200 both cavalry horses and pack animals, although 
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this could largely be provided by allowing the animals to graze where conditions were 
suitable and could, under dire circumstances, be neglected entirely. 201 The army's 
animals could become a source of food when all alternatives failed, but this would 
have been a last resort measure, since it would have seriously undermined the army's 
ability to continue operations. As Erdkamp states, the greatest challenge in keeping an 
army supplied arises from its very nature as a mobile entity?02 
When combined, all of the food listed above comes to represent a truly massive 
amount of material, which it was necessary to deliver to an army on a regular basis. 
Even in modem times, where motorisation and even the use of aircraft have become 
the norm in the establishment of supply-lines, battles have been lost because of failure 
to maintain adequate supplies. Despite having the motorised resources of the German 
army and the might of the Luftwaffe behind it, the German offensive against the 
Soviet Union during the Second World War faltered and eventually failed as it was 
cut otT from its supply lines, thanks to both enemy activity and the sheer distances 
involved. In the Roman world, where supplies would have been delivered by ship, 
pack-animals or even carried by humans, the constraints that supply lines placed on an 
army's activity must have been immense. 
There were obvious advantages to loading down the individual soldiers with as many 
of the army's provisions as they could carry; the need for vulnerable baggage trains 
was reduced and the supplies remained as close as possible to where they would be 
needed. 203 In addition, this would minimise the amount of material that would have to 
be left behind when an army moved and hence diminish the frequency with which it 
would need to be resupplied. Marius's reforms increased the load carried by 
legionaries, to the point where they were jokingly referred to as "Marius's Mules".204 
In addition to his clothing, armour and weapons, a Roman soldier would have been 
required to carry his cooking equipment, tools and rations, with the latter sometimes 
201 Roth. 1998. pages 61-67 
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stretching to thirty days worth of grain. 205 The result of this was a spectacularly heavy 
pack, whose size was considerably in excess of those in use in modern armies. 206 
Dedicated supply trains207 would also have been employed to help move an army's 
supplies. Each unit would have had its own supply train, and there would have been a 
centralised train to serve the entire force."08 The vulnerability of a slow-moving, 
unarmed supply train should not be underestimated and nor should its attractiveness to 
the enemy as a target. Hence it was important that supply trains should be protected 
by the rest of the army while on the march and that their size should be kept as small 
as possible. 
Of course, if the army's baggage train was vulnerable, then its supply lines were even 
more so. Furthermore, whereas the size of the baggage train could be reduced by 
shifting more of its burden onto individual soldiers and ensuring that no inessential 
material was carried, such measures could not be employed with supply lines, which, 
by their very nature, mostly operated at a considerable distance from the fighting 
forces. In general, the supplies would be gathered first at a base of operations within 
the army's area of activity, usually a friendly town or harbour, and would then be 
transported forward again to the army's actual location, where they would be stored in 
or near the camp and, should the army be required to move, would be transported by 
. b . ooy Its aggage tram.-
Roth places the development of sophisticated Roman supply lines at the time of the 
Punic Wars.210 The major operations in Spain and Africa were supplied via ship, with 
grain collected from the allies. This necessitated a complicated logistical operation, 
since the grain would often be arriving from various points around the Mediterranean 
and would require sorting then delivering to the troops. In addition to the danger 
posed by enemy activity, naval supply lines were also vulnerable to bad weather and 
205 Roth. 1998. page 72 
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would be particularly affected during the winter months. In addition, inland 
campaigns would not be able to benefit from naval supply lines and would be forced 
to depend upon slower land-based means of transportation 
Even when an operational base for the collection of supplies could be established, its 
ability to support the troops would often be limited. Its range and the speed of its 
operations would often be inadequate, particularly when it was required to support an 
army engaged in fast moving offensive operations. As such, armies would often be 
forced to operate beyond the ends of their supply lines. There were numerous 
techniques that an army could employ when traditional supply lines failed and were 
not available, some of which were particularly appropriate during offensive 
operations. 
Roth identifies these techniques as "Forage, Requisition and Pillage", although as he 
points out, all three of these share many common features. 211 Indeed, Erdkamp argues 
that it is often impossible to separate foraging from plunder.212 In essence, all of them 
can be reduced to the idea of making the territory supply the anny, although each 
denotes a slightly different context for this. Foraging refers to the practice of 
gathering essential resources from the surrounding land. These resources will 
essentially consist of water, firewood and food for both humans and animals. 
Foraging for water is perhaps the most vital of these tasks, for it is lack of water that 
will render an army ineffective and lead to deaths in the shortest time. 213 In the 
Mediterranean climate, foraging for water was often not more complicated than 
simply finding a nearby river or spring and would have necessitated the digging of 
wells and other, more complex waterworks, as well as sttict organisations for the 
regular collection of water without hindrance by enemy activity. Of course, foraged 
water could become dangerous when contaminated by the enemy.214 
Foraging for firewood was also essential, for, as we have seen, firewood was vital for 
the functioning of the Roman army. This could be a particularly dangerous activity in 
~ 11 Roth, 1998. page 117 
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hostile territory, particularly when the camp was located far from the nearest source of 
suitable wood.215 
Foraging for food was perhaps the most aggressive type of foraging. This would 
involve the harvesting of local crops, planted by the local population for their own use 
and the confiscation of food from local sources. As such, this would no doubt have 
been perceived as theft by the local population and would have had the nature of an 
aggressive act. Although the habit of cutting crops directly from the fields was by no 
means unknown (as is indicated by the presence of a sickle in the standard soldier's 
pack), it would naturally have been easier to confiscate grain that had already been 
collected and processed, so food depots, both civilian ones and those set aside for the 
use of enemy military forces, would have been prime targets.216 Indeed, we can see 
the significance that was attached to these in the Roman response to Hannibal's 
occupation of Cannae. 
Requisition refers to the confiscation or collection of supplies from a friendly or 
occupied civilian populace. This could take a number of forms, ranging from outright 
confiscation without recompense through to forced sale, sometimes at not unduly 
harsh prices. Requisition was naturally a tempting option for a commander, where it 
was available, since it generally relied on the local civilian population to bring their 
goods to the camp and did not require the dispatch of vulnerable foraging pm1ies. Of 
course, large-scale requisitions, particularly of vital pack-animals, would have had a 
detrimental effect upon Roman relations with the region in question.217 
By contrast with requisition, pillaging was a totally non-consensual fonn of foraging. 
Usually inflicted upon the inhabitants of a defeated region, pillaging was the large-
scale, systematic capture of supplies and booty. This would be undertaken with no 
thought for relations with the population being pillaged and civilian casualties could 
be expected as a matter of course during such operations. Of course, attempts were 
made by Roman authorities to keep the level of pillaging, particularly that variety 
where individual soldiers would steal items for themselves, in check, but there can be 
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no doubt that these measures were not entirely successful.218 Looting and pillaging 
have been features of warfare throughout the ages, with the practice remaining alive 
and well in the present day. Under conditions of warfare, the rights of an occupied 
population are frequently ignored in favour of naked greed on the part of the 
occupiers. Pillaging would have been a useful but dangerous tool for a Roman 
commander operating in unfriendly territory; on the one hand, it could provide him 
with much needed resources and much desired wealth, but on the other hand, it could 
be instrumental in the decline of military discipline and would ensure lasting hostility 
on the part of the local population. Gilliver highlights one of the most powerful 
reasons why a Roman commander may have been reluctant to allow his troops to 
engage in plunder; clemency could he a powerful weapon in ensuring the surrender of 
. . d I' 't9 an enemy, savmg llme, cost an tves.-
Command 
One of the most difficult problems faced by any large military force concerns the 
establishment of the proper command structure under battle conditions. Of course, 
armies would generally be under the command of a consul or proconsul, but one man 
alone could not lead an army consisting of thousands, or even of tens of thousands. It 
is a well-known wartime saying that no hattie-plan survives contact with the enemy; 
every hattie requires frequent tactical manoeuvres and readjustments that a general is 
not necessarily well placed to deal with. Just as the modern army relics heavily upon 
its junior officers and NCOs, so the ancient army would have needed any number of 
intermediate authorities between the commander of the army and the troops.220 
As we have seen, the structure of the Roman Army changed dramatically between the 
Regal period and the time of Caesar. Therefore, we should also expect to find that the 
command structure within the army was subject to similar change. For the earliest 
forms of the Roman anny, we do not have sufficient evidence to draw any fim1 
conclusions regarding the nature of the command structure, although it seems likely to 
me that, given the status-oriented nature of the early Roman army, family ties and 
21 x Roth. 1998. pages 148-155 
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links of social dependence would have been important in determining the structure of 
the various subgroups of the army. 
With the introduction of the maniple formation, we can speculate more firmly about 
the military hierarchy. With the size of tactical groups ranging from sixty up to one 
hundred and twenty, it would not have been impossible for a couple of men to 
exercise complete control over each such group. Two centurions were chosen from 
among the men of the maniple, the senior of whom was given command of the left 
flank of the maniple and the other of whom commanded the right flank. These were 
supported by two junior officers and two standard bearers.221 
The adoption of the cohort over the maniple saw the size of the basic tactical unit 
increased from a maximum of one hundred and twenty up to a maximum of six 
hundred. As a result, the number of centurions for each legion was increased from two 
to six, with the addition of a complicated system of rank among the centurions.222 In 
addition, the role of the centurion began to change, with the more senior centurions 
becoming more analogous to officers in the modern army than to NCOs. 
Above the centurions were the military tribunes. While the centurions were 
experienced soldiers, the office of military tribune was often, by the time of Caesar, 
occupied by "political" officers, with no real knowledge of warfare, but required to 
perform a period of military service in order to advance their future political 
prospects. Originally, the foremost centurions had been promoted to this office and it 
would no doubt have held considerable importance, but as the political elements grew 
more common, it seems most likely that any competent commander would have 
ensured that the military tribunes were not placed in positions of real authority. 
Indeed, Parker demonstrates that by the Imperial period, the military tribunes were 
mostly responsible for the am1y's paperwork and for some disciplinary matters, rather 
than for any kind of command in battle.223 Finally, above the military tribunes were 
the legati. Like the position of military tribune, this was primarily a political position 
and was frequently occupied, at least in the Imperial period, by men of very little 
221 Parker. 1928. page 14 
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military experience, who served only short appointments. Although often subordinate 
to a consular or proconsular commander, Iegati could, on occasion, be given 
. d d d 1· I . ''4 Ill epen ent comman o egtons.--
As such, it is clear that the majority of the burden of command in battle would have 
fallen upon the centurions, who would have been the most senior experienced soldiers 
under a general. Their role in ensuring discipline and co-ordination among the rank 
and file would have been similar to that of the NCOs in the armies of the Western 
allies in the second world war, where corporals and sergeants would often find 
themselves in effective command of infantry due to the inexperience of the junior 
officers. However, this would have been tied in many cases to a larger official 
command than that that of the modern NCO. 
That centurions must have played a decisive role in battles is beyond doubt. Our 
accounts of ancient battles make it amply clear that even the most senior commanders 
were expected to engage in battle, even if they were not placed on the very front lines. 
Indeed, our sources indicate a relatively high rate of casualties among senior 
commanders in ancient warfare, no doubt related to the fact that they presented the 
enemy with an extremely tempting target. 
A general's involvement in battle had consequences beyond his exposure to danger, 
although this will have been an impot1ant factor. There is perhaps a natural tendency, 
when one studies accounts of battles, to imagine the general as a disembodied figure, 
floating above the battlefield, able to see the course of the entire battle and to order 
his troops to respond accordingly. In reality, the general would, for obvious reasons, 
only have been able to focus upon a single area of the battlefield, namely that in 
which he had chosen to position himself in. Obviously, the general would need to 
communicate his plan for the battle to his centurions before the battle itself begun, 
since the noise and motion of a battle would have made it impossible to deliver any 
but the simplest of orders or pre-arranged signals. Therefore, it would have been 
necessary for the centurions to ensure that the battle-plan was followed as closely as 
possible during the battle. Indeed, they would also have been required to perform a 
certain degree of improvisation when required, particularly if the enemy line was 
22~ Parker. 1928. pages 187-188 
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broken, a general retreat was sounded or it was necessary to move to the aid of forces 
on a different area of the ficld225 
Manpower 
The final aspect of the practical organisation of the Roman army that I will cover 
concerns recruitment. I have already outlined the process by which property 
qualifications for service in the Roman army were eroded and eventually removed 
altogether, but it will also be useful to examine the system of recruitment itself and 
the other constraints that were placed upon it. 
After the Marian reforms, any member of the citizen body was apparently eligible for 
service. Indeed, Brunt argued that conscription could be applied to all, with a few 
exceptions (which could be suspended in emergencies) and with tough penalties for 
deserters.226 However, this is only true in practice so far as extends to financial 
matters. The Roman army demanded certain other qualities from its recruits, which 
would have ensured that many remained excluded. Perhaps the most significant of 
these was the height qualification. Roth discusses these requirements, five feet five 
inches (in modern measurements) for recruitment into the legions, and five feet ten 
inches for recruitment into the cavalry or the first cohort of a Iegion.227 The first of 
these figures was apparently the average height in Roman society, while the second 
would have been perceived as unusually tall. As such, fully half of the adult male 
Roman population may have been technically ineligible for military service, while the 
vast mqjority would have been ineligible for the more prestigious positions. Roth 
indicates that military service was considered desirable, at least during the Republican 
and early Imperial periods, 228 but Watson demonstrates the degree of unpopularity 
that military service had gained by the time of the late Empire.229 This decline of 
popularity inevitably led to the reduction of the qualifications for military service. 
Although the height requirement is the only such requirement described to us in 
specific detail by our sources (here Vegetius), there would no doubt have been a 
225 Goldsworthy. 1996. page 124 argues that generals needed a certain degree of ability. 
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variety of other qualifications. Physical strength would have been required, 
particularly given the weight of the pack that a legionary was expected to carry. There 
would also, as in modern times, have been a variety of physical defects, such as poor 
eyesight or deformed limbs, that would have excluded somebody from military 
service. 2' 0 
Smith describes the practice of conscription in Republican Rome, but emphasises that 
volunteers, where they were available, would have been taken in preference to 
conscripts?31 Brunt, however, argues that conscription would have been relied upon 
before the Marian reforms.232 No doubt the propel1y qualification was instrumental in 
forcing Rome to conscript from among those groups who were eligible for service. 
Smith envisions such conscription as a decidedly negative int1uence, despised by 
those subjected to it, not only for the danger and discomfort it exposed them to, but 
also for the financial loss it would incur upon them. 233 Of course, the substantial 
financial losses incurred hy smallholders who met the prope11y qualification ensured 
that future generations of their families were not eligible for service. Indeed, the cycle 
that this prompted appears to have been one of the decisive factors leading to the 
dangerous and divisive incidents with the Gracchi. By contrast, when military service 
was opened to those who had previously not met the property qualification, it 
represented an opportunity to earn a livelihood, or even to gain substantial 
enrichment. 
Of course, it is one thing to consider how Rome met her military requirements during 
relatively settled periods, but it is another thing altogether to consider how she 
recruited in times of emergency. In the aftermath of such disasters as Cannae, the 
senate had temporarily suspended the prope11y qualification (which was not to he 
formally abolished until more than a century later) and even recruited slaves into the 
ranks.234 Therefore, it is clear that Roman scruples with regard to eligibility for 
military service were nexible. 
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The high turnover of Roman troops that we would expect to find during crises such as 
the Second Punic War, when Roman losses caused the elimination of entire legions in 
a single blow, must surely have faced Rome with a twofold crisis. Not only did she 
have to make up for her lost numbers, but she also had to train her new recruits with a 
far smaller number of experienced veterans than would normally have been available 
Smith's argument that veterans were mixed in with raw recruits and gradually 
replaced seem convincing,235 since they represent the only practical way in which a 
newly raised anny, forced into service as fast as possible, could be brought up to any 
kind of fighting standard. However, it seems likely that many of the Roman armies 
fighting in Italy dUiing the Second Punic War would have been composed of largely 
"green" troops, and that although our sources may not describe them as such, we 
should bear this in mind when studying them. 
In conclusion, Roman recruitment was, for the most part, an organised, structured and 
restricted process. However, the Romans were well aware that these restrictions 
represented only a means to an end and were by no means reluctant to discard them in 
times of crisis. 
Roman Attitudes to War 
My final task in this chapter will be to assess Roman attitudes towards war. 
Obviously, this is a vast subject and I shall have to limit the scope of my writing here 
to providing a summary of the current critical positions and some guidance for further 
reading. 
Oakley attributes Rome's early warfare to the need to expand as a counter to over-
population.236 During the period of Rome's Italian expansion, war was an annual 
occurrence, undertaken by states in the hope of profit, or to defend their own wealth 
from raiders. 237 The wars were of short duration and usually confined to the summer 
campaigning months. We have no sources on Roman attitudes to war at this time, but 
given the frequency and small scale of these wars, it seems to me to be unlikely that 
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they would be regarded as exceptional or indeed as anything other than a regular 
aspect of life. 
Rich demonstrates a change in the pattern of Roman warfare, beginning in 264B.C. 
with the onset of the First Punic War. 238 From this point onwards, Roman warfare 
became a year-round occupation, due to the necessity of keeping troops in regions far 
from Rome for protracted periods. The scale of the wars also increased, with 
substantially larger armies being required. These increasingly major conflicts were 
accompanied by larger and more numerous peaceful interludes between the conflicts. 
Hence, warfare ceased to be a minor annual intrusion upon ancient life and became 
instead a more significant, but more occasional interruption, with individual conflicts 
being more worthy of note. 
Traditionally, Rome's wars had been viewed as a form of defensive expansion; Rome 
conquered enemies and took control of their territory in the course of defending 
herself and her allies. However, Harris overturned this view, arguing convincingly in 
f f . f R . . ~ 39 H. h avour o a more aggresstve manner o oman expanstomsm.-· ts arguments t at, 
by the time of the late Republic at least, Rome's acquisition of an empire was a source 
of pride for Rome240 cast serious doubts upon the supposed "expansion through 
defence" ethos. Furthermore, his investigations of the potential gains of an 
expansionistic policy for Roman citizens at all levels of society makes the argument 
for an aggressive, expansionistic Rome all the more plausible. 
Although Harris's arguments remain highly significant today for their purpose in 
overturning the myth of Rome's "defensive imperialism", Rich has proposed that they 
too oversimplify the problem of Roman imperialism in the Republican period. Rich 
agrees with, to a certain extent, North's arguments that the causes of Roman warfare 
were more complicated than either the traditional "defensive imperialism" or Harris's 
more aggressive version would imply. He agrees that a variety of psychological and 
socio-economic factors, such as fear and the need for more slaves, accompanied and 
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perhaps even supplanted.the desire for expansion for profit.241 However, Rich then 
deviates from North as he differs with North's view that Roman social structures were 
all working uniformly to drive Rome into an expansionist agenda. Rich demonstrates 
that the social pressures driving Rome to aggressive warfare were not uniform and not 
constant. Moreover, he argues, once Roman conquest spread outside of Italy, it ceased 
to bring many of the immediate benefits, in terms of land for redistribution, that the 
Italian conquests had brought. ~42 
While problems relating to the nature of and the factors behind Roman expansion are 
perhaps easy enough for the modern scholar to consider, matters surrounding the 
Roman's own feelings on these matters are perhaps more difficult to appreciate. The 
modern era, particularly the second half of the Twentieth Century, has seen a radical 
and almost unprecedented shift in attitudes towards war and imperialism. Indeed, 
while there are few today who seriously question the justification of the Second 
World War, the sheer scale of the World Wars, combined with the increased 
immediacy with which new forms of communications allowed for front-line 
conditions to be conveyed to the civilian population, has led to a strong current of 
popular anti-war sentiment. Moreover, the mistakes made by the major hegemonies 
during the cold war, particularly the allempts at interference by the United States in 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan have resulted in a radical shift in the 
perception of imperialism. While the British empire of the Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries was a source of pride for Britain, imperialism is today seen as 
unjust and contrary to international law. The term "Empire" has become fixed in the 
modern imagination with ideas of villainy and tyranny, a tendency both demonstrated 
in and furthered by popular films such as George Lucas's Star Wars saga. 
To carry over such attitudes to a study of the ancient world is extremely dangerous. 
Had the Romans felt the same way about warfare as the population of a modern, First 
World nation, it seems highly unlikely that they would have engaged in it so often or 
allowed it to feature so heavily in their patriotic artwork. Although, as we have seen, 
Harris was perhaps somewhat too ready to depict the Romans as inherently 
aggressive, his chapter on Roman attitudes towards war remains essential reading for 
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anybody attempting to gain an insight on the Roman mindset. 24' According to Harris, 
war represented very much a means to an end for the ambitious Roman aristocrat; 
although diluted, the military service qualification necessary to hold office had not 
been totally removed and time spent in the army would have been an important stage 
in an aristocratic political career.244 Indeed, until the end of the Second Century B.C., 
it would have been normal for waii·are to be the most prominent aspect of a young 
aristocrat's life and military matters would also have remained important to him as he 
continued up the career ladder, particularly if he eventually achieved the office of 
consul, which carried with it important military duties.245 Although it was possible to 
win fame and glory in other areas, such as the law-courts, it was military glory that 
counted for the most.246 As such, Roman aristocrats had a strong motive to seek 
warfare with neighbouring states, since this would present them with the best 
opportunity to advance their own careers. 
However, aristocratic attitudes alone did not constitute the whole of the Roman slate's 
attitudes towards war. Even though, in practice, the power of the general populace to 
in1luence the course of military events was limited, the theoretical powers that they 
possessed to over-rule declarations of war or peace-treaties would have ensured that 
popular sentiment carried at least some degree of weight. As we have seen, before the 
abolition of the property qualification by Marius, service in the Roman army was 
unpopular among those who met the requirements of the qualification hut lacked any 
real wealth or political aspirations. However, following Marius's abolition of the 
property qualification, there is every indication that those who had previously been 
disqualilied enrolled for military service in large numbers and continued to do so until 
the Late Empire. Indeed, as Harris notes, even during the Middle Republic, the 
percentage of the population that participated in military activities was extremely 
high.247 
Harris paints us a picture of a Roman population that was, by and large, enthusiastic 
and opportunistic in matters of war. However, there is, no doubt, an element of over-
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simplification here. That Roman society did not share the modern day terror of 
conflict is perhaps beyond doubt, but this is not to say that Romans were unaware of 
the darker side of warfare. If ordinary ganison duty and even small-scale conflicts did 
not place a soldier in any particular degree of danger, the same cannot be said for 
major struggles such as the Punic Wars. In particular, disasters such as those as the 
Trebbia and Cannae would have cost the lives of a not-insignificant prop01tion of the 
adult male population of Rome and the impact of this upon both individual families 
and the Roman state in general should not be underestimated. No doubt the increasing 
scale of these wars and the ensuing casualties was at least partially responsible for the 
increasingly large gaps between Rome's wars that emerged in the Second Century 
B.C.. 
In addition to this, the First Century B.C. saw a very different type of warfare 
consume the Roman state. Civil wars, which brought all of the problems associated 
with a large-scale war and few or none of the usual benefits. Indeed, it perhaps comes 
as no surprise that we should find strong elements of war-weariness in the writings of 
the Augustan authors. If we look once more at Livy's prologue, we find Livy 
condemning the strife of his own day.248 However, we should not take this as 
indication of uniformly anti-war sentiment, for the very past in which Livy seeks to 
take refuge is filled with wars and conflicts. It seems that the Romans had come to 
separate civil wars, which they regarded as a wholly negative phenomenon, from 
foreign wars and conquests, which remained a source of acquisition and patriotic 
. 249 pnde. 
"4X · 
- L1vy. l.pr 
24~ For more on attitudes to the military in the Late Republic. see Patterson, 1993. in Rich and Shipley. 
1993.pages92-l 12 
57 
Chapter 4.1 - The Battle of Cremera 
The Battle of the Cremera occurred in 477 BC and accounts of it are preserved for us 
today by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. My analysis of this battle will be 
divided into four sections. First, there will be an account of those aspects of the story 
that are present in all of our accounts250 and, as such, can be considered 
uncontroversial in that they were presumably well established in the annalistic 
tradition .. Next, the battle accounts of Livy and of Dionysius will each be examined in 
turn. Finally, there will be a comparative analysis of the two accounts, conducted in 
such a way as to develop some preliminary conclusions on the differing historical 
attitudes of the two authors. 
As it took place in 477 BC, long before the development of a proper literary tradition 
at Rome, we may place this battle firmly in the category of the legendary. For the 
annalists and antiquarians of the first century BC, however, it undoubtedly counted as 
historica1,251 even if it figured amongst the res cum vetustate nimia obscuras, events 
preceding the Gallic sack.252 Although its appearance in the accounts of both 
Dionysius and Livy can be taken as proof that it was already an established part of the 
literary tradition, we can be absolutely certain that there was not an unbroken chain of 
reporting of these events by historians spanning from the time of the battle down to 
the time of our authors.253 In addition, the early date of this battle forces certain 
suppositions upon us regarding the organisation, equipment and tactics of the Roman 
forces involved. If we follow Keppie's timeline254 for the development of the Roman 
anny, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the nonnal size for a Roman legion at 
this stage was approximately four thousand men, supplied largely from the 
households of the upper classes and equipped in the manner of hoplites. 
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The background details to the battle are generally uncontested and may he 
summarised briefly. After four years of sustained hostility with her long-standing rival 
Veii, which had seen the Romans making considerable progress in seizing territory 
controlled by Veii and her allies, the Veientines were forced into taking a more 
aggressive stance so as to maintain their trade routes with other cities. The result of 
this was a series of raids upon Roman holdings, with the Veientines apparently 
assisted by other nation-states hostile to Rome. With their lock upon the Veientine 
territories threatened, the Romans were faced with the need to place a garrison by the 
river Cremera, a tributary of the Tiber. 
From here onwards, the details of the story become more liable to dispute. 
Apparently, with Rome suffering from internal problems and from other more 
dangerous military threats from the Sabines and Etruscans, a decision was taken by 
the gens Fabia, one of the most influential families at Rome, to dispatch every 
combat-worthy person in their house, coming to a total of three hundred people, to 
deal with the growing crisis. The Fabii apparently established a fort and used this as a 
base for a number of successful raids upon Veientine supply-lines and military 
outposts. However, having grown over-confident from their run of continued 
successes, the Fabii were eventually lured into a trap and destroyed almost entirely, 
with the exception of one survivor, who escaped to tell the story of the battle at Rome 
and continue the Fabian line. 
Even before we begin a detailed examination of this account, some problems with it 
are immediately apparent. The neatness of the numbers involved; three hundred Fabii, 
one survivor, suggests that a certain degree of invention has occurred. Also, the date 
of the battle is sufficiently close to that of the more famous battle of Thermopylae and 
the account of the eventual destruction of the Fahii contains so many parallels with 
the Herodotean account as to suggest a deliberate parallel, intended to stress the 
importance of the battle.255 The battle of Thermopylae- although a Persian victory-
was regarded as one uf the most notew011hy and important battles of Greek history, 
thanks to the bravery of the Spartans who fought there and the consequences of their 
";' For a more detailed discussion of the parallels between the battle of the Cremera and the battle of 
Thermopylae. see Ogilvie. 1965. pages ~59-360 
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resistance for the wider Greek war-effort. If a historian were to be successful in 
drawing a link between Cremera and Thermopylae, the inevitable result would be to 
raise the perceived significance of the defeat at the Cremera and further to glorify the 
Romans involved, by placing them on the same level as the famous Spartans. The 
origins of this elaboration must remain within the realm of speculation, but Fabius 
Pictor, motivated by eagerness to glorify his family's exploits, isone of the more 
likely suspects. 
Livy links his account of the events surrounding the battle with his ongoing interest in 
the struggles between patricians and plebeians at Rome. He has already narrated how 
a Fabian consul, Quintus Fabius, has become unpopular with his men for his anti-
plebeian stance, despite his fine military record. 
consul Romam rediit non tam belli gloria aucta quam inritato exacerbatoque in 
se militum odio (Livy 2.43.11) 
The consul returned to Rome, but he had not enhanced his military reputation so 
much as he had aggravated and embittered the hatred of his soldiers towards 
him. 
Indeed, Livy makes no secret of his own views on this matter. 
in Ueientes nihil dignum memoria gestum est; et in Aequis quidem Fabio 
aliquanto plus negotii cum ciuibus quam cum hostibus fuit. onus ille uir, ipse 
consul, rem publicam sustinuit, quam exercitus odio consulis, quantum in se fuit, 
prodebat. (Livy 2.43.5) 
In this latter campaign nothing happened worth recording. Fabius, however, had 
considerably more trouble with his own men than with the enemy. He, the 
consul, single handed, sustained the commonwealth, while his army through 
their hatred of the consul were doing their best to betray it. 
This initial unpopulmity and the accompanying paralysis inflicted upon Rome's 
military was then reversed, as the Roman troops grew weary of taunts from the enemy 
and more eager for action, into which they were eventually (and successfully) led by 
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another of the Fabii, Marcus Fabius (Livy 2.45-47). The aftermath of this battle saw 
Caeso Fabius elected to the consulship, where he unsuccessfully attempted to 
overcome senatorial opposition to the idea of distributing land taken dUJing recent 
victories over the Etruscans among the plebeians (Livy 2.48). 
It is against this backdrop, with the Romans still divided bitterly over the issue of the 
division of land and the Fabii partially isolated from both patrician and plebeian 
orders that Livy begins his narration of the events directly leading up to the massacre 
of the Fabii at the battle of the Cremera. Caeso Fabius's offer to the Senate that the 
Fabian clan should assume total responsibility for operations against the Veientines 
and its reception by the people of Rome is presented by Livy in glowing, and perhaps 
hyperbolic, terms. Is there not, indeed, a ridiculous degree of exaggeration here? The 
Roman people envisage the fighting all being done by three individual gentes: Fabii 
will take on Veii, two others will take on Vol sci and Aequi- and the populus 
Romanus will sit back enjoying pax as the neighbouring peoples are subdued! How 
could this be? One of the messages, surely, of Livy's work, is of expansion by hard 
fighting on the part of the populus itself: that conquest has to be earned. 
si sint duae roboris eiusdem in urbe gentes, deposcant haec Uolscos sibi, ilia 
Aequos: populo Romano tranquillam pacem agente omnes finitimos subigi 
populos posse. (Livy 2.49.2) 
If there were two houses of the same strength in the City, and the one claimed 
the Volscians for themselves, the other the Aequi, then all the neighbouring 
states could be subjugated while Rome itself remained in profound tranquillity. 
However, it is important to realise that this praise is given only through the device of 
indirect speech; Livy is not claiming to share these sentiments himself, but is rather 
att1ibuting them to the people of Rome at this time. As such, this should be seen not 
as direct praise of the Fabii by Livy, although he is no doubt exploiting the 
opportunity for praising them, but rather as a mechanism for expressing the unrealistic 
hopes, soon to be frustrated, of the Roman people in relation to the Fabii. 
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The departure of the Fabii from the city of Rome is perhaps one of the most 
interesting and most revelatory sections of Livy's account of the events surrounding 
the battle of the Cremera. Livy's narrative technique here displays a number of 
striking features. The bright, jubilant scenes that accompany the departure are 
undercut by heavy foreshadowing of the defeat to come, adding a strong tragic 
element of pathos to the scene. 
praetereuntibus Capitolium arcemque et alia templa, quidquid deorum oculis, 
quidquid animo occurrit, precantur ut illud agmen faustum atque felix mittant, 
sospites breui in patriam ad parentes restituant. in cassum missae preces. infelici 
uia, dextro iano portae Carmentalis, profecti ad Cremeram flumen perueniunt. 
is opportunus uisus locus communiendo praesidio. (Livy 2.49.7) 
As they passed the Citadel and the Capitol and other temples, their friends 
prayed to each deity, whose statue or whose shrine they saw, that they would 
send that band with all favourable omens to success, and in a short time restore 
them safe to their country and their kindred. In vain were those prayers sent up! 
They proceeded on their ill-starred way by the right postern of the Carmental 
gate, and reached the banks of the Cremera. This seemed to them a suitable 
position for a fortified post. 
The word infelici is extremely interesting, here. Livy's use of it is in a strictly 
anachronistic sense; none of the people present in the scene he is describing have any 
reason to think of the road as being unhappy or unfortunate. Rather, the word infelici 
can only be used with the benefit of hindsight and as such, this shows that Livy's 
account is here lifting itself outside of direct narrative. Indeed, as Ogilvie notes, it 
seems likely that for Livy, the primary focus of this episode was the "tragedy of the 
Fabii". 2'i6 For Levene, the focus here is on the use of the words "infelici via" as 
representative of a bad omen. Levene remarks that this is the only place in Livy's 
known work where explicit piety (that of the Fabii) is not met with success, where the 
piety has not been undercut by a deeper impiety. Levene highlights that Livy's 
intention here is to emphasise the tragic blindness of the Fabii and that this 
25
" Ogilvie, 1965. page 360 
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demonstrates an over-arching lack or a religious theme to this section or Livy's 
work?57 
Nevertheless, he takes pains to ensure that the Fabian venture is represented as an act 
of supreme bravery rather than supreme folly, by adding a description of the string of 
successes enjoyed by the Fabii in the early days of their campaign, with comments 
upon how unlikely it was that they should have enjoyed such good fortune. 
nee erant incursiones modo in agros aut subiti impetus incursantes, sed 
aliquotiens aequo campo conlatisque signis certatum, gensque una populi 
Romani saepe ex opulentissima, ut tum res erant, Etrusca ciuitate uictoriam 
tulit. (Livy 2.50.1) 
There were not only forays into each other's territories and surprise attacks 
upon the foragers, but sometimes they fought regular engagements, and this 
single Roman house often won the victory over what was at that time the most 
powerful city in Etruria. 
Immediately after this, the narrative perspective shifts to the Etruscans, showing their 
dismay at the initial success of the Romans and then their cunning plans to defeat the 
Romans through trickery. It is clear that Livy is dealing here with one of the more 
obvious problems facing historians of early Rome; namely how to make a Roman 
defeat appear glorious and absolve the Romans involved of any blame. Simply put, it 
is acceptable for a Roman commander to be beaten due to his patriotic 
overconfidence, the trickery of his enemies or a vast numerical disadvantage, whereas 
the idea of Romans losing due to lack of skill, inferior tactics or lack of courage on 
the part of the commander is far less palatable. 
Such justifications of Roman defeats and the absolution of blame for them are 
common in Roman accounts of their own history, pm1icularly in the writings of 
~57 Levene, 1993, pages 159-160. 
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Livy. 258 Further examples may be drawn from his accounts of even the most crushing 
of defeats, namely those suffered at Trebbia, Lake Trasimenc and Cannae. During his 
account of the baiLie of the Trebbia, Livy praises the Roman infantry (Livy 21.55.4). 
At the battle of Lake Trasimcne, it is the consul who is singled out for praise (Livy 
22.5.1). And at Cannae, Carthaginian treachery plays a large role (Livy 22.48.1). 
Livy's account of the battle of the Cremera itself is fairly brief, although not without 
interest. It can be summmised thus: the Fabian forces are ambushed and sUITounded 
while in the process of raiding a herd of cattle (Livy 2.50.6). At first they are 
surrounded on all sides, but they then manage to break out of the initial encirclement 
and take up a defensive position on high ground and for a while it looks as though 
they may survive (Livy 2.50.1 0). However, the enemy once again sunounds them, by 
using a path around to the back of their position and the surviving Fabii are killed, 
save for one survivor (Livy 2.50.1 I). The parallels with Thermopylae, as remarked 
upon above, are in evidence here. In particular, the motif of a defending force being 
attacked from behind after their enemies discover a secret path is a common one in 
ancient historical writing. Aside from Thermopylae and the Cremera, we see this 
pattern appear in Thucydides' account of the capture of the Spartan outpost on 
Sphacteria (Thucydides 4.36) and in Sallust's account of the taking of the fort at the 
river Muluccha (Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 93-94). It seems that it is often used 
when an author wishes to suggest parallels with Thermopylac so as to amplify the 
perceived scale of the events he is describing or else to illustrate the qualities of the 
men involved. 
Livy uses very little technical military language in his description of the battle. Only a 
single formation, the cuneus used by the Fabii to break out of the initial encirclement, 
is described using military vocabulary. No doubt, this is in part due to the simplicity 
and brevity of the battle, as Livy describes it. There may also be a measure of 
unfamiliarity with military terms at work in Livy's mind, but for the most part, it 
seems to me that the lack of technicality in Livy's account is well suited to the battle 
as he describes it, since Livy's version of the battle is essentially a skirmish between 
25
' Rosenstein, 1990. discusses the methods used by Roman commanders to absolve blame for defeat. 
He points to the break in the pax deortl/11, for which the commander himself cannot assign any blame, 
as the fault leading to the break is usually only detectable through hindsight. 
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small numbers of men with no preparation or organisation at all on the Roman side 
and only loose tactics on the side of the Veientines. 
Livy's conclusion to his summary of the Cremera contains an obvious attempt at 
adding a veneer of credibility to his account. 
trecentos sex perisse satis conuenit, unum propter impuberem aetatem relictum, 
stirpem genti Fabiae dubiisque rebus populi Romani saepe domi bellique uel 
maximum futurum auxilium (Livy 2.50.11) 
It is generally agreed that three hundred and six men perished, and that one 
only, an immature youth, was left as a stock for the Fabian house to be Rome's 
greatest helper in her hour of danger both at home and in the field. 
By asserting that authorities agreed that three hundred and six people died, Livy is 
endeavouring to show that he has had either direct or indirect access to sources that 
were kept, at the time of the battle or oral traditions that had formed since it, recording 
the number who died. This would not only add credibility to Livy's account and to the 
numbers he gives, but it would also serve to enhance his standing as a histmian by 
demonstrating his careful use of sources. However, much of the effect of this is lost 
since Livy does not name his sources, and since Dionysius of Halicarnassus presents 
us with wildly different (and generally more credible) numbers. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus treats the episode quite differently. He covers broadly the 
same events as Livy in the chapters leading to his account of the Cremera, although he 
employs a far sharper focus upon the details of the military events than we see in 
Livy and there is far less of a detailed account of the political turmoil at Rome. 
Dionysius is more precise in his identification of the f~tctors leading to the realisation 
at Rome of the need to establish a fortification at the Cremera, pointing to a Veientine 
raid deep into Roman territory, following on from a series of significant Roman 
victories over the Veientines. 
The first really significant deviation from the account offered by Livy comes when 
Dionysius describes the marshalling of the Fabii and gives an account of their 
numbers. While Livy gave a count of three hundred and six, Dionysius makes this 
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only the number of the members of the Fabian family who were present, and adds to 
this a total of around four thousand others; friends and clients of the Fabii (Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus, Roman Amiquities, 9.15.3). We see an earlier reflection of this in 
the writing of Diodorus, with whom Dionysius may have shared sources, or drawn 
from a similar tradition: 
Twv ~£ 'PwJ.La.iwv ~TTTJ0EvTwv CJvvE.BTJ 1ToAAovc; a.vTwv 1TEO'Etv, wv q:>a.CJi TtvEc; 
TWV CJvyypa.lTEWV KO.l TOVc; cJ>a..Biovc; Tovc; TplO.KOO'lOVc;, CJVYYEVEtc; aAA~Awv 
OVTa.c; KO.l ~.a. TOVTO Jl-19. 1TEp1EIAT)J.lEVVOVc; 1TpOCJT)yOplc_l.. TQ.VTQ. Jl.EV ovv 
E1Tpcix0TJ Ka.Ta TOvTov Tov Evta.vTov. (Diodorus Siculus, Library, 11.53.6) 
The Romans were defeated and many of them perished, among their number, 
according to some historians, being the three hundred Fabii, who were of the 
same gens and hence were included under the single name. 
In addition, Dionysius also states that the party led by the Fabii was later reinforced 
by a Roman army under the command of Caeso Fabius, one of the consuls. 
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.15.3) 
The account of the departure of the Fabii is far shorter and more prosaic than that 
delivered by Livy. Next comes Dionysius's account of the initial construction of the 
fort. Here we receive a moderately detailed description of the construction of the fort, 
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Allfiquities, 9.15.4) the initial successful foray 
against the Veientine lands (Dionysius of Ha1icarnassus, Roman Allfiquities, 9.15.5) 
and the consternation this caused for the Veientines. In all of these matters, overall 
leadership is attributed to Caeso Fabius, the consul, rather than to Marcus Fabius, who 
was apparently the leader of the Fabian forces. Dionysius states the reasons for the 
consul taking satisfaction from the initial success of the expedition. Dionysius's 
claims to understand the thoughts of the Roman commander must, of course, be 
understood in their proper context; they are not supposed to be representations of 
"genuine" thought processes, but rather a technique through which Dionysius can 
better explain the situation. However, the motives attributed, namely the pleasure of 
extracting swift revenge and the practical benefits gained from the confiscation of 
livestock and agricultural equipment from the enemy, sound plausible, as indeed was 
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Dionysius's intention. This fils with DH's programme of explaining the underlying 
reasons, outlined in his second preface (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman 
Antiquities, 11.1 ). 
Dionysius's account of the further raids launched from the fortress of the Cremera is 
also very different from that offered by Livy. Dionysius presents us with a more 
detailed breakdown of the Fabian and Roman troop movements, with a division into 
four parts, one of which focuses on the defence, leaving the other three free to plunder 
the sun·ounding lands. As with Livy, Dionysius stales that the Roman and Fabian 
forces defeated the Veientines in pitched battles on occasion, although he does not 
suggest that the Veientines had the advantage of superior numbers. (Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.15.7) 
Yet another major difference between the accounts of Livy and Dionysius now 
emerges. While Livy presents the foundation of the fort, the initial raids and the 
eventual deaths of the Fabii as a single episode and, without specifying a timespan, 
implies that the events occurred in rapid succession, Dionysius gives us a much more 
detailed chronology and indicates that the force remained in place for the duration of 
an entire winter. 
At this point, Dionysius shifts his focus away to events at the Cremera and turns to 
Rome's problems with the Volscii and Aequians (Dionysius of Halicamassus, Roman 
Antiquities, 9.16). It is also made clear that Caeso Fabius has by this point removed 
his am1y from the fo11 al the Cremera, leaving only the Fabii and their companions in 
place. However, with the Veientines set to be reinforced by their Tyrrhenian allies, he 
is sent back to the region, although no longer consul, along with the consul Lucius 
Aemilius and an expeditionary force, the size of which is not described for us. 
After brietly describing Roman successes against the Aequians and their difficulties 
against the Volscii, Dionysius returns to the matter of the Veientines. However, in the 
description of the battle between the forces of the consul, Lucius Aemilius, and the 
Veienline and Tyrrhenian forces that follows, no mention is made of any of the Fabii 
or of their fort at the Cremera. Dionysius then describes the negotiations for the 
surrender of the Veientines and the disfavour that fell upon Lucius Aemilius as a 
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result of the generous terms he allowed (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman 
Antiquities, 9.17.2-4). Of course, the peace does not last, for the Tyrrhenians, still 
hostile towards Rome, arc angry with the surrender of their Vcientine allies and 
convince them to resume hostilities. The Veientincs search for an honourable means 
of breaking their peace treaty and decide upon an objection to the Fabian fortification 
at the Cremera, which has not been disbanded (Dionysius of Halicamassus, Roman 
Allfiquities, 9.18.3). Upon learning that the Veientines are demanding the withdrawal 
of the Fabians, the Roman Senate resolves upon sending a consular army to its 
assistance (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.18.4-5). However, while 
the army is still in preparation, the Fabians are attacked and killed. It is reasonable to 
wonder why Dionysius includes all of this material in his account, providing such a 
break in his narrative. The most likely explanation is perhaps that Dionysius is either 
seeking to demonstrate the perfidy of Rome's enemies through their eagerness to 
violate the terms of a treaty on a technicality and to downplay any suspicions that the 
fort itself was provocative, or else he is reflecting a similar desire found in his 
sources. Again, although it is necessary to enter the realm of speculation, Fabius 
Pictor may be thought a likely suspect here. The Fabian house clearly had the 
strongest motivation to preserve a sympathetic historical tradition relating to the 
events at the Cremcra. 
Unlike Livy, Dionysius presents us with two possible accounts of the battle, although 
he does not treat them with equal regard. The first possible account, which he 
considers the less likely, is that all of the Fabii had left their fort so as to conduct a 
ritual sacrifice which was the duty of the Fabian clan (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
Ranum Allfiquities, 9.19.1 ). Whilst in the process of conducting this sacrifice, they 
were ambushed by a large force of Tyrrhenians and overwhelmed by missile weapons 
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Allfiquities, 9.19.2). Dionysius dismisses this 
account because he regards it has highly improbable that the entire Fabian detachment 
would have left the fort unguarded to perform a religious observance, when it would 
have sufficed for a small group of them to undertake the task.259 It also, perhaps, lacks 
the significance for Rome's development that the other account contains, which 
diminishes its utility for Dionysius's history. No trace of this account can be found in 
25
" Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Roman Antiquities. 9.18.3 
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Livy, for which there may be a number of explanations. Either it was a less common 
account, or Livy regarded it as too improbable for inclusion, or else he simply did not 
wish to break the flow of his narrative by including an alternative. Indeed, it may well 
be that a combination of the above factors was involved. 
This is not to say that this account is without a certain artistic merit. Indeed, it seems 
to me to be likely that this account had arisen due to more recent Fabian traditions. 
Ogilvie remarks upon the Fabian dynasty's repository of historical traditions in his 
introduction to his commentary on Livy's account of the Cremera. He expresses the 
opinion that the "Fabian" elements of the Cremera episode must have been, for the 
most part, an invention of the Fabian house.26° Ce11ainly, despite the lack of 
conclusive evidence, Ogilvie presents a convincing case. Following on from this, it is 
perhaps possible to believe that the religious observance that this account presents as 
incumbent upon the Fabii was perhaps tied in to some later religious duty of the 
Fabian clan, and that this story arose as a consequence of that duty. The motif of 
religiously scrupulous Fabii is of course seen very clearly during the Gallic siege of 
the Capitol, with Fabius Dorsuo (Livy 5.46.2-3 and 5.52.3-4). There is a neat irony in 
the story, where the Fabii, on their way to perform a sacrifice, themselves become the 
sacrificial victims. Much like Livy's account of the battle, this first account offered by 
Dionysius contains little in the way of military terminology and as such, it would 
seem that Dionysius intended it to be treated more as a exemplum than as a detailed 
account of a baLtic. Certainly, Dionysius's second account is far more detailed. Its 
framework is far closer to that offered by Livy; sensing their opponents' 
overconfidence, the Tyrrhenians (as opposed to the Veientines, as we see in Livy) 
plan a subterfuge to allow them to isolate and destroy a Fabian force (Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.20. I). They do so by deliberately sacrificing 
herds to draw a detachment of Fabii (unlike in Livy, we are told that a Fabian 
detachment is left guarding the fortress) further and further from their camp, before 
finally attacking and surrounding them. As in Livy, the Fabii manage to break out 
from the initial trap, inllicting heavy losses upon the enemy, and manage to seize high 
ground (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.20.4). Again, Dionysius 
provides us with more information than Livy with regard to the span of time involved, 
~w Ogi I vic. 1965. page 359 
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making it clear that the Fabii spent a whole night trapped on top of their hill. The next 
day, the Fabian detachment remaining in the fort hears of their comrades' misfortune 
and, leaving a few men to guard the fort, set out to their assistance (Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.21.1 ). However, before they can come to the aid 
of the detachment trapped on the mountain, they are ambushed and killed. The 
trapped Fabians charge the enemies encircling them and fight ferociously for another 
whole day, at the end of which, the Tyrrhenians, who are now also suffering from the 
connie!, offer them the chance to surrender, which is refused (Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9.21.2). The fighting continues into the next day, 
with hunger, wounds and exhaustion only sharpening the Fabian bravery, until 
eventually they are worn down at range and then killed in close combat. Following 
this, the Tyn·henians attack the fort at the Cremera, whose few remaining occupants 
fight valiantly before being killed (Oionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 
9.21.6). 
The military sequences of this account are more clearly defined than those in either of 
the other two accounts I have investigated. Numerous phases of the assault on the 
troops on the hill arc outlined, with the combat alternating between close-quarters and 
long-ranged battle. There is also a consciousness of the effects of thirst and fatigue 
upon the performance of the soldiers involved. There is little in the way of military 
terminology used and it is particularly noticeable that despite an account of a battle 
containing both long and short ranged combat, at no point are the troops on either side 
differentiated using the usual terminology for those involved in the various types of 
combat. Of course, this can perhaps he explained by the irregular nature of both the 
battle and the Fabian forces involved. 
Although Dionysius's account is far more detailed than Livy's, many of the essential 
details and even the much of imagery used are the same. In particular, some of the 
implicit comparisons with Thermopylae arc very much present. 
Ka.i ~v vtq>ETY na.pa.n\~rrto<; ~ n\118v<; Twv J3EAwv. (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
Roman Amiquities, 9.21.3) 
And the multitude of missiles was like a snow storm. 
70 
It is impossible to read this and not be reminded of the famous lines from Herodotus 
about the arrows at Thermopylae blocking out the sun (Herodotus, 7.226). However, 
not all of the Thermopylae comparisons are present in Dionysius's account. Certainly, 
at no point is it suggested that the Tyrrhenians use a concealed path to circle around 
behind the Romans. 
Even a cursory examination of Dionysius's treatment of the incidents at the Cremera 
show that he is far more concerned to demonstrate the manner of his employment of 
sources concerning this matter to his readers than Livy. The presentation of two 
conflicting accounts of an event is by no means atypical of Dionysius's style, as I 
have indicated in chapter 2, but it does perhaps demonstrate that Dionysius has a more 
critical attitude towards the battle and, as such, lends credibility to the account which 
he decides is more probable. Sadly, like Livy, Dionysius does not name his sources. 
Of the origins of the two accounts, he says only: 
£11-ol 11-£v 8"~ o 1\oyo<; oiho<; mCTpToTepo<; icpa.lveTo Tio/\v Tov 1rpoT£pov. 
cp£povTa.J 8"' Ev ypa.q>a.l<; 'Pw11-a.lwv a~JOXPEOJ<; U!l-ctJOTEpOJ. (Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Roman Amiquities, 9.21.6) 
To me now this account appears much more credible than the former; but both 
of them are to be found in Roman writings of good authority. 
Ultimately, though, it is on the basis of his own reasoning, rather than the authority of 
the sources responsible for the transmission of the two accounts, that Dionysius bases 
his approximation as to their credibility. Similarly, it is on the basis of his own 
common sense that he rejects an element of the story which Livy had unconditionally 
accepted, namely the survival of a single youth, who continued the Fabian name. 
Arguing decisively against the likelihood of none of the Fabii having been left in 
Rome during the expedition, Dionysius pours scorn upon it and expresses the opinion 
that the tradition arose from the fact that only one of the next generation of Fabii, the 
son of the former consul Marcus Fabius, enjoyed any degree of prominence among 
the next generation of Rome's political leaders (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman 
Amiquities, 9.22.5) 
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Going beyond the obvious structural differences, there are a number of other areas in 
which Livy and Dionysius vary in their presentation of this episode. For the most part, 
Livy employs a very direct narrative style. Aside from his comment about authorities 
agreeing upon the number of deaths, he does not frame his account with any direct 
indication that he is drawing upon earlier treatments of the affair. Of course, I am not 
accusing Livy of plagiarism here, for as I have already noted, it is made amply clear 
elsewhere in his work that he draws his information from earlier historians. However, 
I believe that the lack of any reference to his sources in this chapter is a good 
indication that Livy does not find them any more open to question in this area than 
they are in most others. 
Dionysius, on the other hand, repeatedly reminds the reader that he is drawing upon 
earlier historians and that his trust in them is often far from absolute. As I have 
already mentioned, Dionysius is not afraid to offer his opinions upon the validity of 
his sources, although he prefers to include all possible accounts, so that his reader 
may understand his reasoning and may make an independent judgement. 
In addition to certain other elements, such as Livy's contraction of the timespan of the 
battle from three days down to one, as Ogilvie notes, the over-1iding impression that 
the reader gains from these accounts is that Dionysius was primarily concerned with 
presenting his readers with an objective historical discourse, while for Livy, the 
primary concern was A cohesive narrative. Of course, as Ogilvie notes261 , it is highly 
unlikely that any such Fabian-dominated battle ever occurred at the Cremera. 
Therefore, it is quite feasible to believe that Livy's storytelling approach is in fact a 
more appropriate manner in which to treat this episode than the more scientific 
methods employed by Dionysius. By modern criteria, it is perhaps Livy's approach 
which emerges as the most applicable. However, Dionysius's more reasoned 
antiquarianism is perhaps more useful to us in understanding the attitudes of the 
Roman elite of his own day towards the military events preceding the Gallic sack of 
Rome. 
261 Ogilvie. 1965. page 359 
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Chapter 4.2 - The Battle of Cannae 
The bailie of Cannae, which occurred in 216BC, was the last of the three mqjor 
defeats that Hannibal's army inflicted on the Romans following his crossing of the 
Alps. Hannibal's earlier victories at the Trebbia and Lake Trasimene had caused great 
concern at Rome and had led to a feeling that the Second Punic War was turning 
against the Romans. Although the delaying tactics of Fabius Maximus had met with 
some success, there was a strong element at Rome, represented first hy the master of 
horse Minucius hut later assumed as a popular cause, who wanted to confront and 
defeat Hannibal in a pitched battle, so as to bring a quick end to Hannibal's 
occupation of Italy. 
Livy's account of the battle of Cannae, which occurs in the twenty second book of his 
work, is among the most famous of his battle sequences and the hattie itself has been 
the focus of much scholarly attention. Despite its age, DeSanctis's accoune62 remains 
one of the more prominent, but there are many matters of controversy surrounding the 
battle, which, although they are not central to my investigation, it may he necessary to 
touch upon. This will allow us to recognise any "political" considerations that might 
be influencing the depiction of the battle. 
Livy's main source for the battle ofCannae appears to have been Polyhius. However, 
the degree of correspondence between his account and that of Polybius varies 
significantly, implying that other sources were involved. 
An explanation of the background to the hattie is essential to understanding several of 
the themes that run through the accounts of it, particularly the intensely hostile picture 
of Van·o and his actions during the battle .. Frustration with the progress of the war 
lead to the highly irregular elections263 of 216BC returning the aggressive, apparently 
plebian Gaius Terentius Varro as consul (Livy, 22.35.1-2). The patrician Lucius 
Aemilius Paulus is then elected as Varro's colleague, although apparently without any 
degree of enthusiasm on his own part (Livy, 22.35.3-4). No detailed record of the 
coc DeSanctis. 1916 
~"·'For discussion of the issues surrounding this election. as portrayed in Livy. sec Lazenby. 1978. 
pages 73-74 
73 
complexities surrounding this election is found in the account of Polybius, which 
deals with the matter as though it were simply a routine election (Polybius, 3.106.1 ), 
adding only the supplementary detail that the dictators, Fabius Maximus and 
Minucius, laid down their office at this point (Polybius 3.1 06.2). Walbank 
acknowledges the failings of Polybius's account and suggests that Livy's is to be 
preferred here.264 
Livy's description of the means that Varro used to secure his election depict him as a 
demagogue of the worst variety. He soars to popularity on a tide of popular sentiment, 
which opposes the caution of Fabius Maximus (Livy, 22.34.2). His base of support is 
described as the "volgus" and he himself is described as increasing his own reputation 
through the destruction of others'. The cautious tactics of Fabius are warped by 
Varro's suppm1ers into a plot by the whole aristocracy to ensnare Rome in war and 
then to prolong the conflict as far as possible (Livy, 22.34.2-11 ). The tone of this 
passage, as the accusations of conspiracy are extended first to the senate, then to the 
augurs, then to the traditional aristocracy and finally to the plebeian aristocracy is of 
crazed paranoia and fanatical hatemongering; inevitably leaves the reader feeling 
contempt for Varro?65 
The real nature of Varro's politics is perhaps more open to debate. While Walbank 
seemingly accepts Livy's version of events and describes Varro's success as "a 
victory for the plebs",266 Lazenby argues that there is no decisive evidence to suggest 
that Varro's policies were in any way "popular". He finds Varro's career to that date 
unremarkable, aside from his support for Minucius and does not find any evidence 
that the senate suffered from a lack of faith in his leadership.267 Lazenby identifies the 
fundamental conflict between Varro and Paulus as being not the tension between the 
plebs and the aristocracy, but rather the tension between the adherents to the doctrine 
espoused by Fabius Maximus and those who preferred the more aggressive strategies 
proposed by the likes of Minucius?6x As Lazenby notes, there is good evidence in 
Livy' s account for the existence of a strong historical tradition of hostility to Varro. 
2r'"' Walbank. 1957. page 435 
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We shall encounter more evidence for this later; before, during and after the baLtle 
itself. 
After his account of the elections, Livy then describes the augmentations that were 
made to the Roman forces in preparation for the coming military actions against 
Hannibal.269 Livy here breaks off from his direct account to admit that there is no 
agreement between his sources on this maller (Livy, 22.36.1 ). Polybius states that 
Rome doubled the number of legions in the field from four to eight, with 
approximately five thousand men in each legion, not including allied troops.270 If, as 
Lazenby claims271 , they also raised an equal number of allied troops, this would bring 
the total number of infantry up to eighty thousand. 272 In addition to this, there are 
apparently six thousand cavalry, making for a total force of eighty six thousand. Livy 
acknowledges this possibility (Livy, 22.36.3), but also suggests that the additions may 
have been on a smaller scale; a total of an extra ten thousand troops added to the four 
existing legions (Livy, 22.36.2). Combined with the cavalry, this would have put the 
total size of the Roman force at approximately fifty to fifty five thousand men. 
Indeed, Brunt argues for a total force of ninety thousand, of which half were Roman 
citizens. 273 
These numbers have been heavily debated by modern scholars. DeSanctis came 
down on the side of the smaller figure, on the basis that when dealing with such 
figures, the lower is most likely to be accurate and on the basis that six thousand 
cavalry were not adequate to support eighty thousand infantry. Dorey and Dudley also 
come out in support of the smaller figure, claiming that commanding and supplying a 
force of more than eighty thousand would have been impossible; they decide that the 
Roman force must have been between forty five and sixty thousand strong.n4 On the 
other hand, Walbank comes out in favour of the larger size, rejecting DeSanctis's 
argument concerning the cavalry on the quite reasonable basis that the Romans would 
have wanted as large a force as possible for such a battle and that a lack of cavalry 
1
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would not have brought a halt to infantry recruitment.275 Lazenby also argues in 
favour of a higher figure, on the basis that it would have been folly for Rome to repeat 
the mistakes of the Trebbia, where an attempt to engage Hannibal with only a small 
numerical advantage and an actual disadvantage in terms of cavalry had led to 
disaster. Personally, I side with those who argue for a larger figure. Polybius's 
declaration of the size of the Roman force is exact and if he experiences any of the 
confusion with which some scholars have credited him, it is not immediately 
apparent. In addition, I do not necessarily see that it would have been logistically 
impossible to support an army of eighty thousand, when said army is encamped on 
Italian soil, at the end of a short supply line and in country that provided ample water 
and opportunity for foraging. 276 Difficulties of exercising command over such a large 
force may well have existed, but this should not be taken as evidence that the force 
must have been smaller; the commanders may well have considered additional 
organisational difficulties an acceptable price to pay in return for increased 
manpower. 
Once he has discussed the possible size of the force, Livy then states that the morale 
of the troops was better than it had been at any earlier point in the war, as a result of 
the successes of Fabius Maximus (Livy, 22.36.5). This remark is opposed by a 
description of strange portents which had been seen at the time and the alann they 
caused (Livy, 22.36.6-8). Walsh discusses Livy's use of portents in his work277 and 
notes that Livy's attitude towards them is often ambiguous. Despite his explicit 
arguments in favour of including them in his work, listed at 43.13.1, he sometimes 
remarks upon them as being suitable only for the overly credulous (Li vy, 21 .62.1 ). 
Nevertheless, Walsh argues, lists of prodigies, including the list given before Cannae, 
are often left without any sceptical analysis and we should believe that Livy is at least 
acknowledging the possibility that they may represent genuine divine warnings. 278 
Presumably, the portents here are supposed to serve as warnings against the rash 
action proposed by Varro. I find it significant that although Livy notes that the 
portents were expiated in accordance with the relevant authorities, the disaster for 
Rome was not ave11ed (Livy, 22.36.8). To Walsh's theories concerning portents in 
'
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Livy, which I find generally convincing, I would add that while Livy believes that the 
reverence for the gods that the men of the past displayed was by no means misguided, 
he also recognised that unfavourable omens must be evaded not through religious 
rites, but rather through prompt and direct action. Levene draws comparisons with the 
had omens received before the Roman defeat at Ticinus. Overall, according to 
Levene, the picture here in Livy is that Hannibal has worked with some success to 
gain the favour of the Gods. However, Levene cautions against reading too much 
significance into Livy here; the defeat at Cannae is ultimately due to human 
recklessness and factionalism, rather than divine disfavour.179 I find Levene's account 
convincing; his arguments here and elsewhere that religion is not an over-arching 
theme in Livy's work seem to be amply supported by the evidence. 
The next chapter deals with the gifts and aid that were sent by King Hiero (Livy, 
22.37). Since this chapter is not directly relevant to the battle of Cannae, I shall not 
present a detailed discussion of it here. Neve11heless, it is worthwhile to say a few 
words on the placing of this episode within the arc of events surrounding Cannae. The 
generosity of King Hero, which extends to the supply of food (Livy, 22.37.6), 
auxiliary troops (Livy, 22.37.9) and even a golden statue of Victory (Livy, 22.37.5), 
serves as a reminder that Rome is by no means alone in her endeavour. Of course, 
Livy's focus on the statue of Victory is perhaps ironic given the outcome of the battle 
that follows its arrival. It may well be that Livy is renecting upon the hubris of the 
Romans, or the loyalty of her ally, at a time when parts of Italy had already gone over 
to the side of Hannibal. Levene presents an alternative here; the statue of Victory is a 
positive omen, albeit one that is undercut by the negative omens already discussed. 
The Romans are more pious after the dictatorship of Fabius and their defeat here is 
more correctly attributable to human folly than to divine disfavour.280 
The account then moves hack to the preparations for the departure of the Roman 
forces and deals with the oath that the soldiers took, which was the first of its kind.281 
According to Livy, prior to this incident, troops had only taken a general oath to 
assemble when called by the consul and not to depart without his bidding (Livy, 
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22.38.3), supplemented by voluntary pledges to soldierly conduct, exchanged within 
and unique to the individual sections of the army (Livy, 22.38.3-4). This was replaced 
by a standardised oath administered officially by the tribunes (Livy, 22.38.5). Livy 
places great emphasis on the fact that this was a measure "quod nunquam antea 
factum erat" (Livy, 22.38.2). Two possible explanations for this emphasis suggest 
themselves; first, that Livy wished to emphasise the uniqueness of the preparations in 
order to show just how great the apprehension felt at Rome was; second, that Livy 
viewed the new system of a unified oath as inferior to the old voluntary oaths and 
wished to associate it with such a notorious defeat as Cannae. Given that the Roman 
defeat in the battle is not actually attributed to any particular failings or lack of 
courage on the part of the Romans, it seems to me that the former explanation is the 
more likely. 
This is followed by an account of the parting words that the consuls spoke to the 
people of Rome as they departed the city. There is little here that adds to our portraits 
of the two commanders as they were formed during the account of the elections. 
Varro again plays the part of the demagogue, and restates his earlier charges against 
the aristocracy (Livy, 22.38.6-7). There is an obvious parallel here with the behaviour 
of Cleon before his departure for Pylos, as it is represented in Thucydides 
(Thucydides, 4.27). This can, I believe, be taken as further evidence that Livy's 
representation of Varro was very much influenced by a hostile tradition that painted 
him as a stock-villain. By contrast, Paulus emerges exceedingly well from this 
chapter. He is set up as an obvious opposite to Varro: 
Collegae eius Pauli una, pridie quam ab urbe proficisceretur, contio fuit, verior 
quam gratior populo, qua nihil inclementer in Varronem dictum (Livy, 22.38.8) 
His colleague Paulus spoke but once, on the day before he left the city. His words 
were more truthful than agreeable to the people, but he said nothing harsh 
against Varro. 
This is, however, qualified by Paulus's sarcastic praise of Varro's skills as a general, 
which allegedly allow him to know everything about the upcoming operation even 
before he has left the city (Livy, 22.38.9-10). The dichotomy here, with Paulus being 
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praised for his refusal to attack his colleague and at the same time delive1ing what the 
reader is no doubt supposed to see as a perfectly well justified attack upon his 
colleague serves to emphasise the extent Livy, or the sources he was drawing upon, 
sought to enhance the reputation of Paulus. 
For the events above- the arrival of the gifts from Hiero, the discussion of the 
changes to the oaths and the consuls' speeches to the people on their departure-
there is no parallel to Livy's text in Polybius. Therefore, judging from the Roman 
perspective of these scenes, it seems likely that Livy was dependent here upon Roman 
sources. There is also no parallel in Polybius for the passage that follows, namely the 
speech given by Fabius Maximus to Paulus, the logical successor to his own policies. 
This long speech begins by setting out Fabius's intentions towards Paulus and 
expressing his respect for him (Livy, 22.39.1-3). Fabius then sets out the main 
argument of his speech; that Paulus's main struggle will not be with Hannibal, but 
rather with Varro (Livy, 22.39.6). Moving on, Fabius draws a parallel between Yarra 
and Flaminius, making the former out to be even more dangerous than the latter 
(Livy, 22.38.6). He pours scorn on Varro's bragging over military matters, of which 
he has no experience (as Paulus himself noted in the last chapter) and declares that 
Rome is heading, under Varro's leadership, for a disaster worse than that of Lake 
Trasimene (Livy, 22.39.8). Next, Fabius outlines the reasons behind his own policies 
for the war; Rome is surrounded by allies, while Hannibal is far from home, with no 
supply line, forced to survive from the spoils ofhis pillaging (Livy, 22.39.13).lt is 
interesting that Livy does here mention the necessity for Hannibal to keep his army 
supplied; matters of logistics could deserve a mention when circumstances demanded. 
Rome is growing stronger by the day, while Hannibal's strength wastes away (Livy, 
22.39.14-15). Fabius ends his speech with a return to the notion that Paulus's true 
fight will be against Yarro rather than Hannibal (Livy, 22.39.17-18). The dangers of 
seeking popularity are discussed (Livy, 22.39.20), as are the dangers of haste (Livy 
22.39.22). 
With no parallel to this speech existing in Polybius and no indication in Livy's text as 
to the source of it, it is my belief that this speech is entirely an invention of Livy. 
First, although no location is explicitly given for this speech, it has the appearance of 
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a private discussion, rather than a public address. Indeed, at one point, Fabius himself 
says 
Nee gloriandi tempus adversus unum est, (Livy 22.39.9) 
It is no time to boast, when I am speaking to one man. 
This seems to me to further advance the possibility that this conversation is in private, 
with no witnesses. As such, any reporting of the speech by a third pmty becomes 
highly improbable. Of course, this is not sure evidence that Livy himself composed 
this speech, for as we have seen, the episode of Cannae, particularly as it touches on 
the two consuls, had developed an active historical tradition by Livy's day. However, 
this speech seems to conform closely enough to the pattern of exempla noted by 
Chaplin that we may find reasonable grounds for seeing Livy's hand at work. Indeed, 
Chaplin notes that Fabius's role here is very much that of the wise adviser.2s2 The 
foremost exemplum here is that of Flaminius, but there are numerous other didactic 
elements to the speech. Indeed, in my opinion, Fabius's speech is giving advice on 
two distinct, yet connected levels. There is the direct, immediate advice given to 
Paulus; he must seek to combat the policies of Varro and continue to employ the 
Cunctator's own strategies. There is also a more general level of advice, which, while 
applicable to Paulus, also serves as instruction to Livy's own audience, and helps to 
fulfil the objective he set out in his introduction. 
The more general lessons that can be drawn from the speech are threefold. First, it is 
the duty of good men to seck to counteract the efforts of bad men, even though they 
may share the same cause. Second, it is not through the pursuit of glory that true glory 
is won. Finally, rash action always brings unsatisfactory consequences. 
Festinatio improvida est et caeca (Livy, 22.39.22) 
Haste is improvident and blind 
2
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Indeed, this line, upon which Fabius's speech ends, has every appearance of being a 
maxim and there can be no doubt that Livy is endeavouring to make the lessons of 
this speech as widely applicable as possible. 
Paulus's reply is reported only in indirect speech. He expresses agreement with 
Fabius, but predicts practical problems in putting the advice into action (Livy, 
22.40.1-2). He also states that he would not be prepared to oppose Varro to the point 
of incurring overwhelming popular enmity (Livy, 22.40.3). It is at this point, one may 
feel, that the defeat of Rome at Cannae is ensured. The consuls then set out from the 
city, Paulus accompanied by the most prominent senators and Varro accompanied by 
a crowd of his supporters, again described in unflattering tenns (Livy, 22.40.4). 
From this point onwards, several chapters are devoted to Roman and Carthaginian 
preparations for the battle and the organisation of their camps. Po1ybius also provides 
coverage of these events, but his perspective on them is often very different. For 
example, in Polybius's account, we are given a description of Paulus's speech to the 
troops. Here, he provides plausible explanations for the earlier Roman defeats at the 
Trebbia and Lake Trasimene (Polybius, 3.108.6-1 0) and reminds them of the reasons 
for which they are fighting against Hannibal (Polybius 3.1 09.6-12). It is clear from 
this speech, which Walbank regards as an invention?83 that in Polybius's account, 
Paulus has resigned himself already to the prospect of a pitched battle against 
Hannibal. Livy's account contains no trace of this speech. I suspect that it may have 
been incompatible with his agenda of showing Paulus to be detennined to avoid battle 
until the last possible moment. 
Chapters 40 to 43 describe Hannibal's supply difficulties, which Paulus had hoped to 
exacerbate through delay (Livy, 22.40.7-8), an incident in which Paulus's caution and 
attention to augury sparked anger from Varro and the troops, but at the same time 
saved the Romans from a trap laid by Hannibal (Livy, 22.42), and Hannibal's choice 
of position for his camp, which is advantageous in that it puts the prevailing wind and 
the ensuing dust clouds in the face of the enemy troops (Livy, 22.42.11 ). There has 
been much scholarly debate over the precise locations of the camp and the battle, 
m Walbank. 1956. pages 441-442 
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which arc not directly relevant to my purpose hcrc.284 Never1heless, while Lazenby 
accepts as probable the Roman tradition that the dust at Cannac was a major factor, 285 
Walbank dismisses it as an invention of Roman propaganda. 286 It is most likely that 
the impact of the clouds of dust was invented, or at least exaggerated, due to the 
absence of any mention of this in Polybius's text. However, I am sure that by the time 
of Livy, successive generations of Latin historians had ensured that this was a 
fundamental part of the Cannae narrativc.287 
At this point, the Romans are using an alternating command system, where Paulus 
and Varro each have the supreme command on alternate days. In the narratives of 
both Livy and Polybius, the same pattern emerges here. Paulus's days arc 
characterised by caution, delay and restraint (Livy 22.45.4, Polybius 3. I I 0.8), while 
Varro uses his days recklessly and aggressively (Livy 22.45.5, Polybius 3.110.4). The 
precise order of events differs between the two accounts, but the overall picture that 
emerges is the same. In chapter 44, Varro wishes to rush into Hannibal's trap by 
engaging him on ground suitable for cavalry battles, which will emphasise Hannibal's 
cavalry advantage, but Paulus restrains him. 
Chapter 45 sees the Romans finally and conclusively provoked into giving battle, by a 
Carthaginian raid on the forward Roman position (Livy 22.45.1-4). Paulus still 
disapproves of the decision to give battle, but will not deprive the effort of his support 
if it cannot be prevented (Livy 22.45.5). Livy now describes how the Romans arc 
drawn up for baltic. Here, he follows Polybius's account almost exactly (Livy 
22.45.7). The Roman cavalry is on the right wing, ncar the river, with the Roman 
foot-soldiers next to them, in the centre (Livy, 22.45. 7, Polybius 3.113.3). The allies 
are on the left wing, with the cavalry on the outside and the infantry closer to the 
centre (Livy 22.45.7, Polybius 3.113.3). Livy omits the detail, given by Polybius, that 
the Roman maniples were drawn up closer together than normal and were of unusual 
depth. This detail is significant, for it demonstrates clearly the Roman intention to use 
their infantry as a tight formation to push through the Car1haginian centre, with a 
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seemingly endless supply of replacements for troops who fell. 288 Its omission would 
appear to be a strong indication that Livy often lacked the ability to discern details 
that were important from a military perspective. Varro commanded the left wing and 
Paulus the right (Livy, 22.45.7-8). 
Hannibal sends his light armed troops ahead over the river and places them at the 
front of his battle-line (Livy 22.46.1, Polybius 3.113.6). The Gallic and Spanish horse 
goes on the left wing, opposite the Roman cavalry (Livy 22.46.2, Polybius 3.113.7). 
The Numidian cavalry goes on the right wing, with the Infantry in the centre, with the 
Afticans at the ends and the Gauls and Spaniards in the centre (Livy 22.46.3, Polybius 
3.113.7). Livy again omits information given by Polybius, namely that Hannibal 
advanced the central infantry companies out beyond the ones on the wings, so as to 
create a crescent formation.289 However, Livy does follow, with a striking degree of 
exactitude, the digression by Polybius upon the arms and appearance of the 
Carthaginian forces (Livy 22.46.4-6). It seems likely that Livy was not particularly 
confident of his ability to work from multiple accounts of the arrangement and 
equipment of the forces involved and hence decided to follow a single account, 
namely that of Polybius, for these sections. Livy also follows Polybius's account of 
how the sun was inconvenient for neither side, but supplements this with another 
reference to the clouds of dust, which apparently inconvenienced the Romans (Livy 
22.46.9). 
Livy continues to follow Polybius as the battle begins; the light-armed troops begin 
the fighting, but their skinnishes are inconclusive. 290 Next comes the battle between 
the Roman cavalry and the Spanish and Gallic horse. This does not follow the pattern 
of traditional cavalry battles, for lack of space forces both sides to dismount and 
engage each other on foot. At length, the Carthaginians get the upper hand and 
slaughter the Romans (Livy, 22.47.1-3). Next comes the infantry engagement, where 
the Romans, through force of numbers, drive back the Spaniards and Gauls and push 
deep into the enemy lines (Livy 22.47.4-7, Polybius 3.115.4-8). Upon this, the 
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African infantry, who had originally been deployed behind the Spaniards and Gauls, 
move in from the sides to attack the narrow Roman f01mation from the rear. This 
leaves the now-exhausted Romans surrounded and faced with fresh Carthaginian 
troops (Livy 22.47.8-11, Polybius 3.115.9-12). 
Having followed Polybius's account closely through the opening sections of the 
battle, Livy now diverges once again from his earlier source. Polybius moves next to 
describe the consul Paulus deciding to increase his level of personal involvement in 
the fighting, so as to make good the earlier promises he had made to the troops in his 
address to them (Polybius 3.116.1-3). Since Livy had omitted this speech from his 
account, it should not come as much of a surprise that this passage is also omitted. 
Livy instead goes on to describe a Carthaginian trick, whereby five hundred 
Numidians feigned surrender, so as to be escorted behind the Roman lines, where they 
later seized up weapons and attacked the Romans from behind (Livy 22.38.2-4). 
There is no mention of this episode in Polybius, and I believe that Lazenby is correct 
to identify this as a Roman propaganda invention designed to make the defeat more 
palatable to Romans by blaming it upon punicafides.291 
Both Livy and Polybius then describe the collapse of the Roman left. However, while 
for Livy, the focus is the panic and confusion in the Roman ranks (Livy 22.38.5), 
Polybius is much more interested in events on the Cmthaginian side of the battle 
(Polybius 3.116.5-8). This Carthaginian focus, along with the favourable appraisal of 
Hasdrubal's tactical skills, leads Walbank to conclude that Polybius was using a 
Carthaginian source here.292 For Livy, the interest is specifically Roman. While 
Polybius briefly noted that Paulus was killed at this stage of the engagement and gave 
a simple yet effective eulogy (Polybius 3.116.9), Livy gives us a far more detailed 
account of the death of Paulus. In Livy's account, Paulus was wounded early in the 
bailie (Livy, 22.49.1) but fought on nevertheless. Having eventually been forced to 
dismount due to being too weak to control his horse, his escort was killed and he was 
left to die on the battlefield (Livy 22.49.2-5). At this point, C. Lentulus, a military 
tribune, came upon the wounded consul and offered him his horse, so that he might 
reach safety (Livy, 22.49.6-8). But Paulus orders Lentulus to return to Rome himself, 
"YJ Lazenby, J 978. page 84. 
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to instruct the Senate to prepare Rome for invasion and to pass a final message of 
thanks to Fabius Maximus (Livy 22.49.9-1 0). Finally, he expresses his wish to die on 
the battlefield, so as not to be forced to face public anger or turn accuser against his 
fellow consul (Livy 22.49.11 ). When his speech is over, Paulus dies in the midst of an 
enemy attack, while Lentulus is carried away by his horse, which bolts in panic (Livy 
22.49.12). 
There can be no denying that Livy's account of Paulus's demise, unlikely though its 
authenticity may be, is a more satisfying conclusion to the plot and character arcs that 
Livy has built up around the battle. The reference to Fabius Maximus closes the arc 
that dealt with the relationship between the famous Cunctator and the reluctant 
consul. Paulus's fear of public scorn and his refusal to publicly condemn Varro both 
mirror his character traits as we saw them before the battle began. Varro is described 
as having fled to Venusia with fifty five horsemen, rather than having been part of any 
organised retreat (Livy 22.49.14). Livy's description of the flight ofVarro is actually 
far less harsh than that of Polybius. 
o\lyot ()f. TIVEc; Eic; OvEVOVCJ'lO.V CltEq:>vyov, i:v ole; ~v KO.l rO.toc; TEpEVTIOc; 0 TWV 
'PwJ.LO.lWV CYTpO.TT)yoc;, av~p O.tCJ)(pa.v J.!EV T~V q:>vy~v, a\vCJITE\TJ ClE T~V 
O.pxTJv T~v a.vTov TTI Tia. Tpl&t TIETIOITJJ.!EVoc;. (Polybius 3.116.13) 
A few escaped to Venustia, among them being the consul Gaius Terentius, who 
disgraced himself by his flight and in his tenure of his office had been most 
unprofitable to his country. 
This ends the account of the battle in both Livy and Polybius. Livy offers a brief 
description of the successful efforts of some of those caught in enemy territory to 
escape from the Carthaginian's clutches (Livy 22.50.4-12), but it seems to me that this 
is little more than Roman propaganda clutching at straws in the face of an 
overwhelming defeat. 
Polybius put the number of Roman dead from the battle at seventy thousand (Polybius 
3.117.3), while Livy's total count, including cavalry and infantry, comes to forty eight 
thousand two hundred (Livy 22.49.15). Walbank states that Polybius's count came 
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from a Carthaginian source and hence may have been prone to exaggeration.293 
Lazenby also argues against Polybius's count in favour of Livy's. 294 Indeed, as 
modern scholars have not been slow to note, Livy's identification of the dead is 
indeed more accurate than Polybius's, for Polybius identifies M. Atilius Regulus as 
being among the dead, despite the fact that he lived to hold future offices.295 
Livy's account of the battle of Cannae clearly has more than one objective. While 
Livy is content to follow Polybius for many of the "tactical" sections of the narrative, 
where we may speculate that his interest in or knowledge of the subject matter was 
less, it seems certain that Livy draws upon other historical traditions elsewhere and 
even on occasion indulges in his own invention. The tradition of hostility towards 
Varro and defence of Paulus seems to have been sparked by Polybius, whose links to 
the Scipios probably shaped his ideology here. However, by the time of Livy, this 
tradition is much more developed and does indeed seem to have become one of the 
dominant themes of the Cannae episode. Perhaps Roman sources found it convenient 
to place the blame for the defeat on the head of one man, a man who did indeed have 
a counterpart every bit as virtuous as he himself was contemptible, rather than upon 
the entire army or even the Roman people. 
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Chapter 4.3 - The Battle of Zama 
I will now turn my attention to the battle of Zama, which took place between Roman 
and Ca11haginian forces in 202BC. Coming at the very end of the Second Punic War, 
the Roman victory here effectively marked the end of Carthage's military power. By 
this stage, the fortunes of war had already begun to shift away from the Carthaginians, 
with Hannibal's strength having been wasted away in Italy through the stratagems of 
Fabius Maximus, the delayer, and with Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, having been 
killed at the battle of Metaurus in 207BC. Scipio's landing in Africa in 204BC led to 
Hannibal's recall from Italy. Arriving in 202BC, he found himself lacking adequate 
cavalry support and forced to face a strong Roman army in the desert at Zama. 
As with the other case-studies, I shall focus not only upon the battle itself, but also 
upon the events that immediately precede and follow it in our accounts. Numerous 
accounts of the battle survive, but only Livy's is of primary interest to me. However, 
given that Livy's account is based so heavily upon the earlier account of Polybius, it 
will be impossible to conduct an examination of Livy's handling of the battle without 
making frequent reference to Polybius's own treatment. 
The battle of Zama occurs in the thirtieth book of Livy's history. The battle itself 
occupies chapters thirty-two to thirty-five of this book, while I shall be examining the 
span of chapters twenty eight to thirty seven. The same events occur during the 
fifteenth book of Polybius's history. The battle itself occupies chapters twelve to 
fourteen of this book. However, since I shall be considering a slightly broader span, 
namely chapters three to seventeen. 
As with the battle of Cannae, the fact that Polybius was regarded as having a certain 
proximity to the events here and would have had unrivalled access to information 
sources upon them ensures that Livy generally slicks closely to the account offered by 
Polybius. Indeed, Walbank seems confident in his assertion that Livy used Polybius as 
his primary source for this episode, with just minor interpolations frum other 
annalists.296 In both cases, the historians approach the events from the same direction; 
296 Walbank. 1967, page 446 
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the Carthaginians have just violated a treaty that had been established between 
themselves and Rome, due to domestic disapproval of said treaty, which placed 
extremely unfavourable terms upon them. Polybius also cites Carthaginian confidence 
that Hannibal would be able to defeat the Roman forces in Africa as a factor in their 
decision to end the treaty: 
TO ~E O"VVEXOV, ov iJ.lKpa<; 0:.~~0. iJ.EYcl~a.<; ETxov i~TI"l~O.<; VIK~O"EIV ~~a. TWV mpl 
Tov 'Avvi.Ba.v. (Polybius, 15.2.3) 
But above all they had no slight hopes of conquering with the assistance of 
Hannibal, but were on the contrary most sanguine. 
Although Livy's presentation of the events concerning the attack on the ambassadors 
differs slightly, the differences are not particularly significant. However, once the 
narrative moves on to the actual account of the episode at Zama, some more important 
differences become evident. Both Livy and Polybius begin their accounts with 
assessments of the psychological state of the Romans. In Polybius, the overriding 
Roman emotion is a desire for retribution for the attack on their ambassadors and the 
violation of the treaty. 
fEVOiJ.EVWV ~E TOVTWV a.veu; 0 "ITO~EiJ.O<; a.~~T)V apx~v El~~q>El .Ba.pVTEpa.v T~<; 
1rpoo-6Ev KQ.l ~VO"iJ.EVIKWTEpa. V. o'{ TE yap 'PWiJ.O.lO\ ~OKOVVTE<; 
TI"a.pEo-TI"ov~~o-ea., <t>'~OTliJ.W<; ~lEKEIVTo 1rpo<; To TI"EptyEvia-ea., Twv 
Ka.pxTJ~OVlWV' ol TE Ka.pxTJ~OV\01 O"VVE\~OTE<; o-q>tO"l Ta "ITETI"pa. YiJ.EVQ. 1rpo<; m:i. v 
ETOtiJ.W<; ETxov 1rpo<; To 1-L~ Tol<; £x6pol<; tmoxEiptot yEvTJe~va.t. (Polybius, 15.3.1-
2) 
The consequence of this was that the war began afresh, the cause of its renewal 
being more serious and more productive of bitter feeling than the original one. z 
For the Romans, thinking that they had been treacherously attacked, set their 
hearts on getting the better of the Carthaginians, and the latter, conscious of 
their guilt, were ready to suffer anything rather than fall into the power of the 
Romans. 
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Nevertheless, Polybius stresses that Scipio himself does place limits upon his thirst 
for vengeance, with his statement in the next chapter that Scipio will not himself sink 
to the level of the Carthaginians by attacking ambassadors (Polybius, 15.4). Polybius 
endorses Scipio's view and leaves no room for doubt that he himself shares the 
sentiments. Indeed, as Walbank notes297 , Polybius's statement concerning Roman 
morality on this matter recurs frequently in later sources on Roman history. 
eEwpwv yup T~V crq>ETEpa v 1TU Tpi&a 1TEpl 1T AElCTTOV 1TOIOV!J.EVT)V ~v 1TEpl 
TOV<; npEcr.BEVTU<; TilCTTIV, ECTKOTIElTO nap' U\JTi;) crvAAoyiZoiJ.EVO<; ovx ovTw<; 
Tt &iov na6Eiv KapxT)&oviov<;, w<; Tt &iov ~v npu~a1 'Pw!J.aiov<;. (Polybius, 
15.4.10) 
For aware as he was of the high value attached by his own nation to keeping 
faith to ambassadors, he took into consideration not so much the deserts of the 
Carthaginians as the duty of the Romans. 
However, in Livy 30.28.1, we receive a very different picture of the mindset of the 
Romans. The emphasis here is placed upon the duality of their thoughts. 
Inter haec simul spes simul cura in dies crescebat nee satis certum constare apud 
animos poterat utrum gaudio dignius esset Hannibalem post sextum decimum 
annum ex Italia decedentem uacuam possessionem eius reliquisse populo 
Romano, an magis metuendum quod incolumi exercitu in Africam transisset: 
(Livy, 30.28.1) 
Meanwhile, hope and anxiety alike were increasing from day to day, and men 
could not quite make up their minds whether it was a fit subject for rejoicing 
that Hannibal, retiring from Italy after sixteen years, had left the Roman people 
to take possession of it, and not rather a ground for apprehension that he had 
crossed over to Africa with his army intact. 
The significance of these lines is not immediately clear. It is perhaps somewhat 
surprising that the non-Roman author, namely Polybius, should apparently be so 
2
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determined to give a version of events which places the Romans firmly upon the 
moral high ground. At the same time, it also comes as rather a surprise that Livy, a 
Roman source writing almost two centuries after Polybius, with access to Polybius's 
works, should have missed such an opportunity to replicate a passage that reflected so 
generously upon the Romans. However, it is my belief that it is Polybius's 
"proximity" to these events, rather than intentional bias towards the Romans that has 
shaped the nature of his account here. 
Indeed, we must treat the story of the Carthaginian attack upon the Roman 
ambassadors with a certain degree of caution. Harris gives numerous examples of 
both real and alleged attacks upon and abuse of ambassadors being used by Rome as a 
pretext for military action, where the real motivation comes from entirely different 
sources. The murder of an ambassador was apparently used as a pretext for a war with 
Illyrii98 , while perhaps rather unsound accusations of ill-treatment were used as 
pretexts for war with Dalmatia299, the Achaean League]00 and even for the declaration 
of the Third Punic War]01 . There is no hint in either Livy or Polybius that the Punic 
attack upon the ambassadors was in any way fabricated. Nevertheless, this seems to 
me to be further evidence for the possibility that Polybius had been significantly 
affected by Roman propaganda surrounding these events, propaganda which was 
perhaps more transparent (and hence more tempting to downplay) by the time of Livy. 
When Polybius was writing his history, some veterans of Zama would still have been 
alive and it would have been perfectly possible for Polybius to have been exposed, 
even if only second hand, to their accounts of the battle:102 Indeed, given the 
significance that came to be attached to this battle, it is improbable, to say the least, 
that Polybius would have been able to live in Rome for any length of time without 
being treated to accounts of the battle, its prelude and the thoughts of those involved. 
Livy, on the other hand, has a far wider perspective on these events. It is not that he 
does not want to demonstrate to his readers the strength of the Roman moral 
superiority; as we shall see, he later does this at length during the speech of Scipio. 
~~R Harris. 1979, page 195 
~~9 Harris. 1979. pages 233-234 
-""Harris. 1979. pages 240-241 
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1 Harris. 1979. pages 234-235 
-"'~The issue of average lifespan in the ancient world is obviously of relevance here. While I do not 
have time lo explore this in depth. see Kajanto. 1968. 
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Rather, he believes that he can give his account of these events a more pleasing shape 
and a more obvious role in his history by giving a wider context to his psychological 
assessment of those involved in Zama. Ultimately, Livy is guilty of treating the 
Roman forces at Zama as though they were all historians. The thoughts he ascribes to 
them are the thoughts that we would expect from intelligent and partially detached 
observers, with a detailed knowledge of the events of the war to that point. Given the 
length of the Second Punic War and fact that many of those fighting at Zama would 
have been just infants when Hannibal gained his initial victories in Italy303 (even 
Scipio himself would have been of no great age at this time), it is highly unlikely that 
any significant section of the Roman army would have been able to achieve such a 
perspective. 
Another aspect of this section of Livy's narrative that is worthy of note, and which is 
not found in Polybius's work, is the manner in which he applies Roman form to 
Hannibal and his army. 
multos occursuros Scipioni in acie qui praetores, qui imperatores, qui consules 
Romanos sua manu occidissent, muralibus uallaribusque insignes coronis, 
peruagatos capta castra captas urbes Romanas. non esse hodie tot fasces 
magistratibus populi Romani quot captos ex caede imperatorum prae se ferre 
posset Hannibal. (Livy, 30.28.6-7) 
Many men who would encounter Scipio in battle had with their own hands slain 
Roman praetors, generals-in-command, consuls, had been decorated with 
crowns for bravery in scaling city-walls and camp defences, had wandered 
through captured camps, captured cities of the Romans. All the magistrates of 
the Roman people did not have so many fasces as Hannibal was able to have 
borne before him, having captured them from Roman generals. 
The purpose of showing Hannibal and his army decked out in the Roman manner and 
loaded down with Roman spoils is not only to remind the reader of the victories that 
Hannibal has won over the Romans, but also to elevate the Carthaginian troops onto 
·""For discussion of the range of ages of soldiers serving in the Roman army, see Roth, 1999. pages 9-
13 
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the same level as the Roman forces. The credit due to the Roman forces will be all the 
greater if their victory can be shown to have been won over a worthy opponent. 
After this episode, both Polybius and Livy describe Hannibal's relocation to Zama 
(Polybius, 15.5.1, Livy 30.29.1) and an episode in the Roman camp, where Scipio 
presents captured Punic scouts with a tour of the Roman camp and allows them to 
return to Hannibal unscathed (Polybius 15.5.4-7, Livy 30.29.2-3). Both remark that 
the position taken by Hannibal was disadvantageous due to its distance from water, a 
factor upon which Appian blames the Carthaginian defeat (Polybius 15.5.8, Livy 
30.29.10 and Appian, Punic War, 7.30). However, once we come to the matter of the 
conference between Scipio and Hannibal, differences between the accounts again 
emerge. In Polybius, Hannibal's decision to meet with Scipio is inspired by his 
curiosity and admiration resulting from Scipio's treatment of his scouts (Polybius 
15.5.8). The dominant theme is that of respect for a worthy opponent. Hannibal's 
actions are in contravention of his orders from his Carthaginian rulers, who had 
ordered him to confront Scipio in battle directly. Livy, on the other hand, confesses 
ignorance as to whether Hannibal was ordered to conduct the negotiations and even 
inserts a note that Valerius Antias describes them as taking place after an initial battle, 
which went in favour of the Roman forces. 
The conference itself follows broadly the same outline in the accounts of both 
Polybius and Livy. However, on closer inspection, a number of discrepancies become 
clear. Walbank discusses the historical basis for this section and argues in favour of 
speeches having their base in reality. However, we must remain aware of the practice 
of using speeches to say "what needed to be said"304 . While Walbank'05 finds it 
reassuring that the speeches present Hannibal as the aging, experienced statesman and 
Scipio as the younger, more aggressive Roman aristocrat, I find this conformity to 
established stereotypes to be somewhat suggestive of plausible-invention on the part 
'"·
1 This phrase is a rough translation of Thucydides 1.22.1. which. as is rightly stated by Woodman. 
1988. page II. remains one of the most discussed passages in all of classical literature. Woodman lays 
out several of the opinions that have been offered on this passage. such as Kagan's insistence that 
Thucydides offered an entirely accurate reproduction of every speech. Woodman himself comes down 
upon the side of G.E.M De Ste Croix, who proposed a theory that Thucydides gave the "general gist" 
of what was said. while still relying on invention for the flesh of the speeches. The significance of this 
passage is increased by the fact that Thucydides provided such a commonly-used model for later 
historians. particularly in the manner of the presentation of their speeches. 
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of Polybius. Eckstein refers to this scene and notes the similarities between the young 
Hannibal, as presented by Polybius, and Hannibal's own impression of Scipio306; 
further evidence, in my mind, that Polybius is employing invention to further his 
literary objectives. In particular, Polybius's asse11ion that the conference happened 
between the two men with only an interpreter in attendance (Polybius 15.6.3) (and 
indeed Scipio's assertion that the substance of the conversation is not worth relaying 
to Rome (Polybius 15.8. I 3)) seems to me to make it highly implausible that the 
speeches given here are an accurate account of "what was actually said". 
The differences between the speeches can be summarised as follows. Polyhius begins 
with an account of how the warfare between the Carthaginians and the Romans spread 
from its beginnings in Sicily and Spain to the gates of the home-cities of the nations 
themselves (Polybius 15.6.4-6). He then expresses his intention to deliver his city 
from danger and put an end to the strife with the Romans (Polybius 15.6.7). Livy's 
Hannibal opens with a somewhat more dramatic tone, reminiscent of the language of 
tragedy. 
tum Hannibal prior: 'si hoc ita fato datum erat ut qui primus bellum intuli 
populo Romano, quique totiens prope in manibus uictoriam habui, is ultro ad 
pacem petendam uenirem, laetor te mihi sorte potissimum datum a quo peterem. 
(Livy 30.30.3) 
Then Hannibal, the first to speak: "If it was foreordained by fate that I, who was 
the first to make war on the Roman people and who should so often have had 
victory in my grasp, should come forward to sue for peace, I rejoice that destiny 
has given me you and no one else to whom I should bring my suit. 
He then goes on to flatter Scipio and to remind Scipio of the importance of the man 
who now begs him for peace. 
After this introduction, he then covers the same territory as had Polybius in his own 
introduction to Hannibal's speech, namely the geographical scope of the war and the 
306 Eckstein. 1995. page 145 
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immediacy it has held for both of the powers involved, coming as it has to the very 
gates of their city. He also denounces the greed that has led his people to desire 
territory beyond Africa; an indirect parallel to the opening line of this speech as it is 
given by Polybius. 
8-E~\WO"CtJ.HVOc; 8-E -rrpwToc; 'Avvi0uc; ~p~UTO AEYEIV we; E0ovAETO J.l.EV O.v J.l.~TE 
'PwJ.Laiovc; E-rr16vJ.L~O"al J.l.TJS"Ii-rroTE J.l.fJS"Evoc; Twv EKToc; 'lTa)\\ac; J.l.~TE 
KupxfJS"ovlovc; Twv EKToc; Al0vT)c;. (Polybius 15.6.4) 
Hannibal first saluted Scipio and began to speak as follows: "Would that neither 
the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the 
Carthaginians any outside Africa;" 
Both speeches then continue with Hannibal reflecting upon the nature of fortune and 
warning Scipio of the sudden twists she can cause, out of fear that his young Roman 
counterpart is unaware of them (Polybius 15.6.8- 15.7.2, Livy 30.30). In Polybius's 
account, Hannibal gives a single illustration of this (Polybius 15.7.2-4) and then goes 
on to propose terms for a treaty and conclude his speech. Livy, however, spends far 
more time on elaboration of this point. In Livy's account, Hannibal focuses not only 
upon the downturn in his own fortunes, but also upon the reversal in fortunes that 
Scipio has brought about for his family. By describing Scipio as avenging his father 
and uncle, Livy transforms a war between nations into a feud between two families. 
The vocabulary of tragedy cast a heavy shadow over all of Hannibal's speech, as Livy 
relates it. If the Hannibal of Polybius's account is a statesman, willing to use literary 
motifs in order to reinforce his point, but primarily concerned with results, then 
Livy' s Hannibal is both a tragic hero and a philosopher. The severity of his language 
used and the emphasis upon Hannibal's wretched current state are both evocative or 
tragedy. However, as Walsh observes, Hannibal's lecture on the fickle nature or fate 
is also reminiscent of the teachings of the Stoics.307 In this respect, Hannibal is very 
much a Roman figure here, just as his army had earlier taken on the characteristics of 
a Roman army. 
-'
01 Watsh, 196l.page 103 
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Indeed, the most significant difference between the versions of this speech given by 
Livy and Polyhius lies in their respective lengths, with Livy's account being longer.30H 
Therefore, it comes as something of a surprise that Scipio's reply is equally brief in 
both of our sources. The ingredients of Scipios's speech arc again broadly the same in 
both Livy and Polybius; Scipio rebuts Hannibal's claim that the Romans should view 
Carthage's current situation as an incentive to make peace and denounces the 
Carthaginians for their treachery in breaking the earlier treaty, rejecting the newly 
proposed terms for peace as a reward for Carthaginian perfidy. However, while 
Poly hi us spends most of the speech dwelling upon the disgust that Scipio feels for the 
Carthaginians' breaking of the earlier treaty, the emphasis in Livy is once again upon 
the role of fate. The rejection of the terms for the treaty is crammed into the last few 
lines of the speech. Poly hi us, on the other hand, does not even explicitly relate 
Scipio's rejection of Hannibal's arguments concerning fate, but rather relegates them 
into summarised, indirect speech, before the beginning of his more direct narration 
(Polyhius 15.8.3). 
The conclusions I would draw from a comparison of the speeches in the two sources 
are largely the same as the conclusions I drew from the comparison of the earlier 
psychological assessments. Polybius's focus is very much upon the justification for 
Rome's continuation of hostilities. For Polybius, the key issue here is that the 
Carthaginians have already proven themselves unworthy of trust through their 
violation of their earlier treaty and that for Scipio to reject their proposal is not only 
understandable, but also morally right. As before, I would defend Polyhius from 
charges of pro-Roman bias on the grounds that the majority of Polybius's sources of 
information, namely the Romans involved in the events themselves, would have 
unfailingly focussed upon this aspect of the matter in their accounts. Livy, on the 
other hand, is writing from a far more distant vantage point. His sources do not have 
the immediacy in their need to emphasise the justifications for the Roman actions. As 
such Livy has rather more freedom to focus upon the development of characters and 
the theme of fate. In Livy's account, the motives of the generals are more personal 
and even philosophical than they are political. There can he little doubt that Polyhius 
.1ox In general, the speeches are generally so similar that Chaplin. 2000. page 25 cites this as the speech 
in which Livy comes the closest to simply reproducing Polybius. 
95 
intended his depiction of Hannibal here to serve as an exemplum309, yet Livy assumes 
the freedom to develop the lesson further by developing the treatment of the theme in 
Scipio's reply. 
Once the negotiations have failed, the accounts of both authors move on to the battle 
itself. Here, we find extremely close correspondence between the two accounts and it 
will not he necessary to make detailed comparisons for the entire duration of the 
battle. Indeed, that the accounts should correspond so closely in this area is perhaps 
indicative of Livy's evident unfamiliarity with military matters; he does not have a 
detailed understanding of the matters under discussion, so he is forced to trust the 
judgement of others. Both authors briefly emphasise the scale and importance of the 
battle before they begin their accounts, but although their methods differ slightly, the 
intention is the same (Polybius 15.9.1-6 and Livy 30.32.2-5). The mindsets of the 
armies are not differentiated at this point; both Romans and Carthaginians are 
thinking alike. 
Livy and Polybius present the encouragement that the generals give to their army very 
differently. In Polyhius's account, it is Scipio's speech that comes first, while Livy 
presents them in the opposing order. However, while Polybius gives a supposedly 
direct account of both speeches, Livy repm1s them only indirectly. The speech of 
Scipio reported by Polybius feels highly generic; it reminds the Romans of the spoils 
that await them if they win (Polybius 15.1 0.2) and of the honour that will be bestowed 
upon those who die fighting if the Romans are beaten (Polybius, 15.1 0.3). It also 
contains a standard exhortation not to flee, with a reminder of the dishonour and 
eventual death that this will incur (Polybius 15.10.3-5). In Livy's account, Scipio is 
more concerned with arousing his men's anger over the Carthaginian violation of the 
truce. He mentions the Carthaginian's weakness and, according to an extremely 
interesting comment by Livy, he uses the fact that his conference with Hannibal had 
gone unobserved to misrepresent his Carthaginian counterpart. This is as clear as one 
could expect to definite evidence that Livy did not intend his earlier narration of the 
conference between Hannibal and Livy to be taken as an accurate account and that he 
did not believe Polyhius's account to be any more precise. Both authors pay less 
309 Eckstein 1995, page 145 discusses the moral lesson that Hannibal delivers here. 
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auention to the speech of Hannibal and in both cases, the primary focus is upon the 
past successes of the Carthaginians, although Polybius also shows Hannibal 
comparing the size and quality of the Roman army at Zama with the size of the armies 
that the Carthaginians have faced in the past. 
Unlike the conference between the generals, the speeches to the troops would 
obviously have been conducted in full view of the armies. As such, Polybius would 
presumably have been able to speak to people at Rome who had been direct witnesses 
to Scipio's speech and his account must be given a greater degree of credibility than 
Livy's. Indeed, I am tempted to believe that Livy's summary of Scipio's speech was 
intended primarily as an estimate of what it would have been appropriate for Scipio to 
say in the context, in the belief that this would be more interesting than the rather 
mundane and generic speech that was indeed delivered.310 
In between the speeches of the generals comes the description of how they an·ay their 
forces. Obviously, this passage is highly significant for our purposes. As one would 
perhaps expect, Livy relies heavily on Polybius for this section and indeed some of 
the lines of Livy's text read very much like a direct translation of Polybius. However, 
it is extremely interesting to note that Livy actually misinterprets Polybius on one of 
the most crucial sections of this passage. Polybius describes the maniples being drawn 
up contrary to the usual fashion, with the principes directly behind the front-line 
hastati, rather than in the gaps between the maniples of the hastati, as was normal. 
1TpwTov }-LEV Tour; ao-Tcl.Tovr; Ka.l Tur; TOIJTwv OTJ}.J.a.la.r; f.v ~ta.O"T~}.J.a.mv, hrl 
~E TOVTot<; Tour; 1TplyKma.r;, Tt8elr; TU<; 0"1TElpa.<; ov Ka. TU TO T~>V 1TpWTWV 
O"i)}.J.O.H:,V ~tcl.O"Ti)}.J.O., Ka.ea. mp [8or; EO"Tl TOt<; 'Pw}.J.O.lOI<;, aAAu Ka. Ta.AA~Aov<; 
f.v a1Too-Tcl.o-et ~~a. To 1rA!)8or; Twv 1ra.pu Tot<; f.va.vTimr; f.:Aecpcl.vTwv. (Polybius 
15.9.7) 
In front he placed the hastati with certain intervals between the maniples and 
behind them the principes, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman 
3111 The question of the authenticity of battle exhortations has heen the subject of much debate. Hansen. 
1993. argues that the hattie exhortation is a Thucydidean creation. which could not practically have 
heen delivered on the battlefield. He argues that such exhortations would, in reality, have been limited 
to a few simple phrases shouted as the general took his position in the line. 
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custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly 
behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the 
enemy's elephants. 
The effect of this is to allow for wide, open channels between the maniples, which 
might be manipulated so as to allow the Punic elephants to pass through without 
causing significant harm to the Roman lines. However, Livy misunderstands Polybius 
here and presents us with a very different and rather confused-sounding account. 
Non confertas autem cohortes ante sua quamque signa instruebat sed manipulos 
aliquantum inter se distantes ut esset spatium qua elephanti hostium acti nihil 
ordines turbarent. (Livy, 30.33.1 )311 
However, he did not form cohorts in close contact, each in advance of its 
standard, but rather maniples at a considerable distance from each other, so that 
there should be an interval where the enemy's elephants might be driven 
through without breaking up the ranks. 
Livy's describes Scipio as drawing up his forces in maniplcs rather than cohorts, so as 
to leave a wide gap between the groups of forces. Although Livy had understood from 
Polybius that Scipio wished to allow open channels for the elephants to pass through, 
he had completely misunderstood the means that were employed. The introduction 
here of the idea of the cohort as a tactical unit is anachronistic, since as has been 
discussed, the cohort does not seem to have been introduced until near the end of the 
second century BC. Indeed, Livy's failure to understand Polybius here must surely 
give us cause to doubt that Livy properly understood the aJTangement of the maniple 
formation. 
Livy then follows Polybius extremely carefully in describing the deployment of 
Scipio's cavalry and the placement of its commanders. As is so often the case, the 
cavalry is not Roman. In this case, we appear to have cavalry from the other Italian 
nations on the left wing and Numidians on the right. Livy then follows the final part 
111 Livy's mistake here has often been remarked upon by commentators and is even deemed worthy of 
a footnote in Moore's 1949 Loeb translation. 
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of Polybius's account of the deployment of the Roman forces by describing the 
placing of and the orders given to the light-am1ed velites. Of course, with Livy's 
earlier misinterpretation of Polybius' s description of the placing of the maniples, this 
particular passage does not sound particularly coherent in Livy's account, since Livy 
has already lead the reader to suppose that the channels between the maniples are of 
considerable width . 
Livy continues to stay extremely close to Polybius during the account of the 
disposition of Hannibal's forces. Hannibal adopts a formation three lines deep, with a 
fourth reserve force. The elephants, of which both authors tell us he had more than 
eighty, are at the front. Livy embellishes slightly here, by commenting that this was a 
greater number of elephants than Hannibal had fielded in any earlier battle. This is a 
simple attempt to further impress the reader with the magnitude and significance of 
this battle. Livy follows Polybius fairly exactly in describing the composition of the 
second line, which is made up of mercenaries of various nationalities, although he 
does add a legion of Macedonians, which Waf bank argues might be an invention of 
the annalistic tradition 31 \ and the third line, composed of Libyans and Carthaginians. 
However, Livy once again embellishes on Polybius when describing the Punic 
reserves. Polybius simply comments that the forth line was made of troops brought 
over from Italy and that it was placed more than a stade behind the other lines. Livy 
comments that these soldiers were mostly Bruttians and that they had been compelled 
to fight against their will. There is certainly no mention of this in Polybius, but sadly 
we do not have sufficient evidence to tell whether Livy had another source for this or 
whether he was simply trying to rind a convincing explanation for the deployment of 
these troops so far behind the other lines. 
However, as noted by Walbank313, it is highly likely that this force is actually 
composed of Hannibal's veterans of his Italian campaigns, who would, of course, be 
his most experienced and most trusted troops. In this case, the purpose of holding 
them back would be to keep them fresh until such a time as their entry into the battle 
would have the greatest effect. Given that this makes good tactical sense and that the 
dangers inherent in leaving a force of dubious loyalty alone and unguarded behind the 
312 Walbank, 1967, page 456 
311 Walbank. 1967. page 458 
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main body of an army and across its line of retreat, the likely conclusion is that Livy's 
explanation was spurious and incorrect. This shows either that Livy was not always 
particularly cautious and careful in drawing inferences from his readings of more 
militarily competent sources, or else that he did not exercise sufficient caution in 
checking "alternative" sources that he may have used where he believed his major 
sources to be inadequate in the level of detail they provided. The section ends with the 
deployment of the Punic cavalry, which, as usual, is on the wings of the force. Livy 
follows Polybius with no embellishment in this section. 
With the forces drawn up and the troops encouraged, the battle finally begins. Livy 
again diverges slightly from Polybius here, since he depicts the battle as beginning 
suddenly, while Hannibal is still addressing his troops, with the Romans giving the 
first battle-cry. Polybius's account had the battle beginning when both sides were 
fully prepared, and after there had already been some skirmishing between the 
Numidian cavalry that both sides possessed. Indeed, in Polybius's account, it is 
Hannibal who gives the signal for the start of the battle itself, when he gives the order 
for his elephants to attack. Regardless of this discrepancy, Livy then follows Polybius 
almost exactly in his description of the elephants panicking upon hearing the battle 
cries and innicting much harm upon their own lines. Despite his earlier confusion, he 
also follows accurately Polybius's account of the Romans handling of the elephants 
who penetrated the Roman ranks. However, Livy cites the elephants driven out of the 
Roman Jines as the main cause of the Carthaginian cavalry being put to flight. Indeed, 
Livy relegates Laelius, the Roman cavalry commander, to a fairly minor role here, 
simply exacerbating the panic among the ranks of the Carthaginian horse. In 
Polybius' s earlier account, it is Laelius' s seizing of the initiative that routs the Punic 
cavalry. Despite the often-attested fear that war-elephants inspired in cavalry, 
Polybius's account again seems the more credible. Scipio's plan had been to allow the 
elephants to pass through his ranks and to go beyond, out of the battlefield. Given the 
lumbering inertia of war-elephants, it seems more likely to me that the elephants did 
indeed pass through the Roman force, rather than being driven back upon their own 
ranks. Again, I believe Livy to be engaging in the invention of what he sees as likely 
factors for issues which his earlier sources did not fully explain. Polybius's account of 
Laelius's charge is, it must be granted, extremely sh011 on details and it is my belief 
that Livy wished to provide a fuller account. 
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This now leaves the Carthaginian forces without any cavalry support at all. Livy's 
dependence upon Polybius is further revealed as he follows his antecedent upon a 
digression concerning the nature of the Roman war-cry as opposed to the Punic one. 
Livy does perhaps show some awareness here that this is at best a peripheral issue for 
the battle, since, unlike Polybius, he remarks Ad hoc dictu parva sed magna eadem 
in re gerenda momenta (Livy, 30.34.1 ). In addition, he omits the quote from Homer 
that Polybius uses to illustrate his point. 
Livy's account then progresses to the hand-to-hand combat involved in the battle. 
Although he broadly follows Polybius's account here, there are some interesting 
variations and stylistic differences. In both accounts, Hannibal's mercenaries push 
forwards and engage the Romans. However, the better-disciplined and more 
numerous Roman ranks push back the mercenaries towards their second line. The 
Carthaginians in the second line have not, to this point, engaged in battle; a marked 
contrast to the Roman second line, who are pushing forwards the hastati and 
encouraging them. At this point, Polybius is highly p~jorative of the Carthaginian 
second line, describing them as Jltcr9o<j>opot<;. (Polybius 15.13.3) Livy takes a more 
detached and less emotive approach to the battle, avoiding the use of language with 
moral implication. Indeed, unlike Polybius, Livy supplies us with the probable 
military justification for refusing to allow the mercenaries to retreat into the 
Carthaginian second line. 
non tamen ita perculsos iratosque in adem accepere sed densatis ordinibus in 
cornua vacuumque circa campum extra proelium eiecere, ne pauido fuga 
vulneribusque milite sinceram et integram adem miscerent. (Livy, 30.34.8) 
Nevertheless, even so they did not admit the panic-stricken angry men into the 
line, but closing up their ranks, they forced them out upon the wings and into the 
empty plain on this side and that outside of the battle, in order not to 
contaminate their own line, still intact and fresh, with soldiers alarmed by the 
flight and their own wounds. 
101 
We now move on to the final stage of the battle. Not all that much needs to be said 
about this for the most pari, since Livy broadly follows Polybius's account. With the 
ground now soaked with blood and covered with bodies314, the advancing hastati find 
their ranks broken up by the uneven terrain. Therefore, Scipio orders a temporary halt 
and reorders the line, bringing the principes and the triarii onto the wings of the 
hastati and advancing in a single line. This line then engages the powerful Carthagian 
second line, which has thus far escaped unscathed. The two sides are fairly evenly 
matched in terms of numbers, skill and spirit, but the return of the Roman cavalry 
allows the CaJihaginians to be encircled and slaughtered, thus ending the battle. 
I suspect that Livy intended to show himself the better historian, through an apparent 
dismissal of subjectivity and there can be no doubt that Livy's account here reads 
more like a dry, scholarly work of military history. However, on the other hand, it 
also demonstrates a far lesser degree of empathy with the combatants; both with the 
advancing Roman front-line and the retreating mercenaries. Polybius's account far 
better conveys the anger that must necessarily have been felt by the mercenaries, as 
refuge was denied to them by their own allies. 
Major discrepancies between the accounts begin once again with the negotiations for 
peace after the battle. In Livy, the treatment of the Carihaginian ambassadors is 
described rather summarily. 
Postero die reuocatis legalis et cum multa castigatione perfidiae monitis ut tot 
cladibus edocti tandem deos et ius iurandum esse crederent (Livy 30.37 .I) 
On the following day the envoys were recalled and with repeated upbraiding for 
their treachery were advised that, being taught at last by so many disasters they 
should believe that the gods and an oath mean something. 
Polybius, however, discusses the matter in far more detail. Indeed, he describes a 
speech given by Scipio to the Ca1ihaginian ambassadors, in which he reminds them 
314 o· Huys, 1987. page 229 discusses the use of gory imagery here in Polybius. D' Huys argues that 
Polybius is normally averse to nccepting gory descriptions of events. on the grounds that they are 
spurious and engineered to evoke pathos. The inclusion of the gory details in this passage is because 
Polybius wishes to emphasise the historical importance of the facts in question. 
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that they have no right to safety (Polybius, 15.17.3-4); a reminder of the earlier 
Ca11haginian attack on Roman ambassadors and the fury it provoked. 
We can draw several conclusions from this episode. First, it is clear that Livy did 
indeed make extremely heavy usc of Polybius when writing his account of this battle. 
The order of events is exactly the same and, for many of the sequences which focus 
on more technical military matters, Livy's work reads almost as a straight translation 
of Polybius, although as we have seen, Livy does, on occasion, become confused and 
differ from Polybius's account through what must surely be accidental error. 
However, to say that Livy just used Polybius, with occasional references to other 
annalists is to grossly oversimplify the matter. It seems to me that in many areas, Livy 
is content to edit and rewrite sections so as to make a more coherent story and one 
that is better fitted to his own time. 315 It is clear to me that the issue of the attack upon 
the ambassadors was of great importance in Polybius's time and that it was viewed as 
a central part of the Zama episode. However, by Livy's time, this sequence has been 
swept aside somewhat and buried under more general conceptions of the battle's role 
in the broader span of the Second Punic War. As such, Livy's changes in emphasis 
are all but inevitable. 
m See Chaplin. 2000. page 25 for discussion of Livy's frequent adaptation of earlier exemplo for 
Augustan audiences. 
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Chapter 4.4 - The Battle of the Muluccha 
The next of my case studies shall be taken from Sallust's work, the Bellum 
Jugurthinum. In many ways, the battle I have chosen to examine here stands in direct 
contrast to Cannae and Zama. While those two great battles against the Carthaginians 
were rightly famous in Roman times, and even retain a degree of this fame in certain 
circles today, the battle at the fort near the river Muluccha is virtually unknown and is 
generally not even attributed a proper name. Nevertheless, I intend to show both that 
this battle was of sufficient scale and significance to be worthy of study and that it 
casts some interesting renections upon Roman techniques for military history. 
The description of the battle fills three chapters of the Bellum Jugurthinum, running as 
it does from chapter 92 through to chapter 94. The reader's initial impression as to the 
significance of this battle is diminished somewhat, since it is placed between two 
episodes of seemingly greater importance. The sacking of Capsa, which was 
instrumental in opening up the eastern sections of Numidia to Marius, precedes the 
account of the Battle of the Muluccha. Although Sallust does not spend more than 
three chapters on the destruction of Capsa, the amount of editorial comment that he 
interjects into the account, including his partial defence of Marius' s actions 
(considered harsh, perhaps unduly so, even by ancient standards), leaves us in no 
doubt that he attached great significance to these events. Chapter 95 sees the 
introduction of a new character into the narrative, namely Sulla, whose future role in 
the course of Roman history was to prove so great. In the two chapters he devotes to 
Sulla's arrival at Marius's camp, Sallust lavishes much attention upon his future role, 
and the characteristics that allowed him to achieve such prominence. 
Sandwiched between these two narrative highlights, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Battle of the Muluccha should have escaped significant notice. However, I can 
find no evidence to suggest that Sallust himself wished to "bury away" the account in 
his text. Indeed, in many ways, the Battle of the Muluccha is among the most unique 
of the battles described by Sallust and contains many historical parallels of which he 
may have wished to make the reader aware. As Paulnotes316, the journey to the 
31
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Muluccha must surely have been a far from trivial undertaking for Marius, given that 
it lies far from Capsa. Paul notes that this expedition would have necessitated the 
continuation of Marius's campaigns through the winter months (a feat by no means 
impossible in the warm climate of Northern Africa), although he also allows for the 
possibility that Sallust has deliberately rearranged the chronology of events here, for 
structural reasons. 
Syme also takes issue with Sallust's handling of the chronology of these events. 317 
Indeed, he even cites the episode as one of those most damaging to Sallust's 
reputation as a source of information on military events. 318 Syme identifies the 
Muluccha as being all of five hundred miles from Cirta, where much of Manus's 
campaigning in I 07BC had been focused. Moreover, Paul states that the Muluccha 
was almost seven hundred and fifty miles from Capsa, where the narrative last placed 
Marius. If we accept Paul's estimate that the armies in North Africa would have 
marched at an average of two miles per hour for twelve hours a day 319, then we still 
have a minimum duration for the journey of over thirty one days. Moreover, with 
much of the territory to be crossed being poorly known, inhospitable and held by a 
population which was not necessarily friendly, necessities of reconnaissance, resupply 
and even combat must surely have slowed the progress of the troops even further. 320 
Indeed, Syme speculates that Sallust has confused the river Muluccha with another. 321 
However, Syme does not go any further than speculation and Paul cites Sallust's 
always-erratic reporting as evidence that his failure to comment on this march is no 
reason to believe that it did not occur. 322 
Chapter 92 begins with a brief and possibly somewhat barbed passage describing the 
high esteem that Marius had won himself through his earlier actions. Sallust remarks 
m Syme, 1964. page 146 
-''X Syme, 1964. page 148 
''"Paul. 1984. page 226 
-'""The matter of long distance endurance marches rose briefly to prominence in the twentieth century 
during the Second World War. after the Japanese media reported in 1942 that one of their anny 
battalions had set a new record by marching a hundred miles in seventy two hours. Shorly afterwards. a 
battalion from the US 5061h Regiment beat this record by marching a hundred and eighteen miles in the 
same time. Both of these marches were conducted on friendly territory. in relatively hospitable 
environments and both left the men involved exhausted and unfit for further marching. let alone 
combat. In this light. the achievements of Marius in North Africa seem all the more impressive. 
·'"' Syme. 1964. page 148 
m Paul. 1984. page 230 
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that both his friends and his enemies believed him to be either supremely skilful or 
divinely inspired. 323 However, as Paul notes, Sallust does not necessarily mean 
comments about divine inspiration to be taken as compliments324 and the passage also 
potentially contains a criticism of Marius's handling of his troops. Whether or not this 
criticism is real depends very much upon our reaction to the phrase "modesto 
imperium" (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 63.6). Paul~25 chooses to read this as 
meaning "rigorous discipline", in which case, no criticism of Marius would be 
implied. However, in the older Loeb translation, Rolfe326 translates it as "mild 
discipline", arguing in favour of his interpretation in a footnote. Although, as Paul 
notes, his own interpretation of this fits better with our description of Marius' s 
treatment of his troops at other periods during his life, it does not seem unfeasible that 
Marius's rather precarious political position at this juncture would have led to him 
attempting to curry favour from his troops. 
Marius remains a complicated character in Sallust's work. When he is discussed in 
detail in chapter 63, the portrait is, for the most part, positive. Marius had grown up in 
Arpinum, where he had engaged in preparation fitting for a life of military service, 
rather than for a life of leisure (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 63.3). His character was 
initially flawless and free from unsuitable ambition (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 
63.2). When he embarked on his political career, he progressed from office to office 
on the basis of his ownmerits.327 His only disadvantage was the lack of an aristocratic 
family background (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 63.2 and 63.6-7). However, this is 
tempered by an allusion to the ambition that was to drive him later in life: 
nam postea ambitione praeceps datus est (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.4) 
For afterwards he was driven headlong by ambition 
.1 2.1 Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum. 92.2 
·' 2~ Paul. 1984. 22~-224 
m Paul. 1984. pages 227-228 
'
26 Rolfe. 1960. pages ~~2-~~~ 
.127 Sallust, Rel/wn Jugurthinum. 6~.5- Paul. 1984. page 170-171 rightly notes that this does not fit 
particularly comfortably with what we know of Marius's career from elsewhere and that there are real 
difficulties reconciling it with Plutarch. L((e C!( Marius, 5 
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Later in the narrative, Marius remains a difficult figure; he is, For the most part, a 
competent and careful commander (Sallust, Bellum Jugurrhinum, I 00.1 ), although 
Sallust does hint at occasional flashes of recklessness, particularly when he describes 
his reasons for wishing to attack Capsa (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 89.6). Marius's 
political ambitions figure heavily in the narrative, especially his desire for the 
consulship. However, since the aristocratic party to which Marius is opposed is 
portrayed in a highly negative light, Marius's ambition and the military reforms that 
follow on from his electoral success (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 84 and 86) arc 
seen as a positive influence, for the most part. Perhaps more unreservedly negative is 
Marius's reliance upon fortune to can·y the battle for him, a trait that we shall sec 
fully demonstrated in the account of the events at the Muluccha. Kraus and Woodman 
perhaps ofFer the best surmise oF Sallust's treatment of Marius, when they talk of 
"virtus alloyed with base elements, sometimes turning a man from the proper course 
altogether". 328 
After his reflections on Marius, and another brief passage on the capitulation of other 
Numidian towns, following the example set at Capsa (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 
92.3), Sallust turns to matters at the river Muluccha. The initial description of the 
enterprise makes no mention of the formidable journey that Marius would have made, 
but does stress the difficulty of the undertaking. 
aliam rem aggreditur non eadem asperitate qua Capsensium, ceterum baud 
secus difficilem. (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.4) 
He essayed another feat, not involving the same danger as the taking of Capsa, 
but no less difficult. 
As I said above, numerous explanations have been ventured as to why Sallust should 
have been so comparatively dismissive of this venture. I find myself in agreement 
with Paul's arguments that Sallust did not make any geographical errors, particularly 
his argument that without the lengthy return march, there is little else to fill the 
32
s Kraus and Woodman. 1997. page II 
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campaigning season for 106.329 Given Marius's election was so heavily based on 
promises to bring the war to a speedy conclusion (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 64-
65), it seems to me highly unlikely that he would have spent significant lengths of 
time sat idle. It seems most likely that Sallust did not comment upon the journey 
because it did not fit into his narrative and because he had so recently described 
another long journey (although not, admittedly, a journey of the same order of 
magnitude) undertaken by Marius, in chapters 90 and 91. 
Next, Sallust describes the terrain on which the battle was fought. The fort was 
situated on a rocky hill in the middle of a plain near the river. The fort was high and 
only accessible by a single path (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.5). Paul notes that 
the description given by Sallust is too vague for the location to be precisely 
identified330, but we nevertheless receive enough information to get a rough idea of 
the tactical situation. The fort on the hill is strong enough to resist almost any attack 
by conventional means and it is well enough supplied to last for a considerable time 
under siege (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.7). Siege engines and towers are 
impractical, due to the narrow approach to the fortress, which allows any that 
approach to be destroyed by the defenders before they can be brought into a useful 
range (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.7-8). Indeed, Sallust spends fully half of 
chapter 92 describing the factors which make the fort so unassailable. 
Sadly, Sallust makes no direct mention of the logistical condition of the Roman army. 
It is possible that the description of the Ligurian soldier hunting for snails in chapter 
93 is intended to hint at a shortage of food, but if so, this is not made explicit.331 If 
Marius had placed his forces so as to besiege a fortification, such matters would no 
doubt have been of great importance to him. Roth is undoubtedly correct in 
identifying the decisive factor in a siege as being the ability of the two sides to 
maintain their supplies. 332 Although it appears from Sallust's account that Marius had 
first intended to take the f011ification by means of a direct assault, it seems highly 
unlikely to me that such an apparently astute commander would not have laid 
provisions to besiege a position so likely to prove unassailable. As we shall see, I 
329 Paul, 1984, page 230 
'-"'Paul, 1984, page 229 
''
1 Sallusl, Bellum Jugurthinum, 93.2 
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believe there is evidence here that Sallust may have had his own reasons for wishing 
to portray Marius as being unready or unwilling to take the f011 by siege. 
First, however, I will examine the motivation that Sallust supplies for Marius's attack 
on this fort, removed so far from his previous area of operations. No doubt we are still 
supposed to bear in mind Marius's motivation for attacking Capsa (Sallust, Bellum 
Jugurthinum, 93.2), namely to surpass the deeds of his predecessor Metellus, but we 
are also supplied with a more tangible, financial motive. 
Quem locum Marins, quod ibi regi thesauri errant, summa vi capere intendit. 
(Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.6) 
This place Marins aimed to take by a supreme effort, because it held the king's 
treasures. 
This does not necessarily indicate greed on the part of Marius and his soldiers. For 
although such spoils were no doubt always welcome to a Roman army, their 
confiscation would lead to an important strategic advance. Jugurtha's strength had 
lain is his ability to rebuild armies from nothing after defeat and a crucial tool in 
doing so was the use of mercenaries. Deprived of his funds, Jugurtha would be unable 
to hire mercenaries or even to provide sufficient pay for a citizen army. Indeed, we 
later learn that the loss of his treasury came as a great blow to Jugurtha (Sallust, 
Bellum Jugurthinum, 97.1 ). 
Chapter 92 ends on a pessimistic and perhaps even cynical note (Sallust, Bellum 
Jugurthinum, 92.9). Surprisingly, Paul has nothing to say on these lines, although I 
believe that they can tell us much about Sallust's attitudes towards Marius and 
towards the Roman soldiery in general. I believe that Sallust intends here to criticise 
Marius's skills as a general, for throwing his forces in a futile attack at an 
impregnable position with no particular thought for strategy, in such a way as much 
equipment (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.8) and, more importantly, the lives of the 
best of his troops were cast away. Sallust also seems to be arguing here that the best 
soldiers are those who die first in battle and that the survivors are deficient, through 
lack of courage. Sallust is frequently scathing in his criticism of the Roman soldiery 
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in the Bellum Jugurthinum; in chapter 38 he describes the officers of the Roman army 
being bribed to abandon their posts (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 38.3), leading to the 
defeat of the army, which, due to its cowardice is put to night (Sallust, Bellum 
Jugurthinwn, 38.7-9) and forced into a shameful surrender. Furthermore, when 
Metellus takes command of the Roman army in North Africa, Sallust devotes the 
whole of chapter 44 to a description of the shameful state of the troops. Even after the 
destruction of Capsa, when the Roman army was in far better shape under the 
leadership of Marius, Sallust attributes the improvement to purely selfish motives 
(Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 92.2). Therefore, I would conclude that 92.9 is further 
evidence of a general disdain felt by Sallust for the Roman army. As Kraus and 
Woodman notem, Marius's army meets with such success against Jugurtha because 
they, like Jugm1ha, are motivated by lubidio, a trait which Marius's reforms to the 
military have given free reign to (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 84.3-4). 
At the start of chapter 93, we are told that Marius continued in his efforts to take the 
fort, in vain. With a complete lack of regard for precision, Sallust merely tells us that 
Marius expended "Multis diebus et laboribus consumptis" (Sallust, Bellum 
Jugurthinum, 93.1 ). There is no precise identification of the length of time involved, 
nor of the type of labour. Indeed, we have no way of knowing whether this should 
mean that Marius simply continued with his efforts to take the fort by direct assault 
over the course of the next few days, or whether he spent weeks, or even months, in a 
protracted siege. As was the case with the journey to the Muluccha, Sallust's 
imprecision here dramatically reduces the value of his account to the military 
historian. 
In the same sentence, we see Marius debating with himself as to whether he should 
abandon his attack on the fort, or else hold out, in the hope that "fortunam" (Sallust, 
Bellum Jugurthinum, 93.1) would come to his aid. By anybody's standards, this is a 
highly negative depiction of a military commander. The contrast of his newfound 
defeatism with his earlier enthusiasm for the endeavour, after spending so many lives, 
hints at a lack of nerve and determination, far from ideal traits in a responsible 
3
'
3 Krauss and Woodman. 1997. page 24 
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commander. The brevity with which Sallust treats the time during which this change 
of heat1 came about ensures that we are not provided with any excuses for Marius. 
Marius's dependence on fortune to deliver him from his difficulties is even more 
significant. It hints at an inability on the part of Marius to solve his problems for 
himsclf334 and even of irresponsibility; as Marius entrusts the lives of his men to a 
concept as abstract and notoriously fickle as fortune. However, there is more to the 
relationship between Marius and ''fortuna" than is immediately apparent from this 
sentence. Indeed, Marius's superstition and uncanny good luck are recurrent themes 
of his characterisation in Sallust' s depiction of him. In his (somewhat delayed) 
introductory character sketch in chapter 63, Marius is shown as being driven to 
ambition for the consulship by the words of a soothsayer, who advises him to put his 
trust in the gods and in fortune as often as possible (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 
63.1 ). Later, as we have seen, at the start of chapter 92, he is credited with being 
blessed with fortune by friends and enemies alike (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 
92.2). Syme goes to some lengths to point out, with convincing evidence, that Sallust 
placed little store in the gods, portents and reliance on chancem; although Syme docs 
not use the phrase himself, the picture that emerges is of Sallust as a firm believer in 
the maxim that "the gods help those who help themselves". 
Paul also examines the role of fortune in Sallust's depiction of Marius.336 He offers 
two theories as to Sallust' s intentions. The first is that Sallust is using a source hostile 
to Marius and that he was therefore reliant on information that Marius's victories 
were achieved only through luck. The second is that Sallust had pro-Marian sources, 
which showed Marius cultivating for himself a reputation as a man blessed by the 
favour of fortune; a device bound to inspire confidence and loyalty among the troops. 
To me, it seems the most likely that the first of these theories is the correct one. In 
93.1, Marius is in no way sending out a deliberate image of one who is favoured by 
fortune. Rather than using fortune as a tool, he is instead holding on in the hope that 
fortune will make use of him. I have nothing to add to Paul's discussion of Sallust's 
sources on Marius, but it does seem to me that we do not necessarily need to look to 
-''~ Indeed. it is worth noting here that it is not Marius himself who eventually brings an end to the 
matter of J ugurtha. but rather Sulla. his deputy. 
m Syme. 1964. pages 246-248 
-'-'
6 Paul. 1984. pages 166-167 
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earlier sources to see Sallust's motivations for his depiction. Sallust's own 
experiences as a "new man" in Roman politics337 and the later downfall of his 
political career338 seem to me to provide ample material for such a depiction of a 
young man of excellent character being ruined by ambition and by dependence upon 
the fortune that speeds him on in the early days of his career. Indeed, I am forced to 
wonder if Sallust's Marius is not supposed to be a representation of a younger version 
of the author himself, complete with blemishes and imperfections. 
There can be no doubt that the depiction of Marius in 93.1 is by no means that of the 
ideal commander and that a good deal of criticism is implied. Indeed, this continues 
into 93.2: 
Quae cum multos dies noctisque aestuans agitaret (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 
93.2) 
For many days and nights he had been prey to indecision 
Although Sallust' s recording of the passage of time here is as imprecise as ever, we 
are at least given a rough idea of how long Marius was assailed by his doubts for. To 
be consumed by indecision for the space of several days is perhaps one of the most 
heinous sins that a commander in a battle situation can commit. 
However, 93.2 also sees the start of the reversal of Marius's fortunes in this 
endeavour, as his accustomed good luck comes into play. A Ligurian, assigned to 
fetch water for the camp339 and distracted by the rather strange errand of hunting for 
snails, makes his way almost to the top of the mountain without realising what he is 
doing. Once there, he is seized by a desire to complete the ascent (Sallusl, Bellum 
Jugurthinum, 93.3) and with the help of a conveniently located tree he ascends 
unnoticed to the plateau above the fortress (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 93.4). He 
then returns, making a careful note of the route he took, and informs Marius of his 
discovery of the route to the Lop (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 93.5-6). 
m Syme. 1964. pages 22-23 
l1X 
· Syme. 1964, pages 38-39 
339 This is the only reference to Roman logistical matters in this episode. 
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Paul finds it significant that Sallust should lavish such attention upon this incident and 
upon the strong element of chance that prevails.340 Although he acknowledges the 
possibility that Sallust used a hostile depiction of the incident taken from Sulla's 
Commentarii, he regards it as more likely that this section was, for the most part, 
constructed entirely by Sallust, working from an extremely bare framework of events. 
This would seem to strengthen my argument that Sallust's depiction of Marius is not 
taken wholesale from his earlier sources, but is rather, for the most part, a product of 
his own invention. The detail that the Ligurian was hunting for snails when he made 
his discovery is highly peculiar and Paul suggests that modern scholarship has found 
it rather difficult to swallow.341 However, it seems to me that it is impossible to pass 
definite judgement on the authenticity of this section of the account. 
Upon hearing the Ligurian's story, Marius sends some of his staff to investigate. He 
receives mixed reports as to the feasibility of an ascent via this route, but on the 
whole, he is encouraged (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 93. 7). He then assembles a 
force to accompany the Ligurian back up to the plateau above the fortress. As both 
Paul342 and Rolfe343 note, the Latin here is uncertain and although we can be sure that 
Marius sent five of his trumpeters and four centurions, it is not clear which other 
forces, if any, were sent to accompany them. Sallust's trademark imprecision yet 
again damages his nan·ative here; as Paul rightly notes, a force of just ten men would 
be grossly insufficient for such an attack, and yet Sallust does not specify any 
numbers beyond this. 
However, at the start of chapter 94, Sallust reverses his usual trend by providing us 
with a great deal of detailed infmmation on the preparations that the men made for the 
climb. The soldiers remove their helmets and boots to facilitate the climb and place 
their swords and shields upon their backs. They discard the standard Roman shield of 
the day, which, with its metal reinforcement, would be near-impossible to can·y 
during a difficult climb and prone to making loud noises when banged on the rocks in 
favour of Numidian hide-shields (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 94.1 ). 
'
4
" Paul. 1984. page 231 
'
41 Paul, 1984, page 231 
'
42 Paul. 1984, page 232 
-'"*' Rolfe, 1960. page 339 
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Sallust reveals here an excellent degree of familiarity with military equipment as well 
as with the practicalities of climbing expeditions. Indeed, this comes as something of 
a surprise given the lack of attention that he paid to the journey to the Muluccha. It 
seems to me to be most likely that either Sallust was writing from some personal 
experience here, or he was writing after consultation with a contemporary authority 
on such matters or else that Sallust's source on this matter, which Paul had speculated 
was strictly rudimentarl44, became far more detailed at this juncture. 
The Ligurian then leads the Romans up the cliff, using ropes to help them, showing 
the safest paths and offering encouragement (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 94.2). I 
believe it is significant that Sallust lavishes so much praise here upon a Ligurian 
auxiliary. The general picture that emerges from this section is of the brave and hardy 
Ligurian leading the timorous and unfit (even though they had been picked for their 
agility) Romans up a cliff that presented no obstacle for the Ligurian, but was the 
cause of much trepidation for the Romans. This seems to continue the general trend of 
Sallust being less than complimentary with regards to Roman forces. 
Eventually, they reach the plateau and find that the enemy are distracted by the 
Roman attack upon their front gate (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 94.3). The focus 
now shifts to Marius, who has been expending his eff01t on keeping the enemy 
occupied with the main body of his force. When he hears (by means unspecified) that 
the Ligurian and those with him are in position, he urges his men onwards and he 
himself forms part of the tortoise-shell formation, which he drives up to the base of 
the walls of the f011, while his artillery and archers lay down fire from a distance. 
Sallust's account here does contain the correct military terminology and gives the 
initial appearance of being a detailed account. However, while we hear of a 
testitudine being drawn up, there is no indication of the number of forces involved. 
Indeed, since we have no precise idea of how wide the approach to the fort was, we 
cannot even hazard an estimated guess. Marius's personal bravery here is no doubt 
intended to impress us and it serves as an important reminder at this juncture of the 
344 Paul. 1984. page 231 
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fact that the portrayal of Marius in the Jugurthine War is by no means entirely, or 
even mostly, negative. 
The Numidians, by now accustomed to driving off Roman attacks, come outside of 
the walls of their fortress to do battle and throw taunts down on Marius and the 
Romans, threatening them with slavery to Jugurtha (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 
94.4). The purpose of this sections seems to be simply to allow the reader, who 
suspects by now that the Numidians are about to be destroyed, a thrill of pleasure at 
seeing Numidian hubris so close to their downfall. 
The focus then shifts back to the Roman flanking force, which sounds its trumpets to 
announce its entry into the battle. The women and children are the first to flee, but the 
panic spreads through the entire Numidian force (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 94.5). 
The presence of women and children in the fortification suggests to me that this is a 
larger and more pemmnent emplacement, perhaps closer in nature to a town, than 
Sallust's account would elsewhere imply. Yet again, a lack of detail provided by 
Sallust makes it impossible to say for certain. The Romans are emboldened by this 
and charge with renewed vigour, first wounding the enemy, then reaching the wall 
and killing them (Sallust, Bellum Jugurthinum, 94.5). 
As Paul notes, the general pattern of this battle, where a force in a highly defensible 
position is taken via a flanking attack from a route not defended because it was 
considered impassable, is a common one in ancient historical texts. 345 Polybius 
comments on this recurring pattern during his account of the siege of Sardis 
(Polybius, 4.15.2-3). There is no doubt that from a genuine military perspective, there 
is often wisdom in looking for points that the enemy regards as too naturally strong to 
be worthy of defending with manpower. However, a number of ideologically-charged 
battle descriptions following this pattern established a trend towards using such 
accounts where an author wished to make a specific point about the participants. As 
we have seen, l believe that the Herodotean description of the battle of Thermopylae 
(Herodotus, 7.226) and the explicit parallels drawn with this by Thucydides in his 
account of the capture of the Spm1ans on Sphacteria (Thucydides, 4.36) played an 
3~ 5 Paul. 1984. page 231 
115 
----------- - ----
important role in shaping Livy's description of the last stand of the Fabii at the 
Cremera. We must therefore face the question of whether Sal lust intended to set this 
battle up to fulfil any of the ideological purposes which such accounts serve 
elsewhere. 
Direct parallels with Herodotus are perhaps the easiest to discard. The Numidians are 
not intended to be symbols of bravery or vi11ue. They do not hold out steadfast until 
the end and they arc not even heroically outnumbered (at least, not in Sal lust's 
account, which gives no idea whatsoever of the exact numbers involved). The 
Romans, while by no means perfect, are not a dissolute, evil force and the path to the 
rear is not discovered by a Numidian traitor, whose actions would be worth only of 
condemnation, but rather by a Ligurian auxiliary, whose actions are worthy of praise. 
However, there arc far closer parallels to be found with the Thucydidean passage. In 
Thucydides, the passage to the rear of the Spartan fortification is revealed to the 
Athenians by the local Helot population, who might reasonably be expected to side 
with the Athenians. The panic caused among the Spartan ranks by the appearance of 
forces on the hill behind them mirrors the panic of the Numidians almost exactly. It 
seems to me that the degree of parallel between the tv/o incidents is close enough that 
it is unlikely to be coincidence. Scanlon draws a parallel between Marius's 
assumption of the command of the war against Jugurtha with Clean's semi-accidental 
usurpation of command of events at Pylos and Sphacteria.346 Indeed, I find it rather 
strange that Scanlon, who elsewhere notes many interesting parallels between 
Thucydides's work and the Bellum Jugurthinum should have failed to mention the 
obvious parallels between those battles, both of which come so soon after parallel 
scenes of change-of-command. 
That Sallust should have invented the episode at the Muluccha entirely seems to me to 
be highly improbable. Sallust is not here in the position that Livy was in when he 
dealt with the battle of the Cremera; he is not dealing with events of Rome's 
prehistory, but rather with events of less than a century before his own time. He was 
writing about events that would, for the most part, have been better referenced and 
-'
46 Scanlon, 1980, pages 160-162 
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better remembered. However, if Paul's tempting theory that Sallust constructed his 
account of the Muluccha from records which gave little more than the bare bones of 
the events,347 then it is highly plausible that Sallust would have filled in the gaps with 
material that allowed him to draw close parallels with an author who influenced his 
work so greatly. 
Sallust ends his account of events at the Muluccha with a highly negative surmise of 
the role that Marius had played. 
Sic forte correcta Mari temeritas gloriam ex culpa invenit. (Sallust, Bellum 
Jugurthinum, 94.6) 
Thus Marius's rashness was made good by fortune and he gained glory through 
an error in judgement. 
Paul rejects the arguments that Marius acted overly rashly, arguing on the basis of the 
strategic objectives that the capture of the fort met. ~48 Judged purely on the basis of 
the facts, as they survive today, this is a reasonable conclusion. However, Sallust does 
not seem to have been purely interested in laying down the facts of the matters he 
describes; indeed, he is often deficient in doing so. Sallust's Marius, as distinct from 
the historical Marius, is indeed guilty of rashness and irresponsibility, leading to 
problems from which he was only saved through fortune. Sallusl' s judgement is not 
fair in a purely historical sense, but from the point of the view of the tale he has been 
telling, which, if the introduction is to be believed, is as much of a moral lesson and a 
character study as it is a record of events, the judgement is sound. 
Ultimately, Sallust's account of the events ncar the river Muluccha is deficient in 
many respects as a work of military history. A consistent lack of detail undermines 
the account, as docs the occasional failure to properly appreciate strategic and 
logistical factors. However, if we remove the account from the expectations of 
modern historiography, then we find that it presents us with an interesting and vital 
347 Paul. 1984. pages 4-5 and Paul. 1984. page 231 
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section from the development of a story that is intended to have as much moral value 
as it does historical. 
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Chapter 4.5- Caesar's Campaign against Ariovistus 
My final case study will concern Caesar's account of his actions against the Germanic 
king Ariovistus. This episode is one of the two main focuses of the first book of 
Caesar's De Bello Gallico. The total span of the episode involving Ariovistus runs 
from chapter 30 of this book, through to the end of the book at chapter 54. Out of this 
span, the battle against Ariovistus itself occupies chapters 51 to 53. However, as with 
the other case studies, it shall be necessary to devote some time to the circumstances 
surrounding the battle. 
The first half of the first book of the De Bello Gal fico deals with Caesar's successful 
efforts to prevent an aggressive migration of the Helvetii through Roman territory. 
Caesar's efforts in this area had won him much admiration from other Gallic 
chieftains, who perceived that his efforts had been as much to their benefit as they 
were to Rome's (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.30). With Caesar's permission, a 
convention between the Gallic states was held, after which an issue was brought to 
Caesar's attention by a representative from the tribe of the Aedui. The long-running 
rivalry between the dominant tribes of the Aedui and the Arverni had led to the 
Arverni and their allies, the Sequani, calling upon the help of Germanic mercenaries. 
These mercenaries found conditions in Gaul to their liking, and consequently 
subjugated all of the parties involved in the Gallic dispute, bringing more of their 
settlers across the Rhine and building a dominion for themselves in Gaul. Ariovistus, 
the leader of the Germans, had repeatedly defeated the Gauls in battle and had 
extracted hostages from their leading families (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.31-32). 
Caesar then lays out for the reader the factors which compelled him to take action in 
this matter. Four distinct motivations are set out; first, the Aedui were acknowledged 
as friends and allies of Rome, and hence their pitiable state was damaging upon 
Rome's reputation. Second, the influx of a large number of Germanic settlers into 
Gaul would be damaging to Roman interests in the areas. Third, the aggression 
demonstrated by the Germans indicated that a future offensive into Italy was likely. 
Finally, Ariovistus himself was guilty of a level of arrogance that Caesar found 
offensive (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.33). Although there has not been a tremendous 
amount of recent English-language scholarship upon Caesar's actions against 
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Ariovistus, these justifications have been deemed worthy of a certain level of 
comment. Adcock describes the motivations as "suited to Roman interests, pride and 
fears"349 and Ebel also notes that Caesar would have needed to justify his campaign to 
those at Rome. 350 
Caesar's initial justifications do indeed give the impression that he is anxious to 
"cover all of his bases". The Aedui's friendship with Rome is a cause for shame at 
their subsequent treatment. The threat to Roman influence in Gaul is an appeal to 
pragmatism and self-interest. The perhaps rather unlikely spectre of a Germanic 
menace to Rome harks back to Roman fears of the Gauls that dated to the Gallic 
sacking of the city in 390BC. Finally, the reference to Ariovistus's arrogance serves 
as a spur to Roman pride, which would not allow any barbarian to defy them. Indeed, 
as Adcock rightly notes, Caesar's comment that he finds Ariovistus's arrogance to be 
unbearable is a good indication that Caesar already believes that the problem demands 
a military solution. 
Nevertheless, Caesar goes on to show that he attempted to find a diplomatic solution 
and that Ariovistus spurned his offer of a conference (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.34). 
Caesar's next message to Ariovistus is described in more detail and contains Caesar's 
demands that Ariovistus should halt the flow of his settlers over the Rhine and should 
restore the hostages he had taken to their people. This message also deals with one of 
the trickier issues that Caesar had to face in his dealings with Ariovistus; namely that 
Ariovistus himself, as well as the Aedui, had been declared a friend of the Roman 
people in Caesar's own consulship. Ariovistus's favoured position is mentioned twice 
in the message; first in the opening lines: 
Quoniam tanto suo populique Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in consulatu suo 
rex atque amicus a senatu appelatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam 
referret, (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.35) 
'
49 Adcock, 1956. page 30 
'-'" Ebel. 1976. page 78 
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Since after having been treated with so much kindness by himself and the 
Roman people, as he had in his consulship been styled king and friend in the 
Senate, he make recompense to himself and the Roman people, 
Then again towards the end of the passage: 
Si id ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam 
cum eo futuram, (Caesar, De Bello Ga/lico, 1.35) 
[Caesar says] that "he himself and the Roman people will entertain a special 
feeling of favour and friendship towards him," 
However, the very end of the passage touches upon the similar friendship enjoyed by 
the Aedui and Caesar's duty to protect them. The essential thrust of Caesar's message 
is that Rome is not unwilling to take sides in conflicts between those that she has 
declared to be her friends. As Adcock notes, the bond of amicitia with Rome was not 
a one-sided relationship and placed behavioural expectations upon the amicus.-~51 
There can be no doubt that Caesar wishes to impress upon his audience that 
Ariovistus has been the first to violate the "contract" that existed between himself and 
Rome and therefore that Caesar himself did not commit any breach of trust. 
Ariovistus 's reply does not directly address the issues of Caesar's message, but rather 
simply asserts Ariovistus's right to dictate to the people he has conquered as he 
pleases. An explicit parallel is drawn between his own treatment of those he has 
conquered and the treatment that Rome inflicts upon the peoples she conquers. The 
message ends with the rejection of Rome's demands, a scornful dismissal of the 
concept of friendship with Rome and a challenge to engage with him in open battle, 
where the German troops will apparently prove their superiority (Caesar, De Bello 
Gallico, 1.36). The arrogance of Ariovistus is made clear to the reader by this 
message, as is his uncultured attitude towards the people he has made subject to him, 
which is no doubt intended to form a sharp contrast with the sympathy that Caesar 
himself displays towards the Gallic peoples. 
151 Adcock, 1956. page 32 
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Caesar now learns of the passage of German reinforcements across the Rhine and, 
fearing the consequences of this, he attends to his corn supply and then takes his 
troops to meet Ariovistus (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.37). Caesar does not here enter 
into details of his logistical operations, although his passing mention of them serves to 
remind us that he was well acquainted with the arts of war and the importance of 
supply lines. The lack of detail seems to be indicative of an awareness on Caesar's 
part that he was writing for an audience largely unaccustomed to and uninterested in 
the details of maintaining an army in the field and that although such matters were of 
importance to him, he recognised that detailed explanation of them was not necessary. 
Caesar marches for three days and then learns that Ariovistus is intending to take the 
town of Vesontio. Caesar describes the town as being well stocked with the supplies 
necessary for the conduct of way and possessed of a strong natural position. 
Therefore, Caesar pushes on with his troops, marching by day and night, so that he 
managed to take the town first and fortify it (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.38). Again, 
logistical matters are mentioned without any real level of detail. With this in mind, it 
may seem rather strange that Caesar should have given such a comparatively thorough 
description of the landscape of Vesontio:152 Pelling argues that Caesar usually 
simplified his topographical desctiptions so as not to try his reader's patience,353 but it 
seems to me that the description of Vesontio goes beyond the requirements of the 
narrative, pm1icularly given that no battle occurs there. I believe that Caesar is using 
this more detailed description to add colour to his naiTative and to fulfil the duty of 
the historian to describe places of interest that would be unfamiliar to his audience. 
Caesar's time at Vesontio gives rise to one of the more striking incidents from the 
first book of the De Bello Galli co. For while he is gathering provisions for his troops 
here, his troops come into contact with Gauls and traders who preach the virtues of 
the German soldiers to such an extent that Caesar's troops are stricken with panic. 
This begins among the tribunes and the politically motivated officers, who have 
accompanied Caesar from Rome so as to court his friendship for political alliances. 
Caesar contemptuously describes the manner in which many of these officers excuse 
152 For the modem location of Yesontio, see Pel ling. 1981. La ramus 40. pages 754-755 
151 Pelling. 1981. Laromus 40. pages 741-742 
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themselves from fighting and the manner in which those who remain display their fear 
openly. This results in the fear spreading to the common soldiery, where it takes root 
so firmly that an open mutiny seems possible (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.39). 
Whether Caesar is exaggerating the scale of the panic within the ranks is perhaps 
irrelevant here; his purpose is to attack those who saw warfare purely as a means to 
advance their political goals. While Caesar no doubt sought to use a military record to 
advance his own career, much as Pompey had done with his conquests in the East, he 
draws a line between himself and those who see war as purely a means for political 
progress, rather than as an entirely separate field of endeavour worthy of study and 
demanding of discipline for its own sake.'54 
Caesar deals with this incipient mutiny through a speech that he delivers for his 
centurions and records for us in its entirety. Since Caesar was writing about events of 
his own time and this speech was delivered in public, it seems best to accept that it 
conveys an accurate account of what was said, if not in terms of its exact wording 
(although this is by no means impossible if Caesar had a draft of this speech on hand 
when he composed the De Bello Gallico) then at least the essence of what was said. 
He begins by stating that he believes it to be unlikely that the matter will result in 
conflict, based on Ariovistus's past behaviour. He then reminds the troops of past 
Roman successes, such as that of his uncle Marius against the Cimbri and Teutoni and 
the suppression of the slave-revolt in Italy. He then notes that the Germans have often 
been beaten in warfare in the past by the Helvetii, whom the Romans themselves have 
recently won a significant victory over. The German's recent victory is claimed to be 
the result of a strategem of Ariovistus, rather than the result of any particular valour 
on the pmt of the German troops. Caesar then deals with the arguments that he had 
heard put forwards against advancing; he reassures his men that the corn supply is 
adequate and that the proposed route in not unfeasible. He also says that he has no 
fear that rumours of a mutiny are in any way founded and that even if they are, he 
shall proceed forwards with the Tenth Legion alone, of whose loyalty he has no 
doubt. He promises the Tenth Legion that he shall make them into his personal guard 
(Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.40). 
3
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This speech is significant to our understanding of Caesar's skills as a general in a 
number of ways. If the speech is indeed reproduced faithfully, then it is addressed to a 
very different audience than the rest of the narrative. Indeed, the increased detail in 
which Caesar discusses the corn-supply seems to me to argue strongly that Caesar 
was here addressing an audience who would both understand and be intensely 
interested in such matters. 
Adcock claims that Caesar's handling of this speech demonstrates his "eminent 
understanding of the art of being a soldier's general". 355 There can be no doubt that 
this speech is a masterful effort towards calming the fears of an anny on the edge of 
panic. The reminder of past Roman victories is perhaps predictable, but Caesar's 
belittlement of the enemy, including his explanation of the stratagem used by 
Ariovistus to beat the Gauls, would doubtless be effective upon those experienced in 
the arts of war. Finally, the praise for the loyalty of the Tenth Legion seems to be an 
extremely clever ploy for ensuring the loyalty of the whole of Caesar's army. The 
men of the Tenth Legion themselves will not only gain a boost to their self-esteem, 
but they will also become fearful of losing their reputation through cowardice. 
Moreover, the unfavourable reflection that this casts upon the rest of the legions will 
place a heavy burden of shame upon those who had formerly been unwilling to fight. 
The speech has the desired effect and after the centurions convey Caesar's message to 
the rest of the army, the troops express their regret to Caesar and the Tenth Legion 
expresses its thanks for his confidence. Caesar then marches on from Vesontio, using 
a route that takes him across open ground rather than through the rough terrain that 
the troops had feared. After seven days of marching, Caesar's scouts report that the 
enemy are twenty four miles away (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.41). Given that 
Caesar explicitly states that the route he took involved a detour of fifty miles, it seems 
reasonable to assume that this choice of routes was, at least in part, inspired by the 
fears of his men. I believe that Caesar wishes to demonstrate here his willingness to 
listen to the concerns of his troops, even if it is not possible to endure any direct 
challenge to his authority. 
155 Adcock, 1956. page 31 
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Ariovistus requests a parley and Caesar begins to hope that the matter might be 
resolved without bloodshed. However, Ariovistus then seeks to impose terms on the 
parley, which Caesar believes were intended to force its cancellation. In particular, 
Ariovistus insists that Caesar should not bring an infantry escort, but rather only 
cavalry. This is probably in response to the often-noted infe1iority of Roman cavalry. 
Caesar is unwilling to entrust his safety to his Gallic cavalry, and so instead mounts 
the Tenth Legion on their horses, fulfilling his promise to make them his personal 
guard (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.42). Caesar arrives at the parley and Arriovistus 
demands that each side should go forwards on horseback accompanied by just ten 
men. It is interesting to note that all of the demands with regard to the setting for the 
parley are dictated by Ariovistus and we do not hear of any response to them by 
Caesar, other than his compliance. Whether or not this is an accurate depiction is 
impossible to judge; it does not seem particularly likely to me that Caesar would have 
been totally silent on the subject of security arrangements and it is probable that he 
wished to portray Ariovistus as difficult and uncompromising. 
Caesar's opening speech contains roughly the same content as his earlier message to 
Ariovistus; both Ariovistus and the Aedui enjoy the friendship of Rome, but Caesar 
cannot stand by while the Aedui are deprived of what Rome acknowledges as theirs. 
Consequently, Ariovistus must cease his aggression and not bring any more German 
settlers into Gaul (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.43). Ariovistus's reply is a more 
complex matter, which contains numerous points of interest. Ariovistus repeats his 
earlier assertion that his conquests in Gaul had been primarily a defensive measure, an 
assertion that runs contrary in most respects to that earlier delivered to Caesar by the 
Aedui and Sequani. Because he acted only out of self-defence, he can treat his victims 
however he pleases. The portrayal of Ariovistus as arrogant and self-centred continues 
with his explanation of his reasons for seeking friendship with the Roman people; he 
is prepared to accept this for so long as it is of benefit to him, but is not prepared to 
put up with the restrictions that it imposes on his behaviour. The Romans have no 
right to interfere in his own area of Gaul, just as he would not seek to interfere in the 
Roman province established there. Moreover, he has cause to doubt the friendship 
between the Romans and the Aedui, since he has not seen any evidence of mutual 
military support between them in the past. Therefore, he must regard this supposed 
friendship as a pretext for Roman expansion (Caesar, De Bello Gollico, 1.44). 
125 
This presents numerous difficulties for a Roman audience. The first two points are 
easily dispatched; Caesar's behaviour towards conquered peoples can easily be 
contrasted with that of Ariovistus and Ariovistus's ideas regarding the concept of 
friendship with the Roman people are deeply flawed. Rome is, to some extent, also 
guilty of discarding friendship with Ariovistus as soon as it becomes inconvenient, 
but, thanks to Caesar, it is demonstrable that they made every effort towards its 
continuation. However, the argument that Rome uses alliances as a pretext for 
expansion is perhaps more difficult to discard. Indeed, it is likely that Rome had often 
heard claims that she should not meddle in the internal affairs of other empires from 
her neighbours in the past. Therefore, Caesar's reply to this is dominated by the need 
to prove that Rome's rights of influence extend to the whole of Gaul, rather than just 
those pm1s of it under direct Roman control (Caesar, De Bello Ca/lico, 1.45). 
Ebel discusses Caesar's analysis of earlier Roman conquests in Gaul in some detail.-~56 
The Arverni, Ariovistus's former allies, had been defeated along with the Ruteni by 
Quintus Fabius Maximus in 121B.C., but had been pardoned by Rome and not made 
into a Roman province. However, as Ebel notes, the Romans regarded such pardons 
as containing the justification for any amount of future meddling in the affairs of the 
pardoned people.357 As such, Rome has both a legal obligation to help the Aedui and a 
moral right to assert her influence over the whole of Gaul. 
At this point the parley breaks up, as Caesar is informed that the German horsemen 
have been pelting his own cavalry with missiles. Although he claims that his forces 
could have easily overcome the enemy, he withdraws so that he can not be said to 
have engaged in battle under oath of parley (Caesar, De Bello Callico, 1.46). While 
we may obviously be inclined to take Caesar's boast here with a pinch of salt, 
especially given that he was not accompanied by true cavalry, he manages to paint his 
actions in what must undoubtedly have been a difficult situation in the best possible 
light for his audience at Rome. 
356 Ebel. 1976. pages 78-80 
157 Ebcl. 1967, page 80 
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After the failure of this parley, Ariovistus requests that Caesar attends a second 
meeting to conclude the business. But Caesar, seeing no need for any more words and 
suspecting a trap, sent two of his men in his place, both of whom had reason to expect 
better treatment at the hands of Ariovistus than any of Caesar's other deputies. Caesar 
is enthusiastic in the praises of Gaius Valerius Procillus, who was a Gaul and hence 
fluent in the Gallic tongue, and he describes Marcus Mettius as a former friend of 
Ariovistus. However, Caesar had been right to suspect a trap and the two are accused 
of spying and arrested (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.47). 
On the same day, Ariovistus advances his camp and pitches it six miles from 
Caesar's. Pelling must surely be correct when he insists that Caesar must have moved 
his own camp forwards at some point prior to this, reducing the distance between 
them somewhat from the twenty four miles that had heen described at the end of 
chapter 41. 358 The next day, he moved two miles behind Caesar's camp, so as to 
disrupt his supply of corn from the Sequani and the Aedui (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 
1.48). As the battle approaches, Caesar is not able to avoid going into more detail 
about his logistical operations, since they have a direct impact on the impending battle 
itself. 
Caesar is also compelled to discuss the German tactics. The Germans combine six 
thousand cavalry with six thousand infantry, a ratio vastly at odds with that of the 
Roman forces. In battle, the role of the German infantry is to move with and support 
the cavalry, providing cover for their retreat and protecting any cavalry who are 
dismounted. The infantry were intended to move quickly around the battlefield and 
were selected for their speed. Although Caesar does not say so, it seems reasonable to 
assume that these fast troops were only lightly armed. By this time, the standard 
Roman tactical formation is the cohort, which, due to its size and rigidity, would 
presumably not be well suited to fast moving skirmishes against these combined 
groups of cavalry and light infantry. 
After failing to provoke an engagement for five days, and presumably with dwindling 
corn-supplies, Caesar takes his troops forwards in a three-line formation, with the 
ViX · 
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intent of building a second camp six hundred paces from the enemy camp. Ariovistus 
sends forwards sixteen thousand light-armed troops to disrupt this, but the first two 
Roman lines hold off the Germans long enough for the third line to establish a small 
camp. Caesar then leaves two legions in the small camp and withdraws his remaining 
four to his original, larger camp (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.49). From this point 
onwards, Caesar's account of the battle becomes increasingly detailed and technical. 
There is little political commentary and far more detail is lavished upon the detailed 
movement of troops. 
The next day, Caesar sends his troops forward again, in the hope of provoking an 
engagement, but is initially unsuccessful. However, later in the day, Ariovistus 
launches an attack upon the smaller Roman camp, which continues until sunset. 
Caesar learns from the prisoners that Ariovistus is unwilling to engage in a more 
serious battle because the German women's traditional divination has revealed that 
the Germans will not be able to win a bailie if they engage before the new moon 
(Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.50). 
Surprisingly little detail is lavished upon the skirmish at the smaller camp. I can see 
two possibilities for this. First, "partem suarum copiarum'' suggests that Ariovistus 
had not committed a particularly significant force to this battle and that consequently, 
it was of little note. The second possibility is that Caesar's troops were not 
particularly successful in this engagement and that he had no desire to spoil the 
narrative of a generally successful campaign by inserting a description of a setback. 
Given that it would have been inconsistent for Ariovistus to have launched a major 
operation, where success would have produced any real result, while labouring under 
unfavourable omens, I tend to prefer the former of these explanations and accept that 
the battle was simply not significant enough to be worthy of detailed record. 
The main engagement of the campaign is prepared in chapter 51. Caesar, eager now 
for bailie and perhaps excited by the prospect of forcing the Germans to engage under 
the psychological handicap of unfavourable omens (I can find no indication that 
Caesar himself paid any attention to Germanic divination) ranged the troops of the 
allies in front of the smaller camp, less than six hundred paces from the enemy camp. 
He then advances his own troops right up to the enemy camp, so as to make baltic 
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unavoidable. Caesar notes that the enemy outnumbered his own legions. The Germans 
are now compelled to bring forward their own forces and they array these in a line, 
drawn up according to their tribes. They place wagons containing their womenfolk 
among their lines, so as to remove any hope of retreat (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 
1.51 ). 
Sadly, Caesar omits to provide us with a count of the forces involved in this battle. He 
himself had six legions at his disposal. Nominally, each Roman legion from this 
period should have consisted of five thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, but, 
many have noted, Caesar's legions in Gaul were often under full strength. As such, it 
is possible that the total size of Caesar's force was not significantly greater than 
twenty two thousand men. The reference to allies in chapter 51 implies that he had 
more forces besides these at his disposal, but no number is given for these. As for 
Ariovistus, we may assume that his troops outnumbered the Roman legionary forces, 
at the very least. He had at least sixteen thousand light infantry and an additional six 
thousand cavalry and probably considerably more besides. At the very least, he most 
likely had as many infantry as Caesar's legionary forces and a significant cavalry 
advantage over them. Caesar's failure to provide a detailed numerical account for the 
forces involved in this battle is a real shortcoming and suggests to me the possibility 
that Caesar's total forces, including both legionaries and allies, was greater in number 
than Ariovistus's; a fact he may have been reluctant to draw attention to. 
Caesar places the quaestor in charge of one of his legions and the legates in charge of 
the other five. Caesar places himself on the right of his own force, noticing that the 
enemies opposed to this seem likely to waver. The battle begins and the charges of the 
two sides are so rapid that there is no time for long-ranged combat with spears, but 
rather the battle proceeds closely to sword-range. Here, the Germans adopt defensive 
tactics, but the courageous Romans throw themselves onto the Geiman formations 
and strike from above. As Caesar had predicted, the Roman right puts the German left 
to flight. However, the German right flank holds out through weight of numbers and 
presses back the Roman left. The situation is relieved by the cavalry commander, 
Publius Crassus, who spots the danger and brings forwards the third line to assist 
those struggling at the front (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, 1.52). 
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This battle description is, in some ways, extremely formulaic. The Roman's initial 
success is attributed to their courage in throwing themselves upon the enemy 
formations, while the Germans manage to hold out on their right flank purely through 
weight of numbers. Obviously, Caesar was not an entirely impartial observer of 
events, although given his perspective on them and his natural desire to praise his own 
troops, this is an easily understandable and forgivable flaw. Caesar is by no means 
afraid of sharing the credit for his victory, and while his own role in the battle is not 
embellished, the role of Publius Crassus is singled out for special praise. 359 I believe 
that Caesar is in no doubt that his victory will bring him no small degree of fame and 
therefore knows that he can safely make use of it to increase the loyalty of his men 
and his subordinate commanders by allowing them to share in it. 
After Publius Crassus's relief of the Roman left, the Germans arc put to flight. Caesar 
himself states that the Germans fled for five miles, until they reached the Rhine, 
which they then crossed. There has been much debate as to the distance given by 
Caesar here, which many scholars have taken as inaccurate. Pelling summarises the 
debate that has surrounded the mattet}oo and eventually concludes that the flight was 
indeed fifty miles rather than five, and that the retreat was an orderly one, since the 
Gennans had time to make preparations for crossing the Rhine. That some degree of 
order was maintained during the retreat does indeed seem undeniable, but even if we 
accept Pelling' s argument for a fifty-mile retreat, I feel it is necessary to ascribe the 
error in the text to manuscript corruption rather than Caesar's own mistake, for surely 
nobody was better placed than he to assess the distances involved. Pelling argues that 
Caesar would not have known exact distances and this I find credible, but for him to 
mistake fifty miles for five seems beyond all comprehension. 361 
Ariovistus himself escapes, but his wives are both slain, as is one of his two 
daughters, while the other is captured. However, the pleasure that Caesar extracts 
from this is nothing to that which he gains from his rescue of Gaius Valerius 
Procilius, the captured envoy. Procilius recounts how his life had been saved by the 
divination of the Germans, which had deemed it inauspicious to execute him (Caesar, 
559 For more discussion of Caesar's willingness. or otherwise, to share praise. see Adcock. 1956. pages 
26-27 
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De Bello Gallico, 1.53). With the Romans victorious, the Gennans waiting to cross 
the Rhine into Gaul return to their homes and Caesar calls a slightly early end to the 
campaigning season (Caesar, De Bello Gallico, I .54). 
Thus ends Caesar's account of his campaign against Ariovistus. For the most part, this 
campaign appears to be an accurate record of what happened; certainly, it would have 
been difficult for Caesar to engage in outright invention concerning such widely-
witnessed events. However, as we have seen, this is not to say that Caesar is without 
an agenda and that he does not occasionally fit the facts into a framework that suits 
his own agenda. Caesar is at pains to demonstrate that his actions were consistent with 
Roman law and morality and with Rome's political interests. This is perhaps 
indicative of the insecurity faced by a general in the field, particularly the insecurities 
faced by a general with as many influential enemies (and uncet1ain allies) in Rome as 
Caesar had accumulated. After the near-mutiny at Vesontio, Caesar portrays his own 
troops in a uniformly positive light. Clearly he wished to allow their reputation to 
enhance his own. The Germans are portrayed as brave fighters, particularly in chapter 
48, but they are also shown up as uncivilised. Their treatment of prisoners and 
conquered peoples is exposed as barbaric and although he does not explicitly criticise 
it, it seems likely that Caesar does not approve of their reliance upon divination, 
which twice works to Caesar's own benefit. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Now that I have examined these instances of battles in our sources, it will be 
necessary for me to review my findings and to examine them in a context that will 
allow them to contribute to our understanding of the authors in question. 
For the most part, my investigations have served to confim1 the currently prevailing 
views on the authors that have been investigated. Certainly, many of the concepts that 
were discussed in chapter 2 have been further confinned. Livy is indeed 
uncomfortable when writing on military matters; his mistake with regard to the 
deployment of the Roman troops at Zama provides ample proof of this, as does his 
tendency to follow Polybius more closely that he would otherwise when describing 
battles themselves. Sallust does indeed suffer from a marked lack of precision in his 
writing; his failure to emphasise the length of the journey to the Muluccha and his 
hasty, simplistic description of the attack upon the fort there can leave no room for 
doubt in this regard. However, the exploration of these case studies has also offered a 
few less obvious insights into the historical techniques of the authors under 
investigation and these insights are summarised below. 
Livy 
Livy has perhaps received more attention than any of the other authors involved in 
this study. The examinations of the Cremera, Canna and Zama have all explored 
different aspects of Livy's writing on warfare. 
From the episode at the Cremera, we have seen that Livy did not regard these early 
battles as being in any way "factual" occurrences. There is no concern with the details 
of events or the specifics of how the battle was fought and such matters are dealt with 
summarily. Livy docs not deem his use of sources, or the existence of various 
accounts of this battle to be at all worthy of note. Rather, for Livy, the purpose of 
narrating such sections is twofold. First, he provides entertainment for his audience, 
and possibly also for himself. This ties in with his aim, as stated in his prologue, of 
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finding refuge from the troubles of the present in the past.362 Secondly, he uses the 
episode, set as it is in the distant past and far removed from the world of Livy's own 
day, to offer comment upon the present. In particular, it is highly likely that Livy's 
narration of this episode is intended as commentary upon the role of the private army 
in the Roman world, since this has developed from being a tool to defend the 
Republic in times of crisis into a force with which individual generals vied with each 
other for power at the expense of the state. 
Livy's wholehearted acceptance of the version of the Cremera story that most 
emphasises the parallels with Thermopylae (as opposed to the other variations on the 
story mentioned by Dionysius) is significant in that it reveals his underlying bias in 
favour of Rome. In this case, with a battle he regards as primarily mythical, he docs 
not feel any compulsion to keep these patriotic urges in check. However, as we shall 
see, his attitude is rather different when it comes to later battles. 
The battles of Cannae and Zama illustrate Livy's handling of victory and defeat. 
Obviously, for an author such as Livy with a pro-Roman agenda, both of these battles 
present very different challenges and Livy's response to them is very different. By 
studying the Polybian accounts of these battles, we can see how Livy adapts his 
account to suit his methods. In the account of the famous Roman defeat at Cannae, 
Livy frequently goes beyond the Polybian account in his condemnation of the 
Carthaginians, his emphasis of the bravery of Aemilius Paulus and his condemnation 
ofTerentius Varro. Numerous episodes occur in Livy's account that are not narrated 
by Polybius: the conversation between Paulus and Fabius Maximus, the Carthaginian 
trick involving the prisoners and the death scene of Paulus most prominent among 
them. Faced with the prospect of a devastating Roman defeat, Livy feels the need to 
adopt the version of events that offers the strongest excuses for the Roman defeat. Of 
course, Livy is compelled by other factors to limit the type and extent of the excuses 
he can offer. For example, as we have seen, Livy down plays the importance of the 
unfavourable omens received before the battle and even presents us with a positive 
omen; the dedication of the statue of victory. For Li vy to assign divine causes to 
Rome's defeat would have been counter-productive for him on a number of levels. 
,r,, Livy. l.pr . .'i 
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First, it would have undermined the Roman achievement in their victories, by 
associating the outcome of battles too closely with the whims of the gods. Perhaps 
more importantly, it would have shown Rome as a city suffering from divine 
disfavour. 
However, when we compare the accounts of Livy and Polyhius concerning the battle 
of Zama, we discover a very different picture. Here, Livy sticks more closely to the 
account offered by Polybius and even, on occasion, discards with some of Polyhius's 
more emotive language. Livy's account dwells less upon the offence caused by the 
Carthaginian attack upon the ambassadors and is less condemnatory of the decision 
not to admit the retreating mercenary forces into the Carthaginian line. Livy is also 
every hit as effusive as Polyhius in his praise of Hannibal's skills as a general and is 
perfectly happy to assign Hannibal's defeat to circumstances beyond his control. So, 
why this sudden reversal of Livy's methods when the Romans are successful? 
Clearly, Livy understands that to be overly enthusiastic in his praise of the Romans 
when they are triumphant, he would not only he in danger of over-exposing his 
prejudices, but he would also be making a clear, decisive contrast between his 
attitudes towards Romans and their enemies and would severely undermine any 
claims he might make towards impartiality. By allowing the Romans to be excused 
their defeats, Livy is also obliged to allow Rome's enemies to retain some vestiges of 
their pride. In addition, Livy can also use this to demonstrate Rome's graciousness 
towards her former foes and increase the stature of Rome by increasing the stature of 
those she has defeated. Livy does indeed use his accounts of warfare and battles to 
advance his pro-Roman agenda, but his handling of these accounts is by no means as 
simplistic as we might expect. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
Although I have only examined one of Dionysius's accounts of a battle, it has 
revealed much about his attitude towards writing on military events. Dionysius's 
history, or at least those sections which survive for us today, is concerned only with 
events that we would most likely term mythological. However, Dionysius did not 
share Livy's agenda of simply retelling these mythological events without any 
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intention to affirm or refute thcm,363 but rather he subjected such early accounts of 
warfare to more detailed investigation, comparing contlicting accounts and offering 
his own opinion upon them. 
Dionysius's account of the Cremcra contains two distinct narratives, one of which is 
significantly longer than any account we have preserved in Livy. The obvious 
parallels to Thermopylae that we find in the account of Livy are gone. Clearly, 
Dionysius is uncomfmtablc with that extent of Roman propaganda. However, it seems 
to me that in relating these stories while stripping them of their propagandistic 
clements, Dionysius is perhaps missing out on the whole purpose behind them. As 
Livy understood so well, the battle stories of early Rome were not supposed to be 
accurate historical accounts, but rather cultural resources for the Romans of later days. 
Sallust 
Sallust's account of the battle at the Muluccha is of crucial importance to our 
understanding of his historical techniques. As has already been stated, Sallust was not 
particularly concerned with the exact details of military engagements, even though he 
was discussing battles that occurred not long before his own time. For Sallust, even 
during his battle sequences, his characters remained his primary focus. The character 
of Marius dominates the episode at the Muluccha. Sallust's focus is firmly upon 
Marius's reaction to the difficulties that face him, rather than the difficulties 
themselves. The Muluccha episode, portraying Marius as a man dependant upon 
chance to b1ing him success and unconcerned for the hardships of his troops, is an 
important episode in the steady undermining of Marius's character that runs through 
the Bellum Jugw1hinum. 
Caesar 
Caesar's account of his dealing with Ariovistus arc extremely revealing with regards 
to his intentions as an author. The length at which Caesar details the events that lead 
up to the battle, his negotiations with Ariovistus and the arguments put forward by 
3
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both sides is striking, dwarfing as it does his account of the battle itself. Caesar was, 
in some ways, faced with the opposite problem from that which Livy had been forced 
to confront. Whereas Livy had been forced to find ways to explain Roman defeats, 
Caesar was compelled to find explanations for his victories, so as to prevent his 
political enemies from using them against him. That Caesar can establish the cause 
behind the battle is more important that the conduct of the battle itself and, indeed, 
Caesar treats the battle almost summarily, with its most important role being to stress 
the superiority of the Roman troops and to give credit to those among his subordinates 
who had deserved it. 
General Conclusions 
Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be reached from this work is that none 
of the authors investigated could genuinely be considered a military historian. In not 
one single case have we seen a battle investigated for its own sake, hut rather, we 
have seen bailie sequences used in line with a variety of ulterior motives. Livy's 
battles fonn the highlights of what are primarily moral episodes, Sallust's are 
primarily tools to be used in the development of his character studies and Caesar's are 
implements of personal propaganda and self-justification. Dionysius perhaps comes 
closer than the others to the modern conception of a military historian in tenns of his 
motives for investigating battles, hut even for him, moral motivations are never too 
far removed and, perhaps more importantly, his choice of subject matter does not lend 
itself to military history in the slightest. 
Of course, this is not to say that halites were not of interest to the historians of the 
First Century B.C. On the contrary, the frequency with which they occur and the 
length at which they are sometimes described makes it amply clear that they were 
considered a vital part of any historical work. However, the interest in them was, for 
the most part, not qua battles, but rather in the shadows that they cast across other 
area._<;. The purpose of the battle accounts is certainly not to offer instruction to the 
reader on how best to organise an army or fight a battle. 
It is perhaps possible to offer some explanations as to the causes behind this. In the 
case Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a severe lack of personal experience with 
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military matters would almost certainly have left them unwilling to make any kind of 
pretence to be offering advice or instruction on military matters. However, it is 
perhaps more significantly true that when we try to find reasons for this lack of a 
specific focus upon warfare, we must also examine our own standpoint. The 
Twentieth Century was marked by two World Wars of cataclysmic proportions, 
which, combined with the increasing immediacy with which modern media can bring 
home the impact of war to the civilian population, have resulted in a changed attitude 
towards battle. Since the end of the Second World War, modern conllict by Western 
has been limited in scale and remote in location. Wars have become isolated events, 
which can be studied in isolation. However, as we have seen, warfare in the ancient 
world was almost a constant state and even if, by the final quarter of the First Century 
B.C. attitudes towards it had changed as a result of the lengthy and divisive civil wars, 
it remained deeply integrated into ancient life. As such, it was possible for historians 
in this period to write about warfare and battle without actually taking on the mantle 
of military historians, for these were simply one of the major aspects of their world. 
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